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THE

WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER

1870

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WAR FOR THE RHINE FRONTIER 1870

ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY

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BY

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THE WAR

FOR

THE RHINE FRONTIER.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE COUNTRY FROM THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE MEUSE TO PARIS.

THE district into which the events of the war now lead us is roughly bounded thus: on the east by the watershed between the Moselle and the Meuse; on the north by the Belgium frontier; on the west by the Oise; and on the south by the middle course of the Seine.

If a man were to journey from the east towards the Meuse, he would remark that the hill-country of Lorraine rises up towards the west. This uprising forms a chain-like edge on the right bank of the Moselle, and similar elevations correspond to it on the left of the river.

From Le Chêne le Populeux, as far as Bar le Duc,

these heights are called the Argonnes, and to the north of Le Chêne le Populeux, where they branch away to the north-west to the Oise, the Ardennes; while sometimes these names are understood to include also the corresponding ranges of heights on the right bank of the Meuse. The elevated land, again, which at some small distance from the Meuse spreads itself out between the Aisne and its tributary on the right, the Aire, is specially called the Wood of Argonne; whilst the heights between the Aire and the Meuse, even past Bar le Duc, as far as the points where they branch off from the plateau of Langres and the Faucilles, are named the Meuse Mountains.

All these lime and chalk hills assume the form of much-indented and wooded plateaux; and although they only rise up to a height of about 1000 to 1200 feet above the level of the sea, they nevertheless, when seen from the monotonous plains of Champagne, which have only an altitude of 400 to 500 feet, make a very considerable impression on the observer.

Lately, agriculture, as well as cattle-farming and industry, has made great progress in these districts. Woods have been cleared away, and where, even at the beginning of this century, only barely practicable paths existed, good carriage-roads now run. Among other places, this is the case also in the defiles of Grandpré, La Croix aux Bois, and Le Chêne le Populeux, which Dumouriez, as late as 1792, called "the Thermopylæ of France."

The Meuse rises near Dommartin in the eastern angle of the plateau of Langres, where the Faucilles branch off to the eastward from it. During its course in France, which country it leaves at Givet, it runs mainly in a direction from south to north in a narrow and tortuous valley, shut in by steep and wooded banks.

The Aisne and the Aire, which run into it, flow both from the Argonnes. The Aisne, which has been formed into a canal for the greater part of its course, and is connected with the Meuse by the Ardennes Canal, runs into the Oise at Compiègne, which river again flows into the Seine.

The Seine, and its tributaries on the right, the Aube and the Marne, all rise in the plateau of Langres, and, following at first the north-westerly slopes, flow in broad valleys between its hills. At Troyes, Brienne, and Vitry le Français, they enter the arid chalk-plains of Champagne, in which their waters have worn deep-cut beds, and of which Chalons on the Marne may be considered the central point. The aspect of these districts is very mournful, there being but few villages and only a stunted vegetation.

The Aube, which empties itself at St Just into the Seine, does not emerge again from this plain; but the Seine and the Marne, issuing from it, soon enter a hill-country, which, well cultivated, attractive, smiling with signs of plenty, and offering most varied landscapes, stretches away over Paris and around the French capital, and aided in some parts by art, pre-

sents a peculiarly charming appearance. As the eastern boundary of this district, we may take a line drawn somewhere from Nogent on the Seine, by Sezanne, Vertus, Mareuil, to the east of Epernay, Sillery to the south-east of Rheims, Bery au Bac on the Aisne, and Laon to La Fère on the Oise. In this part of their course, also, the Seine and the Marne, and the tributaries joining them, flow all in deeply-cut channels.

In this whole district there is no lack of strongholds. For the present we will leave the giant fortress of Paris, which is worthy of a more minute description, and occupy ourselves with the smaller places.

On the Meuse we have in the first place Verdun, Sedan, Mézieres, and Givet.

Verdun, a town of 13,000 inhabitants, is included in the list of fortresses of the first class. It lies on both banks of the Meuse, which here divides itself into five arms, by which the town is surrounded and traversed, like as is Metz by the branches of the Moselle. The citadel, a bastioned pentagon, lies altogether upon the left bank of the Meuse, upon a slight rise in the ground, and is connected by a retrenchment with the fortifications of the town. Verdun has no detached forts; and as the valley, the sides of which are high, closes in rather near to the town, it does not now in any way fulfil the conditions required in a fortress of the first class.

Sedan, with 16,000 inhabitants, famous for its

cloth and machine manufactories, ranks as a fortress of the second class. The town proper, with its fortifications, lies on the right bank of the Meuse; and a few advanced works secure the nearest heights. The suburb Torcy, inhabited by operatives, stands upon the left bank, surrounded by a long line of works. Turenne was born in Sedan.

Mézieres, with about 6000 inhabitants, is a fortress of the second class, and has a citadel.

Givet, with 6500 inhabitants, is called a fortress of the first class. It lies on both banks of the Meuse, and was fortified by Vauban. The citadel, Charlemont, on an isolated hill 720 feet high, on the left bank of the Meuse, was built by Charles V.

Rocroy, with 3000 inhabitants, is considered to belong to the second class. It does not lie on the Meuse, but about 4½ miles from it, upon a table-land which is surrounded on all sides by swamps and the Wood of Ardennes. It is renowned in history as the site of the victorious battle which the French fought against the Spaniards on the 19th of May 1643.

On the Chiers, a tributary on the right of the Meuse, stand Montmédy, Carignan, and Longwy.

Carignan, with old fortifications and 2000 inhabitants, belongs to the fourth class of fortresses.

Montmédy, 2200 inhabitants, and a fortress of the second class, is composed of the lower town (Niederstadt) in the valley of the Chiers, and of the upper town (Oberstadt) upon a height above it, both on the

right bank, and both surrounded with a continued line which is strengthened by bastions.

Longwy, a fortress of the second class, with 3500 inhabitants, is a regular hexagon, on the right bank of the upper Chiers, 23½ miles from Thionville.

On the Aisne we find Soissons, on the Oise La Fère, and between them Laon.

Soissons, the old Roman Noviodunum, with 11,000 inhabitants, has, as a passage across the Aisne, frequently played a part both in ancient and in modern military history. As a fortress it is in the present day absolutely worthless, although it is kept in the third class, and destined to receive a war garrison of 1700 men.

La Fère, with 5000 inhabitants, a fortress of the second class, is of some importance because of its school of artillery and arsenal.

Even if La Fère can be called a fortress—certainly a very insignificant one—the word can scarcely be employed in speaking of the town of Laon, with its 10,300 inhabitants, although traces are still visible of an old enclosing wall, and it is provided with an ancient citadel, which was somewhat repaired by Louis Philippe, and although it is numbered among the places of the third class. The town itself, standing upon a detached height, is certainly admirably situated for defence.

Following now the course of the Marne, we come to Vitry and Chalons.

Vitry le Français has by old traditions always been kept up as a fortress of the third or fourth class. After the ancient town of Vitry en Perthois, at the junction of the Ornain and Vière, was burnt down by Charles V. in the year 1544, the community of Vitry le Brulé, the present Vitry le Français, was founded by Francis I. The town, which has now 8000 inhabitants, and is favourably situated, being at the point where the Rhine-Marne Canal branches from the river, has preserved its old fortifications, which have from time to time been strengthened by the addition of earthworks; still, even with these, it could not offer the slightest resistance to the artillery of the present day.

The town of Chalons on the Marne, with nearly 20,000 inhabitants, a great manufactory of champagne, although it grows none, and rich in everything connected with the champagne trade, is not fortified. When, in the year 1867, the French system of fortresses was subjected to a revision, which, however, was by no means thorough enough, the idea was originated of giving France a strong place in the champagne district for the purpose of checking a German invasion. For this Chalons and Rheims were especially deemed to be suitable; but the Government wavered in its choice between the two, and in the year 1870 there had been nothing more said of its execution. Still Chalons must be here mentioned as a military point, because of its nearness to the great Camp which is called after it.

The *terrain* of this Camp, which is situated about seven miles to the north of the town of Chalons, between the villages of Mourmelon, Gross St Hilaire, Suippe, and La Cheppe, comprises about 12,000 hectares, or about 46,000 Prussian *morgens*, or more than forty-six square miles.*

The ground was bought by the French Government in 1867, at a price of 80 francs the hectare.† When the price of a *morgen* or *juchart*, in the average districts of Germany or Switzerland, is thought of, it is easy to understand what is meant by the epithet, in *La Champagne Pouilleuse.*

It has been calculated by some lovers of arithmetic, that the area of the Camp of Chalons is 300 times as great as that of the Champ de Mars in Paris; and that if it were cut up into strips three yards wide, it would suffice to compose a girdle which would encircle the earth.

The first troops quartered in the Camp of Chalons were the Imperial Guard, under Regnault de St Jean d'Angely, in 1857. In the same year the railway which connects it with the town was commenced, and in little more than two months the line was completed.

From that time two or three series of French troops have been encamped and exercised in the Camp every year, each of them consisting of an Army Corps of about three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with the artillery appertaining thereto.

* About 29,640 English acres. † About 26s. an acre.

The mass of the troops were always under canvas, and the horses stood in the open; but, naturally, a number of permanent or half-permanent establishments sprung up.

Depots for the forces and magazines were built, bakeries and hospitals were established, and the officials of the administration were obliged to remain through the winter. Quarters were erected on an elevated spot for the Emperor and the General Staff; then barracks were built which could receive a division of infantry in the summer, and which in winter gave sufficient accommodation for the brigade left to guard the Camp and all pertaining to it during that season.

The village of Mourmelon consisted, prior to 1837, of twelve miserable stone huts, which, if one takes the trouble to search for them, are still to be found. It has since developed into a species of town. Enterprising men established there shops and drinking-bars of all kinds, to supply the various wants of the soldiers in the summer and winter. They built houses also, in which the officers who were constrained to pass the inclement season there could find some degree of comfort. An imperial theatre was opened for the amusement of the soldiers, and the Emperor caused his own actors to perform there. The great brewer, Frau Dreher, sent there the Vienna beer-booth which had been used in the Exhibition of 1867. In short, an intelligent man, who knew how to look about properly, could finally

find in Mourmelon all he sought as well as in Paris.

In countries where the civil and military element stand in close connection, as is the case in Switzerland and in Germany, men find it difficult to comprehend to the full the value of the Camp of Chalons to the French army. The Swiss and the Germans manœuvre everywhere where they wish. The damage occasioned is afterwards very moderately assessed. The owner of the land does not make exorbitant demands; and the troops carefully avoid doing any useless or avoidable injury. Up to the present time all this has been very different in France; and therefore extensive tracts of land for purely military purposes are of greater importance. Latterly, too, the value of the Camp of Chalons has been increased by the circumstance that in most of the garrisons there were no shooting-grounds long enough for practice at the full range of the Chassepot. All that the French army required for its great exercises could only be properly met with on the Catalaunian fields.

The *terrain*, broadly considered, is a vast plain; but still, slight elevations and waves of the ground are not wanting to give concealment and cover to troops, and there are heights also which afford good positions for artillery. To make a little break in the monotonous uniformity of the chalk-steppe, small square groves of fir-trees have been planted here and

there: these are numbered, and allow some variety and change to be introduced into the manœuvres.

The Camp of Chalons is also not fortified; and, as far as we know, this has never been intended, although we have frequently heard from German sources that such was the case. The only work on the ground was the small fortification thrown up in 1870 near the farm of St Hilaire, for the purpose of exercising in siege operations.

As is well known, the site of the present Camp was the theatre of the decisive battle which, in the year 451, the Neo Romans under Aëtius fought with the Huns under Attila. The latter chief is said to have had his right wing in the village of Suippe, and his left in that of La Cheppe, near which, in the time of the Romans, stood a small temple of Minerva, which was converted by the Christians into a chapel of the holy St Moritz, and was only pulled down in 1820. Close to this runs the old Roman road from Rheims to Bar le Duc, now a good highway. To the south of this road, and to the west of La Cheppe, the ruins of the old circumvallation may still be seen, called Attila's Camp, into which it is said the king of the Huns retreated after his defeat. Aëtius had his right wing at Cuperly, the left towards St Remy; and the hill on which the battle first began was the elevation now called Piemont, which rises up about 90 feet above the plain, to the east of the road from the town of Chalons to Suippe.

These notes may not be uninteresting, as, after the first reverses in 1870, men of a poetical nature asserted that, as in the year 451, so in the year 1870, the invasion of the barbarians of the East would succumb here to the civilisation of the West.

The principal lines of railway which we have to consider in this district are, besides the Paris-Strasburg line—

1. The railway from Paris by Creil, La Fère, Laon, to Rheims;

2. From Paris by Crepy, Soissons, and Fismes, to Rheims;

3. From Rheims to Epernay;

4. From Rheims by Mourmelon, St Hilaire au Temple, to Chalons on the Marne,—the last two, therefore, join the Paris-Strasburg line;

5. From St Hilaire au Temple by St Ménéhould to Verdun;

6. From Rheims by Rethel to Mézieres, with continuations thence north-westwards by Avesnes to Valenciennes, northwards by Givet into Belgium, south-eastwards by Sedan and Montmedy to Thionville;

7. From Soissons by Laon and Vervins into Belgium; and

8. The line from Blesmes to the east of Vitry le Français by St Dizier and Joinville to Chaumont, joining the Strasburg-Paris and the Basle-Paris lines.

CHAPTER XVIII.

CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY OF PARIS UNDER MARSHAL M'MAHON IN THE CAMP OF CHALONS—MARCH OF M'MAHON NORTHWARDS TO RELIEVE BAZAINE.

We have seen how originally only the 6th Corps, Canrobert, was assembled in the Camp of Chalons, where Le Vassor Sorval's division of infantry, and Béville's brigade of cavalry, which had in the first place remained in Paris, joined it on the 1st of August.

Shortly afterwards a number of the Mobile Guard were also concentrated in the Camp of Chalons. The main body of these was formed by the 18 battalions of the department of the Seine. These Mobiles were to be drilled and instructed in the Camp; but the carrying out of this intention was attended with difficulties, as there was a lack of instructors and of arms.

It has also been already related how Canrobert hurried with three of his divisions of infantry to the assistance of Bazaine. There remained then of the 6th Corps in the Camp of Chalons only the greater part of Bisson's division, which had been obliged to

turn back at Frouard; and of the cavalry of the Corps, the two brigades of Tilliard and Savaresse under General Fénélon, for Béville's brigade was still in Paris.

When Palikao's Ministry came into office, it immediately caused a new Corps to be completed, the formation of which had been only in some slight manner commenced before. This was called the 12th; and after this, all fresh embodiments were numbered from this one—and thus there were formed, later on, the 13th, 14th, &c., Corps.

The original field army had, as we have seen, but seven Corps, besides the Guard; so that the 9th, 10th, and 11th Corps were wanting. These never existed; and the only explanation that can be given of the method of enumeration adopted is, that the Ministry of Palikao wished to deceive the Germans, and perhaps the French themselves. In this they did not at first altogether fail; but naturally, as soon as it came to real work, the hollowness of the stratagem showed itself.

The command of the 12th Corps was given first to General Trochu. After he was, on the 17th of August, appointed Governor of Paris, it devolved on General Lebrun, who had left Bazaine's army when Marshal Lebœuf gave up his post as major-general.

The Corps was composed of three divisions of infantry, Granchamp, Vassoigne, and Lacretelle, and of Lichtlin's division of cavalry, which was strengthened by the two brigades, Vendeuvre and Béville,

the latter of which, belonging originally to the 6th Corps, has been frequently mentioned by us.

Granchamp's division consisted of two brigades of together four provisional or marching regiments, each of three of the fourth battalions of the line regiments.

Vassoigne's division was composed of two brigades of together four regiments of marine infantry, which had been originally destined for the expedition to the Baltic and North Sea.

After the battle of Wörth, M'Mahon retired with his own Corps, the troops of the 7th Corps, and the great reserve of cavalry which had joined him, by Saverne (Zabern), first along the railway by Nancy, upon Bar le Duc. On the way he received the order to take command of the Army of Paris, which was to assemble in the Camp of Chalons, and which was to consist of the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, and of the part of the 6th Corps remaining there, which was to be used to complete the other Corps.

M'Mahon now retired at first upon St Dizier and Joinville, towards the railway from Blesmes to Chaumont, to draw in the part of the 7th Corps (Felix Douay) which still stood in the neighbourhood of Belfort, and to cover its movements.

By the 16th of August, the 1st Corps, the command of which had been given to General Ducrot in the place of M'Mahon, and the 7th Corps were in the Camp near the town of Chalons.

The 5th Corps, De Failly, followed M'Mahon along the railway by Nancy, and then retired southwards by Mirecourt to La Marche and Montigny, towards Chaumont. It received on the way divers orders from the headquarters in Metz: first it was directed to march upon Toul; then to move by any route it pleased upon Paris; and afterwards, when in the vicinity of Chaumont, it was called into the Camp of Chalons. Its main body was on the 18th of August at Vitry le Français, about to march into the Camp of Chalons.

On the 15th of August, Tilliard's brigade of cavalry was sent to St Ménéhould. It was there placed under the orders of General Margueritte, who commanded the 1st brigade of Du Barrail's division (Chasseurs d'Afrique) of the great Cavalry Reserve, and was afterwards mortally wounded at Sedan. When the brigade of Tilliard came into the vicinity of Metz, it found the fortress already surrounded by the Germans, and thereupon retreated towards M'Mahon's army again.

Savaresse's brigade, which alone had remained with General Fénélon in the Camp of Chalons, was reinforced on the 17th of August by the 4th regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique, which had just arrived from Algeria. General Fénélon had thus, after this day, three regiments of his division present, and with these he, later on, followed the 12th Corps.

M'Mahon, or his present successor, General Ducrot,

had only about 22,000 men of the 1st Corps in the Camp of Chalons: these had in a great measure lost their knapsacks and a large part of their equipment and baggage. The division of Conseil Dumesnil was in a similar plight.

The whole army which M'Mahon could concentrate in those days in the Camp of Chalons may have numbered about 120,000 men, infantry and cavalry. We have often, in previous works, explained why we adhere to this way of reckoning. It must be remembered that by it we are always below the numbers given by those who count in all, gunners instead of guns, engineers, train, all the branches of the administrative services, and also, where possible, men of the Sedentary National Guards, and other similar formations. With our way of calculating, errors will also unavoidably creep in, but in every case they will be less important and less considerable than when counting by the ration list, or when the numbers of two opposing armies are given on different principles —the one by the list of combatants, the other by the ration list.

The comparatively numerous cavalry of M'Mahon —about 12,000 horses—was good, and in a great measure intact; but, in general, his army was not worth as much as that originally placed in the field, or as that which was now under Bazaine's orders in Metz.

The 1st Corps had been greatly weakened, both materially and morally, by the battle of Wörth, and

the subsequent trying marches. The same was true of Conseil Dumesnil's division. It was therefore resolved that the Mobiles who were then at Chalons should make over their articles of equipment, especially their packs, to these troops, and should be sent back to Paris; and accordingly they left the Camp of Chalons on the 19th of August, and were concentrated for the time being in the Camp of St Maur, near Paris.

The 5th Corps had entirely lost confidence in its chief, General de Failly; he was to be superseded by General Wimpffen, recalled from Africa: but although this general was in Paris by the 25th of August, he only joined the army very late, and, as we shall see, in the decisive hour of misfortune.

The 12th Corps had been somewhat hurriedly gathered together, and could not possibly, however good the individuals of whom it was composed might be, have the same discipline that an older Corps would have.

On the 17th of August the Emperor Napoleon arrived in the Camp of Chalons from Verdun. He greatly wished to repair to Paris; but the Empress Eugenie, as well as the Count of Palikao, counselled him in a manner so earnest that it amounted to rudeness not to take this step. In Paris men spoke no longer of the Emperor Napoleon, or of the Empire; no one troubled himself any more about the man or his concerns; even the adherents of Imperial-

ism mentioned them with shame. Still, spite of this, and although Palikao had, with a loud voice, publicly declared from the tribune that Bazaine alone, and none other, commanded the armies of France, Napoleon III. was Emperor still, and still commanded. If the Mobiles of Paris expressed their opinion of him very candidly, and by their behaviour rendered his sojourn in the Camp unpleasant, yet the marshals of France still bowed down before him.

The great question now was, What was to be undertaken with M'Mahon's army?

The Duke of Magenta himself was agitated by inward doubt. Without distrusting Bazaine, he was still doubtful as to the actual state of affairs about Metz; and it seemed to him unquestionably more reasonable to employ his army to cover Paris, and at the same time to augment his forces by reinforcements from the interior—for the formation of which, the troops he still had would be an excellent nucleus—than to risk an attempt upon Metz, an enterprise which could only have a promise of success if Bazaine was really able to free himself from the iron embrace of the Prussians.

Could he do that? At one time M'Mahon believed he could, and then the matter appeared to him again extremely doubtful. The Count of Palikao meanwhile urged continually by telegrams from Paris that M'Mahon should march upon Metz to relieve Bazaine. A retreat of M'Mahon upon Paris, he said, would

inevitably be the signal for a revolution against the Empire. At the same time he sought, upon the foundation of uncertain reports, and by concealing and veiling what he knew of the truth, to strengthen any hope M'Mahon might have that Bazaine could break out of Metz by way of Briey.

The Emperor Napoleon, as soon as he knew that he could not venture to return to Paris, supported Palikao's arguments, and M'Mahon made up his mind to undertake the enterprise; but still he was only half resolved.

On the 21st of August he set the 1st and 12th Corps in motion northwards—in the first place, upon Rheims. A day's march in rear, followed the 7th and and 5th Corps.

Fénélon's division of cavalry had been sent, on the 20th of August, in the direction of Bar le Duc, to obtain news of the enemy. Returning, it rejoined the army on the 23d at Betheniville, to the eastward of Rheims, which was as far as M'Mahon had by that date arrived.

On the 20th of August the Emperor had held a review in the Camp, at which he had been very coldly received.

On the 21st he repaired to Rheims, and established his headquarters at Courcelles, to the north-west of the town, near which he remained until the 25th, when he moved to Réthel.

On the 24th of August, M'Mahon began to move

towards Réthel; thence, on the 26th, he bent to the eastward towards the Argonnes. His march lay at first by Tourteron to Le Chêne le Populeux.

Here M'Mahon received, on the 27th of August, sure intelligence that the German armies had turned away northwards from the Strasburg-Paris railway to follow him—a movement which we shall describe in the following chapter. Upon hearing this, M'Mahon wished to retire along the valley of the Aisne by Réthel and Soissons upon Paris, and thus to return to his former idea.

Orders to this effect were actually issued, and at the same time M'Mahon informed Palikao of his intention. In reply, he immediately received directions from him to march to the relief of Bazaine, let what might happen, as such was the decision of a Council of Ministers; and it was again reiterated that the retreat of M'Mahon upon Paris would be the signal for the instantaneous outbreak of a revolution there. The Emperor, who came on the morning of the 28th of August to Le Chêne le Populeux, supported the opinion of the Minister. A stormy scene ensued; but M'Mahon yielded finally, and once more, on the 28th, set his army in motion in the direction of Mouzon on the Meuse.

We will now leave for the present M'Mahon's army; but a few remarks about its movements up to this time will be in their place here.

When M'Mahon had once determined to march to

the relief of Bazaine, every hope of success hung upon this, that the Crown-Prince should know nothing of the movement.

With one part of his cavalry M'Mahon could have formed a screen round the Camp of Chalons, while with the mass of his troops he should have marched as rapidly as possible, to render it probable that he, in concert with Bazaine, would have to deal with the First and Second Armies alone, and not with the Third and Fourth also. Under such circumstances the troops might have been called upon for extraordinary exertions in marching. But this did not happen; barely ordinary performances were required of them.

From the direction of the march from Réthel upon Le Chêne le Populeux, it must be concluded that M'Mahon wished in the first place to march by Stenay upon Montmedy. From the Camp of Chalons, by Réthel and Stenay, this distance is 100 kilometres—70 to 75 miles. To assign 20 kilometres to the day's march was certainly not to require too much under the circumstances. Then the head of M'Mahon's army could have arrived on the 25th of August at Montmedy, and the last troops on the 26th. On the 29th, or at the latest on the 30th, he could have united with Bazaine before Metz — that is, if the latter broke through the investing lines—and have fought a battle with Prince Frederic Charles, who would then have been no longer able to oppose him with equal forces.

Instead of such an operation, we see the head of M'Mahon's army only arriving at Mouzon on the 28th of August.

It has already been related, at the end of the former volume, how the dispositions of the troops on the German side after the 19th of August extraordinarily favoured such a movement as that of M'Mahon's. We shall, later on, find these favourable opportunities recurring on other occasions and in other matters. Time was in this case more than ever golden. The slow advance of M'Mahon can only be explained by the inward doubts about the whole situation which he brought over with him from Africa, and which always clung to him—doubts which, as the event proved, were only too well founded, and which the whole course of the war hitherto would certainly have strengthened.

Looking at the general state of affairs brought about by the bad calculations, or rather by the commencement without any calculation at all, of the war on the part of the French, it can scarcely be assumed that a victory of M'Mahon at Metz would have had any vital influence upon the ultimate result of the campaign; but it would certainly have caused delay in the German operations, and thus have revived the courage of the French people.

In 1866 the Prussians sustained at least two, even if insignificant, defeats, at Langensalza and at Trautenau; in the campaign of 1870, they had hitherto

not experienced a single reverse—so many encounters and battles, so many victories.

When M'Mahon evacuated the Camp of Chalons, he set on fire all its military establishments. Paris newspapers asserted that the conflagration was to be a signal to Bazaine that the Duke of Magenta was now speeding to his rescue. But as the distance from Metz to the Camp of Chalons is about 85 miles in a straight line, the conflagration could hardly have answered such a purpose, especially with the chains of heights which rise up between the two places, and the prevalence at that time of thick weather. Much more likely would it be a most unwisely-given signal to the nearer troops of the Third Army; still even these did not remark it.

CHAPTER XIX.

ADVANCE OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH ARMIES (GERMAN) AGAINST THE CAMP OF CHALONS—CHANGE OF THE DIRECTION OF THEIR LINE OF OPERATIONS ON INTELLIGENCE BEING RECEIVED OF THE DEPARTURE OF M'MAHON.

As the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia was advancing along the Strasburg-Paris line of railway, a new army, the Fourth or Meuse Army, was, as we passingly remarked, formed before Metz, and placed under the command of the Crown-Prince of Saxony, to advance on the right of the Crown-Prince of Prussia against M'Mahon and the Camp of Chalons. At the same time, this army was directed to endeavour to seize, in passing, the fortress of Verdun; but it was not, if a surprise was impossible, to delay its march before that place.

This Fourth Army was composed of the Prussian Guard, of the 12th and 4th Corps, of the 5th division of cavalry (Rheinbaben), and of the 6th division of cavalry (Duke William of Mecklenburg).

The command of the 12th Corps was assumed by Prince George of Saxony in place of the Crown-Prince,

and that of Prince George's division, the 23d, by Major-General von Montbé.

The 4th Corps stood already on the Strasburg-Paris railway in connection with the Army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia; it naturally, therefore, became the left of the Army of the Meuse.

The remaining troops of this new army left the neighbourhood of Metz on the 22d of August, the cavalry in advance, the 12th Corps on the right wing, with the Prussian Guard between it and the 4th Corps.

The line of march of the 12th Corps was by Jeaudelize, Haudiomont, Dieue on the Meuse, upon Jubécourt.

On the 23d of August the attempt upon Verdun was made: the 23d division of infantry marched along the Estain road, the 24th division of infantry along the Frésne road, upon the town. Whilst the advanced-guard of the 23d division occupied the north-east suburb, Pavé, the artillery ascended the heights, and thence bombarded the fortress, which was at once summoned to surrender. This was refused, and the Saxons having now fully convinced themselves that there was no urgent necessity for the commandant to capitulate, continued their march. The 48th brigade remained on the 24th of August to observe the fortress, and was then on the 25th, on which day the headquarters of the Corps arrived at Jubécourt, also withdrawn to the left bank of the Meuse to Lempire.

Meanwhile the 6th, and on its right the 5th divisions of cavalry, pushed forward towards Chalons on the Marne, and across the Meuse into the Argonnes.

The head of the 4th division of cavalry of the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia appeared by the evening of the 24th before Vitry. On the 25th, when the greater part of the division had come up, the town was summoned to surrender. It capitulated at 11 A.M., and was then occupied by a squadron of the 5th regiment of dragoons of the 11th Corps, First Army.

In the fortress were found only 300 unequipped Mobiles. Besides these, however, there were 5000 stands of arms, 3000 side-arms, and 17 guns.

The main body of the garrison, also consisting of Mobiles, had withdrawn, as the Germans advanced, to return to their homes. A part of the 6th division of cavalry came upon a crowd of them, numbering about 1000, on the 25th August, nineteen miles to the eastward of Chalons, at Epense. After a few shells had been thrown among them, the Mobiles were attacked by the 15th regiment of Uhlans, were routed, and a great number made prisoners. Many, besides, were killed by the sabre and the lance. From the German side it is related that these Mobiles were minded to surrender themselves, but not knowing what conventional sign would express their wish, had halted and formed square as well as they could, and

that in this manner the superfluous attack of the German cavalry was occasioned.

Is it not possible that the universal hatred of an invader for irregular formations of troops, of an arming of the people, also played a certain part here?

As a matter of fact, if such an arming of the people were prepared long beforehand by an energetic nation determined to resist to the last extreme—which was by no means the case in France—every war of invasion would be rendered impossible.

Napoleon I. was just as enraged with the Prussian landwehr and landsturm, and with the Prussian Volunteer Corps of 1813, as with the Spanish guerillas.

On the 28th of August—that is, a few days after the affair at Epense—the King of Prussia issued the following proclamation from his headquarters at Clermont en Argonne:—

"The Commander-in-Chief makes known to the inhabitants of the arrondissement, that every prisoner who wishes to be treated as a prisoner of war must prove his quality of French soldier by an order addressed to himself personally by the legitimate authorities, showing that he is duly entered on the list of a corps militarily organised by the French Government. At the same time, the military position which he holds in the army must be made recognisable by military and uniform marks which are inseparable from his equipment, and visible to the naked eye at

rifle-range. Individuals who have taken up arms without complying with these conditions will not be treated as prisoners of war. They will be tried by a court-martial, and if not found guilty of any crime which entails a severer punishment, will be sentenced to ten years' penal servitude, and detained in Germany until after the execution of such punishment."

The French Government could certainly easily supply to their Mobiles a ticket as demanded in this proclamation, though there would always be a risk of its being lost. But it would indubitably have been more pleasant to the men, and it would have been better in all other respects, to have received, instead of the miserable clothing of which we have before spoken, cloth clothes—in short, the uniform which had been prescribed for the Mobile Guard at the time of its institution. But just in this respect an unpardonable and incredible negligence and slowness were evinced, of which, even at the end of October, we have numerous examples.

The army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia advanced along the Strasburg-Paris railway, and the head of its columns of infantry reached the neighbourhood of Vitry le Français on the 25th of August. The Crown-Prince had left Toul on one side, and it was for the present watched by a detachment of the 4th Corps, which shortly afterwards was relieved. The attack on the fortress we shall consider later on.

The Prussian cavalry, hastening on before the

army, occupied the town of Chalons without any resistance on the 24th of August, to the great dismay of the Parisians, who would gladly have seen the open town defend itself. On the following day a slight skirmish took place at the railway station at Epernay between a patrol of Prussian cavalry and some French engineer soldiers and Turcos who chanced to be there, and whose conduct was most highly extolled in the Paris journals. But the townspeople in Epernay did not take up arms.

The King of Prussia wished to be present in person at the operations of the two Crown-Princes against Chalons, and, as was now assumed, against Paris. He moved his headquarters, therefore, on the 23d of August, to Commercy, on the Strasburg-Paris line, the town which is noted for its confectionery, especially for its "Madeleines."

On the 24th of August the King advanced more northwards to Bar le Duc, the place where are made the sweetest gooseberry and raspberry preserves.

He was still there, when, on the evening of the 25th, reliable intelligence was received that M'Mahon had evacuated the Camp of Chalons, and was marching off towards the north.

M'Mahon had therefore four days' start, an almost inestimable stroke of good fortune; but we know already how little use was made of it.

It was instantly resolved in the headquarters of the King of Prussia to follow the Marshal, to stop his

march upon Metz if possible, and, if this could no longer be effected, to at least arrive there close upon his heels.

To be able to accomplish this, the two armies of the Crown-Princes of Saxony and Prussia, which were at that moment marching upon Paris—that is, were fronting to the west—must change front to the north.

On the 25th they were, broadly speaking, deployed upon one line, having their right wing, the Saxon Corps, at Clermont en Argonne, and their left, the 11th North German Corps, at Vitry le Français.

The change of front, therefore, required a great wheel to the right, in which the 12th Corps was the pivot, and which would bring the two armies, from the front, Clermont en Argonne, Vitry le Français, upon a front, Clermont-Suippe.

It would undoubtedly have been an error to have allowed the right wing to remain stationary until the wheel to the right should be completed. For this flank was nearest to the French; and even if it could not trust itself to fight a decisive battle alone, it was at least desirable that it should annoy the enemy moving northwards, and thus retard his march, whilst the Corps of the German centre and left (wheeling) wing hurried up with all speed, and by the shortest roads, to take up their positions on the newly-defined front.

In accordance with this view, new instructions were given to the two Crown-Princes during the

night from the 25th to the 26th of August, and on the 26th of August the King moved his headquarters to Clermont en Argonne, to be as near as possible to the events which were about to take place.

Paris, which had expected to see the German cavalry at its gates by the 1st of September, gained by this change of operations a respite of at least fourteen days.

CHAPTER XX.

THE SKIRMISHES OF BUZANCY ON THE 27TH OF AUGUST AND OF NOUART ON THE 29TH OF AUGUST, AND THE ENCOUNTER AT BEAUMONT ON THE 30TH OF AUGUST.

In consequence of the fresh orders issued, the 12th (Saxon) Corps marched on the 26th of August from its position at Clermont and Jubécourt northwards to Varennes, whence it was to gain the line of the Meuse, and by moving down the river retard the French in their probable passage of it. Accordingly, on the 27th, the 24th (Saxon) division was at Dun, on the right bank of the Meuse, having the 48th brigade and the 2d regiment of cavalry pushed forward to Stenay. These troops remained there until the 29th. Orders were also given for the whole of the 24th division to follow; but before the movement was commenced, counter-orders were received, and the division was directed to march upon Nouart, on the left bank of the Meuse.

During this advance, the 24th brigade of cavalry made a reconnaissance in a north-westerly direction towards Vouziers and Buzancy. In executing it, it

came upon the 12th French regiment of Chasseurs belonging to the 5th Corps (De Failly); sent forward against it a battery of horse-artillery, and then attacked with the greater part of the 3d regiment of cavalry.

The French were routed. From the prisoners brought in it was ascertained that a great part of M'Mahon's army was still in the vicinity of Vouziers on the right bank of the Aisne. And such was actually the case; for on the 27th the 7th French Corps was directed upon Vouziers, the 5th upon Germont and Belleville, the 12th upon Le Chêne, the 1st from Yoncq upon Terrou (but it received afterwards counter-orders), while Bonnemain's division was moved to the left flank towards Réthel.

Accordingly, while the 12th North German Corps marched upon Nouart, the other Corps of the Army of the Meuse and of the Third Army were directed upon Buzancy and Vouziers.

On the 29th, the 12th French Corps crossed the Meuse at Mouzon, the 1st marched upon Raucourt, the 5th upon Beaumont, the 7th received orders to move to La Besace, but only reached Oches, Margueritte's division arrived at Mouzon and Carignan, and Bonnemain's at Sommauthe.

On the same day the King of Prussia established his headquarters at Grandpré; the Emperor Napoleon in Stonne, an unimportant village on the road from Le Chêne le Populeux by Beaumont to Mouzon;

and the Crown-Prince of Prussia at Senuc on the Aisne, 3½ miles to the south-west of Grandpré.

Meanwhile the Saxons, marching from Dun to Nouart, came upon De Failly at the latter place. An advanced-guard affair ensued, which was carried on on the German side by the 46th brigade of infantry. The French retreated, covered by their rear-guard, northwards through the Bois des Dames towards Beaumont.

The day before, on the 28th of August, the 4th division of cavalry, on the left wing of the Germans, had encountered at Vouziers the French, who were marching off, but the latter declined to give battle.

After the events of the last days, and after hearing the intelligence which had been obtained, the German headquarters deemed it to be not impossible that M'Mahon, when he found that he would not be able to succeed in marching upon Metz, would seek refuge in the neutral territory of Belgium. To prevent this, it was resolved to follow him vigorously, and force him to turn and fight once again in the angle between the Meuse and the Ardennes Canal.

To this end dispositions for the 30th of August were issued on the evening of the 29th; but before giving them, we must narrate briefly the positions of the several Corps of the two German armies on the last-named day. Taking them from right to left, they stood as follows:—

1. The Army of the Meuse:

The 12th Corps to the east of Nouart, towards La Neuville;

The 4th Corps to the north of Landres, 7 miles to the west of Dun;

The Guard in the second line, behind the two former Corps, at Dun on the Meuse.

2. The Third Army, Crown-Prince of Prussia:

The 1st Bavarian Corps, Von der Tann, with the 2d division at Sommerance, behind the left wing of the 4th North German Corps, and the 1st division more to the west at St Juvin, on the road from Varennes to Grandpré;

The 2d Bavarian Corps, Hartmann, at Fléville, behind the 1st;

The 5th North German Corps, Kirchbach, at Briquenai, and to the north thereof, at Authes;

The Würtemberg division, Obernitz, at Boult au Bois, to the west of Briquenai;

The 11th North German Corps, Gersdorff, at Vouziers;

The 6th North German Corps, Tümpling, which had only very recently been drawn from Germany and attached to the Third Army, stood a day's march to the south of Vouziers, on the roads from St Ménéhould and Suippe:

The four divisions of cavalry,—namely, the 2d—which, like the 6th Corps, had only just been called up into the first line—the 4th, the 5th, and the 6th, all

stood together on the extreme left, about Vouziers and towards the Aisne, between Semuy and Réthel.

To these troops, then, thus situated, the following orders were given for the 30th of August:—

The 12th Saxon Corps was directed upon Beaumont—the 23d division by way of La Neuville, the 24th by Beaufort through the wood of Dieulet.

The 4th, from Landres through the wood of Dieulet upon Beaumont;

The Prussian Guard was to follow these two in reserve along the Meuse;

The 1st Bavarian Corps upon Beaumont, the 2d Bavarian to follow it;

The 5th North German Corps to the left of the 1st Bavarian, upon Pierremont and Oches;

The 2d division of cavalry upon Buzancy, to support the centre;

The Würtemberg division upon Le Chêne le Populeux;

The 11th North German Corps by Vouziers and Quatre Champs, also upon Le Chêne le Populeux;

The 4th division of cavalry was to follow the 11th Corps to Quatre Champs, and to bend thence to the north-eastward by Chatillon upon Oches;

The 6th division of cavalry was to move upon Semuy, and push forward its outposts as far as Bouvellemont (Boullemont) to the north, and observe from that place in the direction of Mézieres;

The 5th division of cavalry, advancing to Tourteron, was to watch the highway towards Le Chêne le Populeux;

The 6th North German Corps was to march upon Vouziers, and go into cantonments about that place towards the south and south-west, in the direction of Rheims and the Camp of Chalons.

The King of Prussia removed his headquarters to Varennes, famous through the flight and capture of Louis XVI.; and the two Crown-Princes repaired in the morning to the site of the expected battle.

With the knowledge which we have of the actual marches of the French, and of the existing intentions of M'Mahon, the direction given to the left wing of the Germans may appear to be somewhat too divergent towards the west. But the Germans on the 29th of August could not know all that we know to-day. Had not M'Mahon, as late as the 27th, still intended to commence a retreat from Paris? Was it not possible that, when he arrived at a knowledge of the true state of affairs, he might return to his original idea, and attempt to carry it out in some way or other? It is not a good thing to have to say in war, "I did not think of that." Therefore the employment of the 6th Corps in its post of observation of Rheims and Chalons was not without good grounds.

Immediately after the commencement of the formation of the 12th Corps (Trochu, afterwards Lebrun), a 13th Corps also was begun in Paris under General

Vinoy. This was to consist of three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry. By about the 23d of August, at least two of its divisions of infantry, composed of fourth battalions, were gathered together, under Generals d'Exéa and Polhes, and a cavalry division under Réyau.

On the 23d of August the Emperor Napoleon telegraphed from Courcelles, near Rheims, to the Count of Palikao :—

"It is very important that strong forces should be directed upon Rheims, which is the junction and main point of the railways, to prevent hostile patrols cutting off our communications!"

Palikao thereupon immediately sent thither, by way of Laon, a detachment of Vinoy's Corps — D'Exéa division. This, it is true, arrived too late to take any share in the decisive operations; but the movement shows that the Germans did well to provide against the possible arrival of supports from Paris to the aid of M'Mahon.

On the French side, on the 30th of August, the 12th Corps, Lebrun, with its own division of cavalry, Lichtlin, and also that of Fénélon, stood at Mouzon on the right bank of the Meuse, Lichtlin's horse being placed under the command of Fénélon. Marshal M'Mahon was also in Mouzon, and the Emperor Napoleon on the same day moved thither his headquarters from Stonne.

The 7th French Corps was at 11 A.M. on the march

northwards towards Villers devant Pont below Mouzon, and had only a weak rear-guard between Oches and La Berlière.

The 1st French Corps was at the same time moving towards Remilly, while the 5th Corps, De Failly, was engaged in cooking close to Beaumont, and having only arrived there that morning after a long night-march, was not keeping a very vigilant look-out.

The head of the 1st Bavarian Corps, the 4th brigade, of the 2d division, marching by way of Sommauthe, arrived at about 11 A.M. in the vista between the woods of Dieulet and Beaumont. Thence they saw the camp of De Failly's troops. Von der Tann at once brought forward a few batteries, and opened fire upon it. The shells aroused the French from their quiet repose (this time they were surprised by artillery), and De Failly at once ordered a retreat to be commenced as speedily as possible, leaving behind the whole of his baggage and camp equipage.

Hereupon Von der Tann at once sent the 4th brigade forward in pursuit, and on its left the 3d, as soon as it came up; while at the same time the head of the 4th North German Corps, advancing to the east of Beaumont, appeared on the right of the 4th Bavarian brigade.

De Failly retreated fighting upon Yoncq, where the Bavarians captured two guns.

Von der Tann, meanwhile, as soon as his 1st division came up, sent it forward upon La Besace to attack

thence the right flank of the French; but this movement was executed a little too late. More decisive was that of the 4th North German Corps, which threatened to cut off De Failly from the Meuse, and was supported by four battalions and two batteries from the 2d division of the Bavarians; for, pushing forward against De Failly's left flank, it compelled him to change the direction of his retreat, and to fall back by Pouron and Brouhan upon Villers devant Mouzon, instead of retiring direct upon Mouzon, where he would have found his nearest support.

From the 7th Corps De Failly had not received any support, for it had continued its retreat upon the Meuse without halting.

When the fight between De Failly and the 4th North German Corps neared the neighbourhood of Mouzon, General Lebrun desired to support the former from the right bank by passing over his whole Corps to the left of the Meuse; and Lichtlin's division of cavalry, and Grandchamp's of infantry, were already across, when Marshal M'Mahon caused the movement to be stopped.

Lichtlin's division attacked the Prussians, but encountered infantry in good order, and, suffering much from its fire and from that of the artillery, was obliged to withdraw. But still its attack, and the French artillery fire from the right bank of the Meuse, which did not cease until 8 P.M., gained some time for De Failly, so that he was able to reach Villers

devant Mouzon and cross to the right bank of the Meuse comparatively unmolested.

To the left of the Bavarians, the advanced-guard, and some of the artillery of the 5th North German Corps, advancing from Buzancy against Oches, had come under fire about noon. But the French detachment at Oches was not willing to continue the action, and as soon as it heard the cannonade on its left flank, and almost in its rear, commenced a hurried retreat through Stonne, to which place the Prussian advanced-guard pushed forward.

The 1st French Corps (Ducrot) reached Carignan on the 30th of August between 3 and 4 P.M.

BATTLE OF SEDAN, 1st SEPTEMBER 1870.

Grandpré
Vouziers
Buzancy
Stonne
Le Chesne
Boult
Olizy
Villers Cernay
Poix
Chémery
Sedan
Donchery
Frénois
Wadelincourt
Bazeilles
Balan
Givonne
Daigny
Haybes
Fleigneux
Floing
Illy
Cazal
Francheval
Pont Maugis
Lamécourt
Fontenoille
Matton
Pure
Glaire
Mathon
Dames
Les Deux Villes
Sachy
Brévilly
Douzy
Carignan
Villers
Lombut
Emilly
Ambly
Ambly Fleury
Sailly
Vivier
Villy
Malandry
Moulins
Autreville
Olizy
Yoncq
Noyers
Mouzon
Remilly
Remilly Wirquin
Raucourt
Villers
Puilly
Lamécourt
Beaumont
Mairy
Lombut
Tétaigne
Lamécourt
Baâlon
Bellevue
Bellefontaine
Cunel
Matton
Fontenoille
Pure
Glaire
Mathon
Dames
Les Deux Villes
Carignan
Villy
Malandry
Noyers
Mouzon
Beaumont
Sedan
Donchery
Douzy
Carignan
Chémery
Raucourt
Flaba
Villemontry
Lamécourt
Puilly
Yoncq
Olizy
Malandry
Moulins
Autreville

CHAPTER XXI.

THE BATTLE OF SEDAN ON THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBER.

MARSHAL M'MAHON ordered the concentration of all his Corps upon the heights around the fortress of Sedan and upon the right bank of the Meuse to be effected upon the 31st of August.

The Emperor Napoleon, oppressed probably with evil forebodings, had sent his young son into security in Belgium, not wishing to expose him to the real work of a battle. He himself left Mouzon on the evening of the 30th of August, and, journeying through the night to Carignan, and thence to Sedan, reached the latter place about 10 A.M.

The King of Prussia, after receiving the report of the proceedings of the 30th, despatched, on the evening of that day, the following order from his headquarters in Varennes:—

"The Army of the Meuse (Crown-Prince of Saxony) will prevent the French left wing from escaping to the east between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier. The Third Army (Crown-Prince of Prussia) will continue its march northwards and

attack the French wherever they may make a stand on the left bank of the Meuse; for the rest, it will operate against their front and right flank in such a manner as to hem them in between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier."

In compliance with these instructions, the Crown-Prince of Saxony caused the Prussian Guard, and afterwards the Saxon horsemen, to cross to the right bank of the Meuse at Prouilly; the 12th Corps was to effect the passage by a bridge of boats at Létanne; and the 4th Corps, which was far in advance, was to move from the neighbourhood of Mouzon down the left bank of the Meuse.

On the evening of the 31st of August, the Guard stood at Carignan on the right bank of the Chiers, with its outposts at Pouru aux Bois and Pouru St Remy;

The 12th Corps at Douzy (24th division of infantry) and Mairy, with its outposts from Pouru St Remy to the mouth of the Rullebach in advance of Douzy;

The 4th Corps on the left bank of the Meuse opposite Torcy, a fortified suburb of Sedan.

The Prussian cavalry of the Guard and the Saxon horsemen rendered the railway from Carignan to Sedan unsafe. The Prussians crossed to the right bank of the Chiers at Sailly and Carignan. The Saxon division of cavalry, after it had crossed the Meuse on the 31st of August at Prouilly, remarked from the Bois de Vaux a quantity of trains standing

in the railway station at Carignan ready to be despatched. Its batteries at once opened fire upon them, and then descended the left bank of the Chiers towards Douay. When in the neighbourhood of Brevilly, French waggon-trains were seen on the highway on the right bank of the Chiers. The cavalry regiment of the Saxon Guard at once crossed the river and went in pursuit, but could not overtake the convoys, as it met with a fire of musketry from the French infantry and from the inhabitants of Pouru St Remy.

The 1st Saxon regiment of Uhlans, No. 17, on the other hand, succeeded in penetrating into Douzy, after the horse-artillery battery had shelled the place, and captured 40 waggons, the railway trains, and a number of prisoners. The French escort, vigorously pursued as far as Francheval, retired upon Douzy.

Of the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, the 1st Bavarian Corps was also, in pursuance of the above order, to march on the 31st of August upon Remilly on the Meuse, and the 2d Bavarian Corps was to follow it to Roncourt.

The 1st Bavarian Corps had the 1st brigade and two batteries at its head; then followed the 2d brigade, the reserve artillery of the Corps, and, lastly, the 2d division (3d and 4th brigades).

At 9.30 A.M., the advanced-guard of the Corps arrived on the left bank of the Meuse near Remilly, and thence saw the French columns of the 12th Corps

and the cavalry moving along the other bank towards Sedan by way of Mairy, Douzy, and Bazeilles. The two batteries, which were joined by the artillery from the reserve as soon as intelligence was received of what was going on, came speedily into action, and opened fire upon the French. These answered with their artillery, but without effect, for the Bavarian guns proved to be far superior in accuracy and range.

At Bazeilles the railway crosses from the right to the left bank of the river, and only returns to its original side above Donchery. The 4th and 9th battalions of the Bavarian Rifles, inclining to their left at Remilly, had succeeded in obtaining possession of the railway bridge of Bazeilles, but could not penetrate further into the town, owing to the heavy fire from Chassepots and mitrailleuses—a fire which, it appears, was delivered in part by the inhabitants of the houses.

Von der Tann therefore drew back these battalions to the left bank, resolving to defer the attack in earnest upon Bazeilles until the Crown-Prince of Saxony should descend the right bank of the Meuse; and to this end he caused two pontoon-bridges to be thrown across the river near Remilly.

In the interim the French made an attempt to blow up the railway bridge of Bazeilles, but this was frustrated by the Bavarian Rifles.

After a while Von der Tann received the news

that the Crown-Prince of Saxony would not be able to attack in force on the 31st of August. Thereupon he ordered the greater part of the 1st division to remain in the position which it had taken up, caused the railway bridge to be barricaded, and bivouacked towards evening with the remainder of his Corps, between Remilly and Angecourt. The 2d Bavarian Corps encamped near Roncourt.

The 5th North German Corps stood on the same evening (the 31st of August) at Chéhery; the 11th between Frénois and Villers sur Bar, opposite Donchery; the Würtemberg division at Boutancourt, to the south-west of Dom le Mesnil.

The 6th North German Corps was to move forward to Attigny and Semuy, on the Aisne and Ardennes Canal, whence it could be easily pushed forward in a north-westerly direction should M'Mahon by any chance be again seized with the idea of attempting to gain Paris; and in this case it would be supported by the divisions of cavalry which were patrolling in the neighbourhood.

For the 1st of September, the Crown-Prince of Prussia gave the following directions to the Third Army: The 1st Bavarian Corps was to cross the Meuse at Remilly and attack Bazeilles; the 2d Bavarian Corps was to post itself below Bazeilles at Wadelincourt and Frénois — either to support the 1st Bavarians or to keep up the connection between it and the 11th North German Corps, at the same time

observing the fortified suburb of Torcy before Sedan; the 11th North German Corps was to cross the Meuse at Donchery, to advance northwards upon Vrigne aux Bois, and to wheel there to its right (eastwards) against St Menges; the 5th Corps and the 4th division of cavalry were to follow the movement of the 11th Corps; the Würtemberg division was to remain at Donchery, partly to act as a general reserve, partly to be in readiness to resist a possible sortie of the French from Mézieres.

In compliance with these instructions, the 11th Corps, in the course of the 31st of August, threw two bridges across the Meuse at Donchery, and commencing at once the passage of the river, stood by daybreak of the 1st of September in full strength on the right bank of the Meuse.

The advices which were received of the extremely lively retreat of the French during the 31st of August, awakened much anxiety in the headquarters of the King, lest M'Mahon should be purposing to avoid the decisive battle by retreating in some one or other fitting direction.

This care was certainly, as a matter of fact, without any cause. On the evening of the 31st, M'Mahon did not in any way believe that there was a considerable force of Germans in his vicinity, and the French troops therefore encamped around Sedan: the 7th Corps on the right, towards St Menges and Floing, having the cavalry reserve in rear of its left wing;

the 12th Corps towards Bazeilles; the 1st Corps towards Daigny and Francheval; and the 5th Corps on the heights to the north of Sedan, it not even being deemed necessary to communicate to them orders for the following day.

Nevertheless the German headquarters did right to assume that if M'Mahon really recognised his position on the 31st of August, he would make every effort to escape from it by some means or other. The means might be badly chosen, but the desire must be supposed to be present.

The King of Prussia, therefore, commanded that even during the night, from the 31st of August to the 1st of September, three divisions of the left wing (Army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia) should pass over the Meuse, to be able to deploy at daybreak in readiness to advance northwards to an attack upon the road from Sedan to Mézieres. This order was communicated to the Crown-Prince of Saxony, and was already more than half executed; for, as we have seen, the 11th Corps was occupied during the night in question in crossing the river. It only remained, then, to transport across one more division, and for this the Würtemberg was chosen. It was directed to pass over the river between Dom le Mesnil and Nouvion, and to take up a position to the north of the latter place at Viviers au Court, awaiting there further orders for its employment in either an easterly or westerly direction. At daybreak the Würtembergers

threw a pontoon-bridge across at the point indicated, and at 6 A.M. began to cross over by it. At 9 A.M. the head of the division entered Viviers au Court.

The Crown-Prince of Saxony, for his part, as soon as he received intelligence of this movement from the royal headquarters, at once ordered the troops of the Army of the Meuse to be alarmed. By 5 A.M. on the 1st of September the Prussian Guard and the 12th (Saxon) Corps were to be upon the line Pouru aux Bois-Pouru St Remy-Douzy, ready to advance against the French front Givonne-Moncelle. Of the 4th Corps, the 7th division was to post itself in reserve at Mairy, but the 8th and the reserve of artillery were to move towards Bazeilles to support the 1st Bavarian Corps.

From the positions of the French, and from the dispositions of the Germans, it followed that the former had a clear front of about six miles, and that on this they must, during the forenoon hours of the 1st of September, be driven together by seven and a half German Corps—by a collective force of from 170,000 to 180,000 men, to which they could at the most oppose a body of 120,000 men.

That the whole of M'Mahon's army could cut its way through the Germans was impossible. It must in any case have left behind considerable portions to retard the pursuit of the Germans at some points, while the main body, following in some degree the example set by Blücher in 1814 at Champeaubert-

Etoges, forced a passage through the line elsewhere and won its retreat sword in hand. But let the march of this portion be then directed whither it might be, the Germans would, after they had once come up, have remained constantly by M'Mahon's side; and if they had simply contented themselves with molesting him with their cavalry and artillery, which no longer permits Xenophontian retreats, he would yet have suffered enormous losses, and on the third or fourth day German leadership would certainly have attained anything it might have failed to accomplish on the first.

And whither was M'Mahon to retreat? With the forces which, in the existing state of things, he could convey away, and with these closely followed by a German army, he could, instead of being free to attack the blockading troops, under the most favourable circumstances only have thrown 40,000 to 50,000 men into the lines of Metz, and thereby would have brought rather a burden than relief to Bazaine.

Or could he have fallen back upon any other free fortress to draw breath for a while, and then again seek further safety in flight?

There is, as we know, no lack of fortresses in this neighbourhood; but these small nests are not adapted to afford a harbour of refuge to a large army. The nearest stronghold which could in any way be made to serve as such was Lille. But Lille is 108 miles from Sedan.

A comparatively easier expedient remained. The Belgian frontier is only five miles distant from the rear of the position at Sedan on the road to Bouillon. It cannot be doubted that, if the French had come to the determination early on the morning of the 1st of September, they could have succeeded in reaching Belgian territory, and that, too, without very severe fighting. But then they must have permitted themselves to be disarmed and interned by the Belgians; and French pride revolted against this. A few French detachments might adopt this plan, but not a whole French army. In short, M'Mahon's troops were doomed.

The fatal battle was begun by the 1st Bavarian Corps. General von der Tann had certainly received general instructions not to advance to a decisive attack until he was sure of support from the Army of the Meuse, especially from the 12th (Saxon) Corps; but it was, nevertheless, to be permitted to him to capture Bazeilles, even during the night before the 1st of September, if it should seem to him to be feasible to do so; and in that case he was to be free to manœuvre further from that place when the fitting moment should arrive.

The large village of Bazeilles, built entirely of stone, contains the old castle in which Turenne spent his youth, and also another one of more recent date.

At 4 A.M. a thick fog hung over the scene, and Von der Tann set his troops in motion to attack

Bazeilles, in and behind which Vassoigne's division of marine infantry of Lebrun's Corps were posted.

At the head of the Bavarians marched the 1st brigade (Dietl); the 2d brigade (Orff) followed; and then came the 2d division (3d and 4th brigades).

Very soon afterwards the struggle for Bazeilles began. The Bavarians penetrated into the village and were driven out again by the French; then the former received reinforcements, and in their turn repulsed the temporary victors. Soon the fight raged furiously in the streets, and in the gardens and parks enclosed by stone walls. Desperate fighting took place for single houses. In these contests, it is said, the inhabitants took part, and this is very possibly true. The French deny it, and in revenge accuse the Bavarians of many atrocious cruelties on women, children, and grey-headed men. Without placing too high a value on these recriminations, it may nevertheless be imagined that in such a bitter house-to-house combat some ill-fated individuals were not too leniently treated.

The artillery on either side could not take any part in the fighting at this stage, neither could it directly support its own party until the other had complete possession of the town; and therefore, in the movements in which both sides were mingled confusedly together, it was obliged to confine itself to firing at the enemy's reserves and at the hostile batteries.

The Bavarian artillery was posted upon the heights

to the north-east of the town, and the French, comprising the mitrailleuse batteries of Lebrun's Corps, to the west of La Moncelle.

It was 10 A.M. before Bazeilles was definitely in the hands of the Bavarians. During the struggle for the village, Marshal M'Mahon had been dangerously wounded by a splinter from a shell, and at 7.30 A.M. was obliged to give over the command-in-chief to General Ducrot, and allow himself to be carried to the rear.

Ducrot now formed the idea of taking up a position behind Sedan on the plateau of Illy—an intention which can only be understood to signify that he wished, in any case, to keep open the road of retreat on to Belgian territory. He had already given instructions for this movement, and it had been commenced by several detachments, when he also was compelled to resign the command.

We have before mentioned General von Wimpffen, who, recalled from Africa, was to take command of the 5th Corps in place of De Failly. He had arrived in Sedan on the 31st of August, and directly he heard that M'Mahon was wounded, he, as the senior general of division present next to De Failly—whose claims, after what had gone before, could no longer be considered—at once demanded the commandership-in-chief of the army, and this Ducrot gave over to him at 9 A.M.

General von Wimpffen, born 1811, after leaving

the School of St Cyr, passed the greater part of his time of service in Algeria. He became a brigadier-general in the Crimea in 1855. In Italy, he commanded, during the first part of the campaign of 1859, a brigade of the Guard; and in the same year, after the battle of Magenta, was appointed general of division. Soon after the war, he was again sent out to Africa. There he commanded, in 1870, the province of Oran, and conducted the operations against the tribes on the Morocco frontier. These operations have been very variously criticised; but, in any case, they were of a very different nature to those of a campaign against Germany.

Wimpffen, who had the renown of possessing great bravery joined to cool-blooded calculation, made himself acquainted with the state of affairs from the heights of Balan, and matters did not seem to him to be desperate. He therefore caused the movement which had been begun by Ducrot to be stopped, and ordered the troops to return to their former positions.

As fortune was really setting very much against the French, this double change of commanders within a few hours certainly could not improve their chance of success. The last recalls vividly to the recollection the transformation of the Austrian General Staff at Königgratz on the morning of the 3d of July 1866.

On the German side, the Crown-Prince of Saxony directed the 12th Corps to move from Douzy through Lamecourt upon La Moncelle; and on its right the

Prussian Guard, which was further in rear, upon Villers-Cernay.

The 48th brigade of the Saxons—the advanced-guard of the 24th division—came into action near La Moncelle at 6.30 A.M. The batteries of the advanced-guard, and soon afterwards the whole of the artillery of the division, moved up to the east of La Moncelle, to the north of the Bavarian batteries; and after the village was taken, two more batteries from the reserve artillery of the Corps joined them. Posted there, the Saxon artillery suffered at times not only from the French guns, but also from the fire of infantry proceeding from the bottom of the valley of La Moncelle.

To the right of the 48th, the 47th brigade of infantry pushed forward in the direction of Daigny, and captured there three mitrailleuses.

Towards 9.30 A.M., the 46th brigade, belonging to the 23d division of infantry, came up, and from La Moncelle completed the communication with the Bavarians; the 45th brigade was also sent to La Moncelle; and the batteries which gradually arrived formed at length a single line with those of the 1st Bavarian Corps.

At 8 A.M. the head of the Prussian Guard arrived at Villers-Cernay, and towards 9 A.M. several of its batteries came into action on the heights between that place and Givonne. In general, the Guard was directed to ascend the Givonne brook towards Fleigneux, as soon as the position between Daigny and Givonne was won; the 12th (Saxon) Corps was then,

turning to its right, to follow this movement. To carry out these orders, therefore, the 1st division of the Guard advanced in the first place against Givonne, while the reserve artillery of the Corps took up a position to the north of the batteries which had already opened fire, to support this movement.

We turn now to the left of the German army, to see how the battle progressed on that wing.

The 11th Corps had crossed the Meuse at 6 A.M., and its head reached Vrigne aux Bois an hour later. On its left the Würtemberg division commenced to pass over the river at the same time at Nouvion.

To the right of the 11th Corps stood the 2d Bavarian Corps (Hartmann) opposite Torcy; having the 4th division (Count Bothmer) at Frénois, and the reserve artillery with the 3d division (Walther) at Wadelincourt.

The 5th North German Corps was, at 6 A.M., on the march through Cheveuges going towards Donchery; the 4th division of cavalry followed it.

The 6th Corps had, as we have already seen, a special destination, as had also the greater number of the divisions of cavalry.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia had quitted his headquarters, Chémery on the Barbach, at 4.30 A.M., and arrived towards 6 A.M. on the battle-field, to the west of Frénois; and thither the King of Prussia also repaired from his headquarters at Vendresse.

The detachments of cavalry which had been sent forward brought in news that the road to the west, to Mézieres, was quite free from French. The 11th Corps could therefore now be turned without hesitation against the army of M'Mahon in position at Sedan, especially as the 5th Corps was to follow it immediately on to the right bank of the Meuse, and as, moreover, the Würtemberg division was ready to observe the before-mentioned highway.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia therefore, towards 7 A.M., gave the order that the 11th Corps should turn to its right against St Menges. General Gersdorff, who at that time was chief of the Corps, received the command about 7.30 A.M. at Briancourt, to the south-east of Vrigne aux Bois, and at once gave directions for its execution. Towards 9 A.M. the advanced-guard showed itself to the west of St Menges, attacked the village, and after a stubborn contest, obtained possession of it, the French garrison (belonging to the 5th Corps) retreating upon the main position of their Corps on the heights between Illy and Floing. The commandant of the 11th Corps at once caused his artillery, which was up with him, to move to the south of St Menges, and the infantry to deploy behind it.

The 5th Corps, which immediately followed the 11th, marched behind it with the reserve artillery in advance, and then deployed to the left of it at Fleigneux. By 11 A.M. the greater number of the batteries

of the 5th and 11th Corps were engaged there and at St Menges in a heavy fire against the extreme right of the French.

As the road to Mézieres was found to be clear, the Würtemberg division received orders, which reached it at 10.30 A.M. at Viviers au Court, to return to Donchery and place itself in reserve there, while the 2d division of cavalry was also drawn into the same place. The Würtembergers therefore took up with the bulk of their forces a position at Donchery; but nevertheless Hügel's brigade was posted on the left bank of the Meuse at Dom le Mesnil towards Mézieres.

The 4th division of cavalry, which had followed the 5th North German Corps on to the right bank of the Meuse, placed itself at Troifontaine, to the south of the 11th Corps, and to the west of the peninsula of Iges formed by the Meuse; and its horse-artillery batteries opened fire from the eastern edge of the woods there, at a range of 4000 paces, against the French position at Floing.

When the Crown-Prince of Prussia appeared at Frénois, the battle was, as we know, raging somewhat furiously upon the right wing, where the Army of the Meuse and the 1st Bavarian Corps were engaged. He therefore, at 7 A.M., ordered Walther's division of the 2d Bavarian Corps to move towards Remilly, to support thence the 1st Bavarian Corps at Bazeilles; and to this end Bothmer's division was also to march from Frénois to Wadelincourt. Two of its batteries,

together with the reserve artillery of the Corps, were advanced upon the peninsula of Iges, to concentrate their fire upon Floing, as the batteries of the 4th division of cavalry and a great number of those of the 11th Corps were already doing.

We have hitherto only followed the battle on the right wing of the Germans—the Army of the Meuse and the 1st Bavarian Corps—up to 10 A.M.; pointing out, at the same time, the course which could and would most likely be followed: the fight on the left—the main mass of the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia—which only commenced later on, we have considered up to 11 A.M.

It is manifest now that at the latter hour Wimpffen's army was so ensnared that only two, and they barely practicable, ways of escape remained. It might possibly still break through to the north or to the south; to escape to the west or to the east was, according to all human calculation, impossible.

On the north, the gorge between Fleigneux and Givonne, and through the woods of Daigny and Terme, a passage barely 4000 paces wide was open by which to retreat on to Belgian territory. The highway in the same direction to Bouillon was already no longer practicable for the French army.

On the south, there was still a possibility of issuing through the fortified suburb of Torcy in the direction of Vouziers and Rheims. And this movement would be in the beginning the least ex-

posed to danger. What the ultimate result would be, no one can say; but in war it is always necessary in a desperate situation to venture something. To entertain the idea of escaping by this way would certainly have required much resolution. The success of the enterprise, if undertaken, would depend upon extreme simplicity and clearness in the dispositions, and upon the unconditional obedience and self-sacrifice of all the individual Corps commanders. From information which we have received from various quarters, it appears to be very doubtful whether — especially as the Emperor was present in Sedan — General Wimpffen would have had the authority necessary to carry out successfully the plan indicated by us. But independently of this, it would seem that no one in the army even thought of this road of retreat. As is generally the case after a misfortune, numerous controversial writings have been published as to who is to bear the burden of the catastrophe of Sedan, but in none of these has the idea of breaking through to the south been discussed. As regards General von Wimpffen, he seems to have cherished for a very long time the hope of being able to succeed in repulsing the Germans, and to have held that then would be the moment to think of marching off. And it was in accordance with this idea that until 4 P.M. no general orders were given. Every Corps commandant, even every divisional commander and brigadier, acted almost independently,

striving to maintain himself in his particular position, or to drive back his own especial adversary. The chief of the army appears rather to have observed, first here and then there, these detached efforts, than to have attempted to direct them to a common end, or arrange them with a general object.

When at last General von Wimpffen was constrained to abandon his first hope, he turned to the idea of escaping in the direction of Carignan. But it was then, as we shall see, much too late to entertain the project of a general breaking through.

We return now for the present to the right wing of the Germans—to the Army of the Meuse and the 1st Bavarian Corps.

After the latter had at 10 A.M. obtained possession of the village of Bazeilles, it was not able at once to debouch from it, for the troops, mingled confusedly together in the local fighting, had to be collected together and re-ordered, and had to establish themselves in the place.

Towards 11 A.M. Walther's division of the 2d Bavarian Corps, which division had been sent by the Crown-Prince of Prussia to aid the 1st Bavarian Corps, came up across the railway bridge. Von der Tann at once caused it to advance along the right bank of the Meuse against Balan, and afterwards supported it in this movement by a part of the 8th division of the 4th North German Corps, a battalion of which had already taken part in the struggle for

Bazeilles. At the same time he concentrated the 1st and 4th brigades and the reserve artillery of the 1st Bavarian Corps upon the heights to the north-east of Bazeilles, in readiness to resist any by chance successful offensive blow which Lebrun might attempt to the east through Balan.

After a severe engagement, the Bavarians, and the Prussians of the 4th Corps, who were supporting them, took the village, and maintained themselves in it, although it was heavily shelled by the French artillery in Sedan.

About 4 P.M. the French troops in this neighbourhood were directed to retreat upon Sedan, but many large detachments of troops had already retired without orders in that direction. This command did not proceed from General von Wimpffen, but from the headquarters of the Emperor. At this same time General von Wimpffen proposed to Napoleon to attempt to break through the enemy towards Carignan in order to rescue his person. Before he received the answer of the Emperor declining the offer, he had communicated his intention to General Lebrun. The latter answered, "You will sacrifice 3000 more lives, and it will do no good; but if you like to attempt it, I go with you." And forthwith Wimpffen and Lebrun, with the men they had with them, began to advance. Walther's Bavarian division was driven out of one part of Balan, but it was at once supported by the 1st Bavarian brigade. At the same time the reserve

artillery of the 1st Bavarian Corps opened a murderous fire. Wimpffen, who saw on the one hand that the enemy was perfectly prepared to receive him, and on the other hand was overwhelmed with astonishment when he began to count, and discovered the smallness of the force which was at his disposal, recognised that his attempt was a vain one, and stopped the movement, retiring into Sedan, pursued to its very gates by detachments of Prussians and Bavarians.

To the right of the Bavarians and of the 8th division of the 4th North German Corps, the whole of the 23d division of infantry of the 12th (Saxon) Corps had concentrated behind La Moncelle. Towards midday it received the order to march northwards along the valley upon Daigny, and thence to mount the heights which lie to the west towards La Garenne.

The division pushed forward up the valley, sustaining numerous encounters with various French detachments of the 1st and 7th Corps, and towards 3 P.M. its advanced-guard ascended the heights to the west of Daigny. Ducrot offered a most stubborn resistance, but was finally overpowered. The Saxons took two mitrailleuses, and made more than a thousand prisoners; and at 4 P.M. Ducrot began his retreat upon Sedan.

In the combat which, as we have before related, took place between the Bavarians and the 8th North German Corps on the one side, and Wimpffen on the other, the Saxons partook to this extent, that they

detached a regiment in its direction, which, however, did not come into action.

Of the Prussian Guard, the 2d division marched, at 11 A.M., against Daigny and Hoybes; but as the 12th Corps shortly afterwards gained possession of the former village, the Guard could now turn more to the north against Givonne, and thence against Illy. Here it brought the whole of its artillery into action, and by 3 P.M. it came, at Illy, into communication with the 5th Corps—that is, with the extreme left of the German army. It may be said that in this hour the net was closed: the expression may be somewhat trivial, but it tells the truth; a glance at the map will prove that.

By this time the fate of the French army was sealed. Separate detachments, especially of cavalry, might by good luck have broken out; but the army could do so no longer. But it was precisely the best troops that did not wish to separate their lot from that of the others; they made most honourable and gallant efforts, but only to oblige the adversary to pay dearly for his victory, and to cover the retreat of their friends—not to win an advantage for themselves, which they would not value unless it could be gained for all.

On the left wing of the Germans, after an artillery battle had raged for some time, the infantry of the 11th Corps advanced, soon after 11 A.M., from St Menges to the attack of Floing, the 19th brigade of

infantry from the 5th Corps joining on to its left. The fighting there was very stubborn, especially with the 7th French Corps. The French infantry and cavalry vied with one another in bravery, but acted without unity, working by regiments and by brigades. At 11.30 A.M., four French regiments of horse made the last attempt of importance at this point. Thrown back by the steady fire of the German infantry, they were obliged to seek refuge in the woods to the north of Sedan, and by 2 P.M. the French here were in full retreat upon the town.

The 5th North German Corps marched to the left of the 11th, upon Illy, to complete the enclosure, which was accomplished at 3 P.M. by the junction of the former Corps with the Army of the Meuse, as we have before related. Several gallant rallies were made by the French here also, but, as everywhere else on the field, without any general leading idea or any guiding authority.

Following the advance of the infantry of the 11th and 5th Corps, the 4th division of cavalry had marched, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, from Troi-fontaine up the heights to the north of Illy, and had been directed thence by the Crown-Prince of Prussia towards the road from Sedan to Bouillon, to embarrass the retreat of the French along it into Belgium, should they attempt such a movement.

From the Würtembergers a detachment had to be sent along the left bank of the Meuse against a sortie

of the garrison of Mézieres, which, however, was repulsed without any great trouble.

At 5 P.M. the heads of all the German columns pushed forwards towards Sedan; the fortress was bombarded by the field-guns, and the town was soon in flames, as were also the adjacent villages.

In the town of Sedan, where the whole army of M'Mahon was crowded together in narrow streets, a confusion reigned which mocks any attempt to describe it. Napoleon III. resolved to capitulate; but he did not regard himself as commander-in-chief. General von Wimpffen, who had commanded during the day, was to arrange the capitulation of the army, Napoleon surrendering his person only.

General von Wimpffen found the matter very distasteful, as can easily be understood. He now demanded his dismission from the Emperor Napoleon, but the latter refused to grant this, and with reason. Wimpffen had, on the morning of that same day, claimed the commandership-in-chief because of his seniority, when he might very well, under the circumstances, and without in any way prejudicing his own rights, have left it in the hands of Ducrot, who had taken it over from M'Mahon.

Wimpffen therefore was obliged to submit to the refusal of the Emperor. For the rest, Napoleon had not waited for the consent of the commandant of the army, but had already hoisted the flag of truce over the gates of Sedan.

When the King of Prussia remarked from the heights of Frénois that Sedan was already in flames, he ordered the bombardment of the town to cease, and sent forward an officer of the General Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf, with a flag of truce towards the fortress. On the road, Bronsart met with a Bavarian officer, who informed him that the white flag was waving over the gate of Sedan. He therefore continued his way, was admitted into the town, and at once conducted before the Emperor. When he communicated his commission to the latter, which was to summon the army and the fortress to surrender, Napoleon remarked that Bronsart must enter into negotiations to that end with Wimpffen, the commander-in-chief of the army.

The Emperor had wished to give to Bronsart a letter for the King of Prussia; but now he bethought himself of another messenger, and despatched the writing by one of his adjutants, General Reille, who, with Bronsart, reached the King about 7 P.M.

Napoleon's letter began: "As I have not been able to meet death at the head of my troops, I lay down my sword in the hands of your Majesty." For the rest, the Emperor surrendered only for his person, as he had not conducted the command-in-chief. From various circumstances which we have had occasion to relate, it may be concluded how doubtful this assertion really was.

The King of Prussia returned late in the evening

to his headquarters at Vendresse, where he arrived about 11 P.M. Before this he had commissioned General von Moltke to arrange the conduct of the transactions relative to the capitulation, and had directed Bismark also to assist in the same.

These transactions were conducted in Donchery, on the French side by General Wimpffen himself, who hoped at first to secure more favourable conditions than were really arranged. Towards midnight, Moltke declared that on the German side the only terms which would be accepted were that the French army should lay down their arms; and then added, that if the capitulation was not concluded by 9 A.M. on the 2d of September, the bombardment of Sedan would recommence. Wimpffen requested an adjournment until 1 A.M. to consider the matter. After this interval, the negotiations took a more rapid course, so that soon after 6 A.M. the terms of the surrender were drawn up, and only required the ratification of the King of Prussia. This consent Moltke obtained from him at 8 A.M. on the battle-field, whither the King had again repaired from Vendresse.

By the capitulation, the French army became prisoners of war; the officers were permitted to retain their freedom, their arms, and their personal property, on giving their word of honour not to fight again in this war against Germany. All arms and *matériel* of war were to be handed over by a French to a German commission, and the fortress of Sedan

was to be delivered over to the King of Prussia at the latest on the 2d of September. The disarming and surrender of the troops was to follow on the 2d or 3d of September.

Moltke at once issued dispositions for carrying out these conditions. By them the surrender of the French troops was to take place upon the *terrain* in the elbow of the Meuse, from Villette to Iges, before the 1st Bavarian and the 11th North German Corps. The sending off of the French prisoners of war was to be carried on along two lines: 1. By Stenay, Estain, and Gorze, to Remilly on the Metz-Saarbrücken railway; 2. By Clermont en Argonne and St Mihiel, to Pont à Mousson.

The number of French who became prisoners of war by the capitulation of Sedan amounted to 83,000 men, including 4000 officers; to these must be added 25,000 men who were taken prisoners during the battle, 14,000 wounded, and 3000 who had escaped to Belgium. All these give a total strength of 125,000 men to M'Mahon's army, naturally counted by the ration list, and including the garrison of Sedan; or of 130,000 men, if the losses at Buzancy, Nouart, and Beaumont are reckoned also.*

* A French author, an officer in the Rhine Army, gives the following numbers:—

Losses in the battles of Nouart—

Beaumont, Bazeilles, up to 31st of August inclusive,	9,000
At Sedan, including prisoners made during the battle,	46,000
Capitulated (officers included), ...	70,000
Escaped to Belgium, ...	15,000
Total strength of M'Mahon's army, . .	140,000

Over 400 field-guns, 70 of which were mitrailleuses, 150 fortress-guns, 10,000 horses, and an abundant war *matériel* of every description, fell into the hands of the Germans.

The losses of the Germans at Sedan are calculated at 13,000 men, killed and wounded.

Although Sedan is a fortress, the capitulation of the army of M'Mahon or of Wimpffen must be designated, as it everywhere has been, as a capitulation in the open field; for Sedan, destitute of detached works, is far too small to receive such a mass of defenders as the army consisted of. And as a capitulation in the open field, that of Sedan is, in regard to the magnitude of the host which surrendered, an event which stands without a parallel in history. A superficial comparison of it with Prenzlau, Ratkau, Baylen, Villagos, will suffice to prove this.

But in our opinion the occurrence acquires a much greater political importance by the capture of the Emperor Napoleon. His assertion that he could not find his death on the field has been much ridiculed; but we believe that he really sought it there. It has been said he only did not go near enough to the enemy. But, in the first place, a too close approach would be prevented by his followers; and, secondly, it is by no means certain that such an act would necessarily have insured his death. There was an equal chance of its leading to his being made prisoner on the field of battle. There remained, certainly, the

perfectly sure expedient of suicide. But it has very much astonished and troubled us, that perfectly pious people, who elsewhere condemn this act most unsparingly, should demand it here from the most faithful son and firmest support of the Church.

But, apart from this, we are convinced that the death of the Emperor would have had no other political result than his surrender; while, if he had escaped with life and liberty from the bloody field of Sedan, many things would have turned out differently to what they have done.

At 6 A.M. on the morning of the 2d of September, Bismark received word in Donchery, by General Reille, that Napoleon wished to speak with him, and was on the way to Donchery. Upon this Bismark at once rode out and met the Emperor near Frénois.

The Emperor expressed a wish to converse with the King of Prussia; and when the Chancellor of the Confederation informed him that the latter was at that moment very far off, in Vendresse, Napoleon demanded whether the King had yet determined upon the place for his present imprisonment, and what were Bismark's views on the matter. The latter offered him, for the time being, his own quarters in Donchery, which he would at once prepare for him. The procession set itself in motion towards Donchery; but before it arrived at the bridge over the Meuse there, Napoleon saw on the roadside a lonely workman's house. He halted and asked Bismark if he could

dismount, and the two men had there, in a poorly-furnished room, an hour's conversation.

The Emperor was, in the first place, especially troubled by the severe terms of the capitulation which the army of M'Mahon must submit to. Bismark would not enter upon this subject, as it had been settled between Moltke and Wimpffen, and when Napoleon returned to it, simply declined to discuss it. On his side, he asked the Emperor what he thought about peace negotiations. Napoleon answered, that as a prisoner it was impossible for him at present to commence treating, and that only the existing regular Government in Paris, with the Empress-regent at its head, was competent to do so.

It would be interesting to know whether Bismark or Napoleon himself, after the events of the 1st of September, in any way believed in the continuance of the Government of the Empress. That Bismark did, seems to us to be doubtful in the extreme; as he himself says, in his report to the King, that after the utterances of the Emperor it appeared to him to be doubly true that, beyond its military advantages, the present situation offered nothing of practical moment.

After a long conversation in the room, the Emperor went out in front of the house, and sat down there in the open air with Bismark. It was here that Napoleon made the statement that he himself had never wished for war, but had been forced into it by the pressure of the public opinion in France.

We for our part have throughout expressed our conviction that the Emperor Napoleon never particularly desired this war; but in honour of truth it must be said that that public opinion which forced him to make war was created by his own party—by the press and unions which this party managed—by the continuous prosecutions against untimely manifestations of a free opinion—by the official candidates—and by other like institutions,—and that the Emperor himself was not quite innocent of all these elements and foundations of the Cæsaric-Bonapartic public opinion. This public opinion, which certainly greatly influenced the Emperor, was in no way that of France.

While the Emperor and Bismark were conversing, the latter received notice that on the south of the village there was a small and comfortably-furnished house called Castle Bellevue, which was not occupied by the wounded. Bismark informed Napoleon of this, and added that he would propose it to King William for the place of meeting, if the Emperor would agree to it, and if he would repair thither at once, as he must at all events need some repose.

Napoleon proceeded, then, with Bismark to Bellevue, where also were now assembled General von Wimpffen, his Chief of the Staff, the Prussian General Podbielski, and Lieutenant-Colonel V. Verdy, awaiting the ratification of the capitulation. On the French side some of the conditions were again referred to, and an attempt was made to introduce alterations in them.

But while this controversy was taking place, an adjutant of Moltke's brought Bismark a communication from the former, saying that he had met the King upon the battle-field, and that King William would not grant the Emperor an interview until the military capitulation was completely settled.

Bismark now, in order to inform the King of the state of things, rode towards him, but on the way met Moltke with the text of the capitulation as it had been sanctioned by the King. Both now turned back together to Bellevue, and the definite signing followed without any further delay.

About noon Bismark and Moltke brought to the King the signed capitulation, and the latter, accompanied by the Crown-Prince, then repaired to Bellevue, where he had a quarter of an hour's interview with Napoleon.

As a temporary residence, the Castle of Wilhelmshöhe near Cassel was apportioned to the Emperor—the place where once his jovial uncle, Jérôme, had lived as King of Westphalia, and where the Electorate-Prince of Hesse has left so many of his historical footsteps.

Napoleon quitted the Castle of Bellevue on the morning of the 3d of September, and, much-impeded by trains of troops and of waggons, and also by French guns which the Germans had captured, arrived at Bouillon only on the morning of the 4th. Proceeding then through Belgium by Verviers and Cologne,

he reached Wilhelmshöhe on the evening of the 5th, where preparations for his reception had been already made.

For some days after these events the Prussian newspapers talked as though they were really convinced that the German armies arriving before Paris would have to deal with a regular Government—they meant the Regency of the Empress Eugenie—and concluded that after the repeated, and in many cases signal, defeats of the French regular army, there was every probability of a speedy peace. Circumstances very soon rendered it impossible to continue such language.

CHAPTER XXII.

PARIS AT THE END OF AUGUST AND IN THE BEGINNING OF SEPTEMBER—THE REPUBLIC DECLARED.

AFTER the communication which the Count of Palikao made to the Corps Legislatif on the 22d of August, and of which we have made mention, the Minister of War appeared as seldom as possible in the Chamber. He excused his absence on the ground of his labours in organising fresh forces, which must not be interrupted for secondary reasons. In reality he must have found it tedious ever to repeat that all was going on well, that the deep "plan" was being executed—that he had the best possible news, but that he, as they would understand, could not communicate it, because success depended upon secrecy, because all might be ruined if the Prussians, who were spying about everywhere, heard anything of "the plan." In time these general forms of speech might become suspicious even to the Chamber, if it compared them with the statements contained in the Prussian telegrams, which certainly only came into Paris in very small numbers. Palikao himself had not that trust in

the course of events with which he so easily inspired the majority of the Chambers, and he, more than any one else, was filled with a feeling of the necessity of keeping the Emperor and the army of M'Mahon away from Paris. We have before seen the steps he took to effect this.

The business which the Minister of War resigned, the official and semi-official journals took up. According to these papers the doom of the German armies was signed and sealed—"the plan" was being executed. As regards "the plan" itself there were many contradictions. Some of the newspapers held stubbornly to the victory of Bazaine on the 18th of August, on which day three Prussian Corps had been thrown into the quarries of Jaumont, the site of which still remained an unsolved enigma. According to them, Bazaine was master of all the roads, and had already left Metz to unite with M'Mahon upon the fields of Champagne, where now, instead of the cross-bows and catapults of the Romans, Chassepots and mitrailleuses would do their work, and annihilate the red-haired barbarians of the East. Other journals, to whom, as time went by, the march of Bazaine from Metz seemed to become doubtful, asserted that he wished to remain in and about Metz. That was exactly "the plan." The Germans, advancing incautiously and arrogantly, would find themselves between two fires, &c. Fluently dilated upon, this strategical imbecility was to be read even as late as two days after

the battle of Sedan. There was not a single sensible word in all these sensation articles, but the masses were imposed upon by the confused, high-toned, and fine-sounding military expressions, as we have seen to be similarly the case often enough in Germany (1859 Guilay, 1866 Benedek).

And together with "the plan," the situation of the Germans especially occupied the above-named Paris journals.

He who read believingly the things there said, would certainly not have given a centime for the German armies, and would be unable to comprehend why they did not very speedily retire from France. According to the 'Volontaire,' the Germans had, by the end of the 16th of August, lost 144,000 men, killed and wounded—the dead being in an enormous proportion; the remainder were dying of starvation; the last reserves were being called up from Germany, "La landwehr" and "La landsturm"—old men of sixty years of age, with flint-muskets, carrying an enormous tobacco-pouch on the right side, a still larger spirit-flask on the left, and a long clay-pipe in the mouth, panting under the burden of a knapsack, in which they carried their coffee-mill and elder-tea, and who moved, coughing and spitting, from the right to the left bank of the Rhine, cursing those who had torn them from the embraces of their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, to lead them into the arms of death.

Between the Crown-Prince of Prussia and Prince Frederic Charles, again, serious quarrels were said to have arisen, so that the one would no longer support the other. The news from the German side, which could not be altogether ignored, was simply dealt with as "the notorious Prussian lies." Lastly, it was spread abroad as a certain fact that the King of Prussia had become insane (*fou*). The genesis of this last news, which could only be traced by watchful observers, was highly interesting. The 'Liberté,' namely, one day stated in an article, the contents of which can easily be condensed, that the King of Prussia must have become insane, because he had ventured to penetrate between two French armies and march upon Paris. On the following day a second journal brought out an article with the title, "The King of Prussia is mad," and gave in it, in fuller detail, the explanations of the 'Liberté.' On the third day, a third journal announced: "On the best authority, we hear that the King of Prussia has gone beside himself about the state of his army, and has become mad. This is naturally kept secret, but it is necessary to watch him very closely." To every impartial observer, it was manifest that then, less than any other time, had the King of Prussia occasion to go mad.

With suchlike tales, then, were the intellectual Parisians, and Frenchmen generally, fed by the persons whom the Empire had brought up to educate the people through journalism.

We await here the question. But why, then, did the intellectual Parisians and Frenchmen generally believe such things? But such credulity was only natural. Imagine people who heard and read literally nothing else whatsoever! Could they be expected to believe that everything that was told them was a pure lie? Was so much to be expected of them when that which they necessarily wished for was told them day by day in comforting lies? Let the trial be made under like circumstances on the right bank of the Rhine, and we shall see whether the result would not be precisely the same; perhaps only the people there would be more disposed to depression, and therefore to doubt.

The very few independent and truthful journals in Paris lost courage, as can easily be understood. They disclosed such facts as they were obliged to, but they did not trouble themselves any longer to point attention to the disclosures by writing leading articles on them.

When the army of the Crown-Prince began its march upon Paris, and before the departure of M'Mahon from Chalons to the north was determined on, which must necessarily alter the dispositions for it, General Trochu was appointed, on the 17th of August, Governor of Paris, and commander-in-chief of the collective forces assembled for the defence of the capital.

Trochu, born 1815, passed through the School of St Cyr, and then the School of Application for the

General Staff, and left the latter early in 1840 as lieutenant on the Staff. In 1843 he became a captain. In Africa, where he had served since 1841, he drew upon himself, by his prudence and bravery, the attention of Marshal Bugeaud, whose adjutant he was from 1845 to the death of the Marshal in 1849; and as the Marshal fully recognised the merits of his adjutant, so did the latter also love and respect the memory of the former, whom he ever regarded as his real teacher in the art of war. In 1853 Trochu became colonel, and at the outbreak of the war in the East, St Arnaud chose him to be his adjutant. Promoted to the rank of general at the end of 1854, he remained as adjutant to Canrobert until this latter resigned the chief command, when he undertook the command of a brigade of infantry, which he led with brilliant bravery. On the 8th of September 1855 he was severely wounded by a shell. In the beginning of the campaign of 1859 in Italy, he again led a brigade, but was appointed general of division on the 4th of May, being at the time only forty-four years old. With his division, which was hurried up to support Niel, he played a peculiarly brilliant part in the battle of Solferino. After the Italian campaign, the General fell most markedly into the background; most likely because his connection with Marshal Bugeaud, whom he remembered with just pride, had gained for him at the Court the unpleasing name of Orleanist. Moreover, to Trochu, a man of soldier-like simplicity and

of the highest honour, the reckless desire of gain and enjoyment which, under the influence of the Second Empire, pervaded all society, and spread even into the army, was very repulsive. He feared that such things would be fatal to it; and not being able to respect the persons who then enjoyed the highest outward consideration, he kept himself personally far away from the circles of the Court.

In the year 1867, on the occasion of the Army Reform Question, he published his book 'L'Armée Française.' Filled with love for the French army, and with respect for its excellent qualities, he yet could not overlook its shortcomings in organisation, and brought these clearly to view. The truth was here, as elsewhere, not listened to with pleasure; and even those officers who justly appreciated the penetration and love of truth displayed in the work, found, for the most part, that the book was inopportune, and that it was not just then the time to unveil to all the world the faults of the French system. The hidden adversaries of the General became more and more hostile to him, and the Government passed him by on every occasion. When the war of 1870 broke out, General Trochu was only a member of the Committee of the General Staff, a post which gave him but little to do. Trochu, when he saw the war conjured up in such a frivolous manner, and saw, moreover, how the troops, barely formed or equipped, were marched with all haste to the frontier through the streets of Paris

with the cry, "À Berlin! à Berlin!" was much depressed, and foreseeing a disastrous issue to this manner of proceeding, did not in any way hide his opinions from Marshal Lebœuf. Trochu, therefore, remained at first altogether unemployed. Only when the 12th Army Corps was being formed did this man, acknowledged to be one of France's most distinguished generals, receive a command, and was finally, as we have seen, called by the Ministry of Palikao to be Governor of Paris — to a post which manifestly in the course of the war must become a most important and decisive position.

This appointment of Trochu could only be regarded as a token of a breaking off from the purely Imperialistic Bonapartic performances of the last lustre, and as a sign that the Ministry of National Defence wished to employ every good Frenchman in his fitting place, without regard to his peculiar opinions —without heeding whether he was an unconditional supporter of the Empire or not.

That such a signification was to be attached to the nomination of Trochu was shown by Palikao also, in the speech in which he informed the Corps Legislatif of it.

Trochu announced his acceptance of the office in a proclamation, which was posted up at every street-corner, and which was received with universal acclamation. It concluded thus: "And to complete my task, which done, I shall, I assure you, retire again

into the darkness from which I have emerged, I take one of the old devices of the province of Brittany, where I was born; 'With the help of God for our country.'" No word in the proclamation made mention of the Emperor or of the Empire, and this omission was evilly spoken of by some of the Mamelukes of the Chamber; but to the Parisians it was very pleasing. In Paris but few men spoke any more of the Emperor, of the Imperial Prince and Court, or of the Empress, and when they did, it was with expressions of the deepest contempt. The Empire had been buried since the 7th of August. Even they who had basked in its brilliancy turned from it as did the others—they could not pardon it that it had been unfortunate, and that it now threatened by its misfortune to injure them also; and thus they who still had in some corner of their hearts any sympathy for fallen greatness, did not dare to speak of it.

With General Trochu was associated a Committee of Defence. Over its composition much strife arose, which was not completely soothed before the catastrophe of Sedan. The Corps Legislatif wished to strengthen the Committee with a number of Deputies to be chosen by the Chamber. The Government, on the contrary, declared that if members of the Chambers were in any case to form part of the Committee, they must be nominated by the Government itself.

Until the appointment of Trochu but little had been done to place Paris in a state of defence. The

General now began the task with the greatest zeal. The works which he introduced were:—

1. The arming of the fortifications;
2. The arming of the artillery;
3. Providing living forces;
4. Provisioning;
5. Instituting measures for internal safety.

Paris, which had become in 1841 a giant fortress, the like of which does not now exist elsewhere, nor has been seen since the days of Babylon and Nineveh, required immense labour to render it presentable as such to the enemy; for modern Europe and the Parisians themselves have seldom in later years thought at all of Paris as a fortress, or considered that it might at some time be required to play the part of one.

The ramparts in the detached forts, as well as in the principal enceinte, required to be levelled for the reception of guns and men, banquettes had to be marked out, embrasures cut, and the thickness of the parapets regulated. Ditches had to be excavated before the various gates, drawbridges constructed, and cover provided. The entrances of the eight railways into the town had also to be secured. The exits of the canals of St Denis and of De l'Ourcq were strongly bridged over, and parapets raised upon this bridging; the ditches of the main enceinte were filled with water; the entrance and the exit of the Seine

were secured by new works; a flotilla of gunboats was formed upon the river; and then the construction of well-covered powder-magazines in the enceinte, which were altogether wanting, was taken in hand; and, lastly, the system of detached forts was to be completed by the erection of new works. These tasks required time for their execution; but they were all at least begun by the first days of September; and, as we shall see, time was gained for the completion of the most important.

As regards the artillery armament, the detached forts had already, since 1867—since the Luxemburg affair—that which was necessary for security against an attack *de vive force* or by surprise. This was now completed; and, at the same time, steps were taken to give to the main enceinte the guns necessary for its safety.

Of regular troops there were in Paris the 13th Corps (Vinoy), of which we have already spoken, and the depots of the Guard and of various regiments of the line. By drawing in the marching regiments and the remaining depots of the line, and by completing them with men of the reserve, with men who had served and were recalled to the colours, and with recruits, it was thought that it would be possible to form another Army Corps; so that then the regular troops would amount to some 60,000 men.

Further, 12,000 sailors, among whom also were some marine infantry, were drawn into Paris and

united in a marine division, under the command of Vice-Admiral la Roncière le Noury. Under him, Rear-Admirals de Saisset and Pothuau were appointed brigadiers. This division was destined to defend the principal detached forts on the north and east sides of Paris. In each of the forts assigned to it a captain of the fleet had the special command. The sailors were particularly intended to work the heavy guns with which the forts were armed, and in the service of which they were practised.

9000 custom-house men were formed into a division to watch the ramparts. 6000 wood-rangers made a brigade of Rifles of two regiments.

In addition to these troops, which collectively must be regarded as more or less regular and accustomed to discipline, there were the Municipal Guard of Paris, infantry and cavalry, and various formations of the *gendarmerie* of the departments.

The total of the above-enumerated forces would amount to at least 90,000 men.

To them 100,000 men of the Mobile Guard from the provinces were next to be drawn in; and, lastly, the Sedentary National Guard of Paris, which was to be brought up to a strength of 266 battalions, with at least 200,000 men. Of the latter, a portion, consisting of the young or unmarried and stronger men, could be mobilised, and be used then for service outside the ramparts. Finally, with all these were as-

sociated volunteer formations of various kinds, under the names of Franc-tireurs, Eclaireurs, and so on.

The total number amounted to 400,000. The arming, clothing, and equipment of the Corps, which had to be absolutely improvised, only progressed slowly; and as long as Palikao's Ministry and the Empire existed, this was no doubt owing to the unwillingness of the Government to place arms in the hands of the whole male population of Paris.

And speaking of these things, we must not omit to mention the affair of the firemen (*pompiers*) of France.

After Palikao's Ministry had succeeded to power, owing to the impression made by the totally unexpected, and therefore astounding, events of the beginning of August, and after the feeling then aroused had been strengthened by the pitiable despatches of the Emperor from Metz, the new Minister of the Interior, M. Chevreau, issued an order to all the prefects to send to Paris as speedily as possible all firemen under forty years of age. The capital seemed to the Ministry to be at that time threatened from day to day. To call out the citizens appeared to it to be a hazardous proceeding; and so it wished at first to base the defence of Paris upon the firemen from the provinces, who were in some degree disciplined, and who had very little in common with the Parisians.

From the 15th of August, then, these men streamed into Paris. Everywhere were to be seen the most wonderful uniforms, surmounted by helmets of classical design. There came in the crowds not only young men below forty years of age, but many decided antediluvians, with the most beautiful white beards, and with the thinnest legs, the spareness of which was rendered yet more conspicuous by the tightness of their pantaloons. No preparation had been made for their reception. Most of them had no idea wherefore they were called to Paris, but rather imagined that a great conflagration was going on, which they were to extinguish. The presence of these brave, devoted men could only occasion embarrassment; for by the 17th of August, 60,000 of them had arrived. On that day the Minister of the Interior instructed the prefects to stop forwarding any more, and began to try to get rid as soon as possible of those who were already come. This was effected after a time; but a great number of provincial firemen had at all events had the pleasure of admiring the wonders of the capital, which but few of them had seen before — and this in itself was some satisfaction.

The Committee of Defence wished to provision Paris for six months, and thus render it independent for that period; but for so large a town this was an immense undertaking. It was, it is true, rendered somewhat easier by the amount of money amassed

in Paris, by the trade and business connections of the capital with the whole of France, and by the space which there was within its walls for the accumulation of great quantities of supplies. Already in the third and fourth weeks of August numerous trains arrived from Nantes, Havre, and Rouen with corn, rice, forage, and salt meat. A cattle-park was established in the Bois de Boulogne. New mills were erected; so that very shortly two and a half times as much corn could be ground in the town as in ordinary times. But still the gathering in of stores sufficient to furnish with rations a town like Paris—a town of 1,800,000 of population—was a work of great difficulty, even if the supply was limited to the most necessary food, as on board ship. And it must be remembered that the inhabitants of Paris are somewhat spoiled; and although certainly not such large eaters as are to be found elsewhere, they still all of them in every grade know how to appreciate the good things of this world. It was almost impossible to guarantee fresh meat for six months, if only on account of the quantity of forage which the requisite number of live cattle would consume in such a length of time; and, in addition to this, the year 1870 had been throughout France an exceptionally bad one for crops, on account of the drought which had prevailed. Salt, one of the most indispensable necessaries of life, generally falls short first in invested towns, because, as a rule, people have no idea of

the enormous quantities usually consumed in modern life. Whence, too, were to be procured eggs, butter, and fowls for six months? Whence were to come fresh vegetables, which can generally be bought in Paris at such moderate prices, and of such an excellent quality? Of fish we will not speak. The Seine certainly supplies a few, but they are very indifferent; and the fish from the sea, and other maritime products, would naturally be shut out when once the investment had taken place.

It might, then, perhaps be possible to provision Paris for six months with comestibles such as are supplied to ships, although even that, spite of all zeal which might be expended upon it, would be no light task; but to provide for it food, such as all classes had long been accustomed to, was clearly impossible.

On the 25th of August, General Trochu caused a great raid to be made upon the quarters of the town in which the higher *demi-monde* and its friends resided. Many of these were seized, and among them were found an enormous number of foreigners —a fact which is worthy of notice, as a certain party in Germany are always discoursing with virtuous indignation on the immorality of the French. These ladies, together with their intimates, were speedily expelled from Paris. This measure met with universal approbation—among other reasons, because this society, thus summarily disposed of, was ready

for anything, even to the extent of assisting intrigues against the defence of Paris.

Another measure which followed very shortly was not so generally approved of. On the 28th of August, placards on the street-corners announced that all foreigners who were subjects of the States with which France was at war must leave Paris and its neighbourhood within three days, and must either return to their homes or retire into the Departments to the west of the Loire. Any who claimed to be exempted must obtain a special licence from the Governor of Paris. General Trochu remarked that this banishing appeared to be also necessary for the sake of those expelled.

A similar expulsion has scarcely occurred since the days of antiquity, for there were 80,000 Germans in Paris. Much hardship was caused; for the decree affected, among others, many men who had been residents in Paris fifteen and twenty years—who had founded families and businesses there—whose wives were Frenchwomen, and whose children had been born in France. Now at three days' notice they were driven from the country which they had made their own, and obliged to return to a home which had long become foreign to them. There was even discovered a chief of battalion of the National Guard, who, German by birth, had never been naturalised. Much misery was consequently seen everywhere. Considering the generous and humane character of

the French in general, and of the Parisians in particular, one involuntarily asks one's self on what grounds such a measure could appear to be necessary.

It is true that there were Germans, guests of France, who had sought and found there a livelihood which their own country denied them, who now manifested in public places their joy over the German victories in a manner which amounted to brutality, and which must have deeply wounded every Frenchman; there were also people who loudly proclaimed their approval of the most severe behaviour of the German armies towards France. Among the uneducated classes of German workmen, also, threats were made of conspiracies and deeds of violence on their part when once the German hosts should appear before Paris. But such cases were exceptional, although here and there rough treatment ensued, which supported the statement of General Trochu that the banishing was for the good of those banished. People also whom the decree of the General did not affect, such as German-speaking Swiss, and Austrians, began to depart. One of these, on being questioned, replied, "What does it avail me that I am Swiss? I speak perhaps a word of German to a countryman; a gamin calls out, *Un Prussien! un espion Prussien!* I am surrounded, arrested, perhaps mobbed to death on the way to the Commissioner of Police. All the reclamations of our ambassador would not then restore me to life."

Let us look at things as we may, at the bottom of

this banishment of the Germans lies the awakening of national hate.

And this awakening of national hate—its awakening on both sides, not on the French alone—is for Europe the greatest curse of this war, compared with which all material sufferings, all material losses, great and pitiable though they may be, are as nothing. It was the anxiety to ward off this misfortune, which they saw was inevitable if war broke out, that caused a number of single-minded men of both nations to strive for years with all their power to postpone its advent.

The expulsion of the Germans was not confined to Paris or the fortresses, but even those who lived in the open towns were hunted away. One of the men who first incited the measure was M. Gambetta, who was shortly afterwards called upon to play a great part in the history of his country.

On the forenoon of Saturday, the 3d of September, the first news of the catastrophe of Sedan reached Paris, and though it was not at all complete or definite, great excitement had arisen on the Boulevards by noon.

The session of the Corps Legislatif was opened at 3 P.M., when Palikao announced important events. He commenced with describing a sortie of Bazaine from Metz, which had been repulsed. This, he acknowledged, was not good news. Then first he began to talk of a battle fought between Mézieres and Sedan, in which

first success, then misfortune, had been on the French side; then he stated that M'Mahon was wounded,—and all this he told in confused and obscure language, that still left grounds for hope, dwelling especially on the fact that the intelligence was not official. But he repeatedly declared that the news was most important, and that by it the Government was compelled to appeal to the living power of the people.

After Palikao's explanation, a lively discussion at once ensued. Jules Favre first brought some order into it, in a speech which, far superior to his usual declamations, demanded: "What is the truth? The truth is, that the French army has, under all circumstances, whenever it has met the enemy, behaved with heroic courage. You know the miracle of bravery which Marshal Bazaine wrought when he sought to rupture the circle of the far superior forces which surrounded him. Without counting the enemy, in spite of all obstacles, knowing that France required his sword, he sought to set himself free. On the other hand, a general not less brave set out to support him in this enterprise. He has succumbed. There was no want of bravery. What was wanting was freedom of command. It is notorious that troops were demanded from him to protect the Emperor. He refused to send them, and then the Council of Ministers despatched some of those which were destined to defend Paris. That is well known, and such a state of things ought not to continue. We

must know how we stand with the Government. Is the Emperor in communication with his Ministers? Does he give them orders?"

To this question Palikao answered distinctly, "No."

"Then," continued Jules Favre, "the Government has practically ceased to exist; and if you are not incredibly blind, if you have not an obstinacy which is no longer patriotic, you must admit that it is your duty to demand from the country those resources by which deliverance can be effected. I will not examine the question more deeply. The answer of the Minister has cleared up the main point—the Government has ceased to exist."

Hereupon arose furious interruptions by the Mamelukes. The President, Schneider, stood up and spoke: "On every occasion it would be my duty to protest against such words. Under the present circumstances especially, I must protest against everything that may cause a weakening of the country."

Jules Favre—"A weakening! What I seek is moral power; and it lies in a liberated country, which must only rely upon itself and upon its representatives, no longer trusting to those who have plunged it into destruction. (Great noise from the Mamelukes.) In this extreme crisis I have but two words to add—France and Paris, both equally threatened, both united in resisting by a close solidity, are resolved not to lay down arms until the enemy is

driven back. The country knows that in it, and in it alone, lies the remedy. (Applause on the Left.) It is necessary that, to avoid confusion, all parties step back in favour of a military man, who will take upon himself the defence of the nation. His name is well known and dear to the country. He must take the place of all others; before him all the phantoms of Government must disappear. That is the remedy: I say it in the sight of the country—may the country hear me! (Very good! on the Left, and corresponding cries on the Right.)"

This distinct recommendation of making Trochu a sort of dictator was very displeasing to the Count of Palikao, and he reminded the Chamber that a constituted Government existed, and that it was their duty to rally round it.

During the subsequent part of the sitting, the Corps Legislatif was principally occupied in discussing the urgency of calling in the collective male population of all ages between twenty-five and thirty-five years, instead of, as up to the present, only soldiers of the higher age who had already served; and afterwards with the question of the election of officers for the National Guard of Paris, which had been already postponed for a long time.

The Chamber finally adjourned until 3 P.M. on the 4th of September.

But it was destined to meet again ere that. When the sitting closed it was 4.30 P.M.; and only at a

later hour was intelligence brought by telegrams from Belgium and Switzerland which showed the catastrophe of Sedan in its true light.

Groups immediately formed on the Boulevards, and paraded them singing the Marseillaise. One of these mobs proceeded to the Luxemburg, at that time the headquarters of the Governor of Paris, and there demanded that the deposition of the Emperor and of the dynasty should be proclaimed.

Palikao himself could not as yet credit the whole extent of the misfortune; and in the evening telegraphed to the French consul in Basle to inquire if the German news of the catastrophe of Sedan was to be believed. He received for answer, that by all accounts there could be no doubt of the truth of what was stated.

Meanwhile several of the deputies had hurried to the President, Schneider, and communicating to him what they had heard, had importuned him to assemble the Chamber as quickly as possible. This he consented to do, and, sending to the private dwellings of the members, summoned them to meet at midnight between the 3d and 4th of September.

At 1 A.M. on the 4th, the sitting was opened. The Count of Palikao was present also. In spite of the telegram from Basle, he had lain himself down to sleep peacefully, without consulting the Ministry, and was first awakened and caused to arise by the messenger from Schneider.

The Count was the first speaker, and now confessed the truth.

"Our army," he said, "has, after heroic efforts, been thrown back by overwhelming forces on Sedan. Resistance was no longer possible. The army has capitulated, and the Emperor has been made prisoner."

After communicating this serious intelligence, Palikao demanded an adjournment until the morrow. Properly speaking, this would be until the 5th of September, but he meant only until some later hour in the day of the 4th.

The President, Schneider, supported the motion, and Jules Favre, speaking in the name of the Left, did not oppose it; but he at the time laid before the Chamber a motion with the following contents:—

1. "It is declared that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte and his dynasty are deposed from the power which the constitution bestowed on them.

2. "The Corps Legislatif nominate a commission of government, composed of . . . The same is invested with the full authority of a government, and has the special task of resisting the invasion to the utmost, and of driving the enemy from the territory of the nation.

3. "General Trochu is confirmed in his post of Governor-General of the town of Paris."

The ex-Minister Pinard alone ventured to remark, "We have not the right to proclaim the deposition;"

and the Chamber then adjourned until noon on the 4th, the whole sitting having lasted but twenty minutes.

In the morning hours of the 4th, a proclamation of Palikao's Ministry was found on all the street-corners: "Frenchmen! a great disaster has happened to the country. After three days of heroic battles delivered by the army of M'Mahon against 300,000 of the enemy, 40,000 men have been made prisoners. General Wimpffen, who assumed the command in place of Marshal M'Mahon, severely wounded, has signed a capitulation. But this cruel blow does not shake our courage. Paris is to-day in a situation to defend herself. The military forces of the land are being organised. In a few days a new army will stand under the walls of the capital. Another army will be formed on the banks of the Loire. Your patriotism, your unity, your energy will rescue France. The Emperor has been taken prisoner in the battle. The Government, in harmony with the public force, will adopt all the measures required by the importance of the events."

At 1 P.M. on the 4th of September, the President, Schneider, opened the sitting of the Corps Legislatif. The Count of Palikao had surrounded the place of meeting, the Palais Bourbon, with numerous troops, and occupied the Place de la Concorde.

Against this Count Kératry protested; and in the course of a debate, in which it was demanded that

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the Corps Legislatif should be guarded only by the National Guard, Palikao adopted a very high tone, and spoke at times in most unmeasured terms. Then, in opposition to the motion which M. Favre had brought forward in the midnight sitting, he moved the following governmental one, and demanded that the debate on it should be declared urgent:—

1. "A council of government and of national defence is hereby formed. The same to consist of five members—each to be chosen by an absolute majority of the Corps Legislatif.

2. "The nomination of Ministers shall be subject to the approval of this council.

3. "General the Count of Palikao is nominated Governor-General of this council.

"Given in the Council of Ministers, the 4th of September 1870.

"For the Emperor, and by virtue of the power which he has intrusted to us.

(Signed) "EUGENIE."

Hereupon Jules Favre demanded that his proposal also be declared urgent.

M. Thiers moved a conciliatory proposition. He inclined to the view of Favre, but he held that, for the sake of unity, a sacrifice should be made. His motion, which was supported by forty-seven members, ran:—

"In view of the existing state of affairs, the Cham-

ber nominates a commission of government and of national defence. A Constituting Assembly will be convened as soon as circumstances will permit."

By a decision of the Chamber all three of these motions—of Favre, of Palikao, and of Thiers—were recognised as urgent. They were to be examined by a committee of nine members, to be named by the Bureau; and during the consultation of this, the President adjourned the sitting at 1.40 P.M. until 2.30 P.M.

But before that time the state of affairs was greatly changed.

In the course of the forenoon a number of battalions of the National Guard had assembled in their arrondissements. In the afternoon they traversed the Boulevards, and were greeted everywhere with the cry, "The deposition! the deposition!" "Long live the National Guard! long live the Nation!" And between these arose every now and again the shout, "Long live the Republic!"

After parading the streets, these men finally posted themselves in crowds by the palisades which shut off the court of the Palais Bourbon from the Quai d'Orsay. A gate in this was at first partly opened, but a *questor* of the Corps Legislatif shut it. Thereupon the National Guard and people both demanded that it should be reopened. A deputy from the Left, M. Steenackers, came then from the Palais Bourbon, and promised the mob that this should be done if they

would enter without arms. A number of the National Guard then took the bayonets from their muskets, and announced themselves as a deputation; whereupon, by an order from Steenackers, the gate was thrown open. The National Guard entered, the people thronged in behind it, and soon a confused multitude overran not only the tribunes, but also the floor of the Chamber.

When the deputies wished to return from the Bureau to resume the sitting, most of them shrank back affrighted. By 3 P.M. the whole palace was filled with people who did not belong to it, but who made themselves perfectly at home there. After the nominal reopening of the sitting no one could make himself heard, and therefore, at 3 P.M., the President adjourned the Chamber, a great number of deputies belonging to the majority and to the Centre retiring to a room in the Hôtel du President to consult as to what further steps should be taken.

While the nature of a new government was being deliberated upon there, the members of the extreme Left, the Irreconcilables, accompanied by a mob of the National Guard and of citizens, proceeded to the Hôtel de Ville, and being there nominated by the latter to be members of government, a Republic was forthwith proclaimed.

Upon information of this being received by the deputies assembled in the President's house, three of them were deputed to repair to the Hôtel de Ville,

and there enter into negotiations with the Provisional Government.

The deputation found that this government consisted of all the deputies for Paris, excepting only M. Thiers. M. Jules Favre, one of its members, afterwards returned to the Palais Bourbon and thanked the members who were still there for the offer of their co-operation, but regretted that the Government must decline accepting it, as no good could result from it; and stated, further, that the dissolution of the Corps Legislatif had been therefore decreed.

Simultaneously with this the Senate was also prorogued. It had been opened at 12.30 P.M. by the President, M. Rouher. At first there had been a succession of violent declarations of adherence to the Empire and the dynasty; and when news of the proceedings in the Corps Legislatif arrived, the senators had protested against this anarchy, and expressed their deepest disgust at it. But when the question was discussed whether, under the existing circumstances, the Senate should not sit *en permanence*, to be able to act at once vigorously, as events might require, Messieurs les Senateurs lost courage, and separated with the resolve of meeting again at the customary hour on the 5th, without regarding what might happen outside, to consider any proposals which the Legislature might bring forward.

But this sitting was never to take place. The Provisional Government declared the Senate to be not

only dissolved, but abolished. The senators dispersed to all quarters of the compass, as the members of the Right and Centre had done, and none dared to oppose the revolution. Their place of sitting, as well as that of the Corps Legislatif, was then sealed up and watched by the new authorities.

While thus the sitting of the Chambers closed amid tumult, and the Republic was proclaimed from the Hôtel de Ville, a crowd of people, and of the National and Mobile Guards, broke, at 3 P.M., from the Place de la Concorde into the gardens of the Tuileries, and advanced towards the reserved garden of the palace, which was occupied by troops of the depot of the Imperial Guard, under General Mellinet. A man of the Mobile Guard was sent forward with a white flag to open negotiations on the part of the mob. General Mellinet pointed out that the tricolor flag no longer waved over the building, a sign that no member of the Imperial family was within it, and declared himself ready to withdraw his men if the National Guard would at once occupy the palace. The troops raised the butts of their rifles in the air, and the gates were opened. The National Guard took possession, and the people streamed in, not only from the west, but also from the east side, from the Place du Carrousel, without being guilty of the slightest disorder, save only that they removed the numerous golden N's, the emblems of the fallen power.

The Empress Eugenie had left the Tuileries at 1 P.M., accompanied only by a subordinate servitor of the palace, and crossed on the evening of the same day the Belgian frontier at Maubeuge, whence she shortly afterwards repaired to England, whither her son was also sent. The whole of the Court servants, high and low, had dispersed, and had left to her fate the lady whom, but the day before, they had worshipped on their knees. There remained behind only the kitchen domestics, who perhaps felt themselves tied to the place by the certainty of good cheer, and a faithful subaltern *employé*, the secretary of General Lepic, Marshal of the Palace. This official was the only one who pitied the Empress in her abandonment and felt for her solitude in the last hours of her sojourn in the Tuileries.

The last member of the Imperial family to leave Paris was the Princess Clothilde, wife of Prince Napoleon. After hearing mass, she quitted the Palais Royal at 3 P.M., and journeyed to Prangins in the Canton Wadt, a possession of her husband, where her children had been already sent. The husband himself had, after the first misfortunes which the French army experienced, left the camp, the air of which was always disagreeable to him, and under pretence of a diplomatic mission, had found the opportunity of breathing more freely in Italy, in the vicinity of his royal father-in-law.

The Provisional Government of the Republic and of National Defence was composed of M. Emanuel Arago, Cremieux, Jules Favre, Ferry, Gambetta, Garnier-Pagès, Glais-Bizoin, Pelletan, Picard, Rochefort, Jules Simon, and General Trochu, who was confirmed in his post of Governor of Paris, and appointed at the same time President of the Government.

The Ministerial posts were distributed thus:—Foreign Affairs, Jules Favre; Interior, Gambetta; War, General Le Flo; Marine, Admiral Fourichon; Justice, Cremieux; Finance, Picard; Public Instruction and Art, Jules Simon; Agriculture and Commerce, Magnin: as Mayor of Paris, a title which was now revived, Etienne Arago; as Prefect of Police, Count Kératry; and as Director of the Post-Office and Telegraphs, M. Steenackers, were appointed.

Most of these men are sufficiently well known. The Mayor of Paris, an old Republican, brother of the celebrated astronomer Francis Arago, was born in 1802, his nephew Emanuel in 1812.

Vice-Admiral Fourichon, born 1809, entered the Naval School in 1826, and became "captain of line-of-battle ship" in 1848. As such he was, after the *coup d'état*, Governor of Cayenne; and the political prisoners who were sent there by the decrees of President Prince Louis Bonaparte, assert that he carried out to the utmost the sentences of deportation—a somewhat remarkable recommendation for a Minister of the present Republic, which was founded upon the

ruins of the Empire and Bonapartism.* Fourichon was promoted to Vice-Admiral in 1859; and at the outbreak of the war in 1870, he received the command of the North Sea Squadron; and the decree which appointed him Minister of Marine under the Republic reached him on board the ironclad ship Magnanime, before Wilhelmshafen (Bay of Jahde).

Le Flo, born 1804, became brigadier in 1848, and in the same year was elected for the Assembly. There he sat on the Right, and was a promoter of the Bonapartic policy until the Prince President fell out with that side also, when Le Flo took part against him. He was therefore arrested on the 2d of December 1851 and exiled from France, whither he first returned in 1859. From that time until 1870 he took no part in State affairs.

Leon Gambetta, born in Cahors in 1838, springs from a Genoese family. In his youth he displayed many traits of great energy, which may also be explained by the nervous excitability of the Southern character. In the year 1859 he became an advocate in Paris, where, towards the end of 1868 and in the beginning of 1869, he made himself especially celebrated by his defence of the men accused in the Baudin affair, and also on the occasion of the "emancipa-

* It was Fourichon who expressly ordered the Republicans transported to Algeria, after the success of the *coup d'état*, to be fastened to the "spit" during their passage. The "spit" is a long iron bar which is run through the chains of fifteen or twenty of the galley-slaves.

tion" of Toulouse. In the latter year he was returned to the Corps Legislatif for Paris and for Marseilles, and decided to sit for the latter place. As a deputy, he, in spite of protracted sickness, became the acknowledged leader of the extreme Left—the Irreconcilables.

Count Kératry, of an old Brittany family, was born in the year 1832, entered the French cavalry as a volunteer in 1854, went through the campaigns in the Crimea and in Italy, and after the last, towards the end of 1859, became a sub-lieutenant. In 1861 he went with the 3d regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique to Mexico. In 1864 he served for a time in the *contre* guerilla force of Colonel Dupin, became then orderly officer to Marshal Bazaine, and in 1865 took his discharge. He then devoted himself to literary occupations, and wrote those articles in the 'Revue Contemporaine' which essentially placed weapons in the hands of the Opposition to attack the Government and Bazaine concerning their behaviour in the Mexican war, and which involved the author in a verbal and written controversy with M. Rouher. In 1869, Kératry was elected for the Corps Legislatif; and he it was who, after the prorogation of July, made the proposal that the Chamber should, if not summoned before, reassemble on the 26th of October by its own authority. We have already related the fate of this proposition.

Rochefort, as a member of the new Government,

had in the first place to be released from the prison of Ste Pelagie, where he was still confined. With him numerous other Republicans were set free who had tried to raise the flag of their cause on the 14th of August. The attempt failed, principally because by an error the simultaneous uprising of the different sections of the conspiracy did not take place. The ringleaders who were captured were tried by martial law and sentenced to death, as Paris was already in a state of siege; but luckily the sentence had not yet been carried into effect, and the Republicans of the 4th of September could not consistently cause it to be executed upon the Republicans of the 14th of August.

M. Steenackers, born in Lisbon in 1830, was only naturalised as a Frenchman in 1866. His parents were Belgians. He originally intended to be a sculptor; but soon giving up that idea, he devoted himself to politics and to historical researches. In 1869 he was, after he had been for some time member of the council of the Upper Marne, returned to the Corps Legislatif.

M. Isaac Adolf Cremieux was born in Nîmes in 1796, and has been an advocate since 1817. As such he has been engaged in political processes of every nature, and conducted them with great cleverness, both for men of liberty and for the tyrants of the world. During the Oriental question of 1840 he entered zealously into the cause of his evilly-entreated co-believers, and secured the acquittal of the Jews of

Damascus. In the year 1848 he pronounced for the declaration of the Republic, and entered the Government as Minister of Justice, although he had never before been estranged from the House of Orleans, and although he had even in the last hours promoted the regency of the Duchess of Orleans. He, however, soon resigned his post, as he would not consent to the prosecution of Louis Blanc. He was then returned to the Assembly. There he did not show himself at all pleased with the Government of Cavaignac, and favoured the election of Prince Louis Napoleon to be President. But when the latter was so chosen, he opposed him in the Legislatif, and had the honour of being arrested during the *coup d'état.* When he was liberated, he retired altogether from politics, and devoted himself to advocacy. Throughout he showed no hostility to the Bonapartic rule, neither had he any antipathy to the family. In the year 1869 he was elected by the 3d district of Paris in the after-elections for the Corps Legislatif.

It certainly cannot be said that there was much homogeneity in the constitution of the Provisional Government, but it can be asserted that all its members entered it with the firm conviction that after the catastrophe of Sedan nothing remained for France but a Republic—that a government of some kind must be given to it, and that this took upon itself a heavy burden. In truth, it required much ill-feeling to assume or to give out that the new Ministers ex-

pected to derive much pleasure from their tenure of office.

They all knew well that their Government was not a regular one — that it was only a makeshift, which had, however, to be accepted. All understood thoroughly that by the political law of France the general voice of the people was required to confirm it in power, or to form from it another. But divers opinions prevailed as to the moment in which the French nation should be called upon to give its vote; and this, under the existing state of affairs, is easily to be comprehended, without accusing the members of the Government of fearing that an immediate appeal to the people would cost them their places.

The next question, of the greatest interest to the whole civilised world, was, How would the revolution in France affect the continuation of hostilities? Could it lead to a speedy peace?

Most of the men who now formed the Provisional Government had, before the commencement of the war, protested most decidedly against it. It might therefore be assumed that they would strive to bring about its cessation. But then they indubitably could not conclude a peace. Only a regular government could do that. Even supposing that the Provisional Government had the whole of France on its side, it was nevertheless not regular. The government of a great country can neither be chosen nor confirmed in office by acclamation. In order that it may be

regarded as regular, it requires formal sureties, which in this case could only be obtained by means of a general vote.

The Provisional Government, therefore, created in the Hôtel de Ville in Paris, could not seek to conclude peace with the Germans, and the Germans could not be expected to accept from such a Government that which itself it dared not venture to seek.

But this Government could take one step towards bringing the war to a close. It could at all events conclude an armistice which would not formally bind France to accept peace. The Germans also could arrange such a temporary cessation of hostilities with it; and the essential object of such an agreement must be to enable France to recognise by her general vote the Government already formed, or to create a new and regular one.

But with all this it is clear that the German interest would not allow such an armistice, unless it would presumably lead to a peace—to a peace which would answer her demands; and therefore the Provisional Government must not only itself recognise these, but must be nearly convinced that France also would agree to them.

But when the Provisional Government entered into office, the state of affairs between the two nations had assumed a very different aspect to that which they wore when Napoleon III. sent his declaration of war to Paris; for now a great gulf yawned between the

two nations which it seemed impossible to bridge over.

We have seen how nobly and moderately the German rulers and press expressed themselves before and at the commencement of the war. Germany accepted the challenge which was thrown down before it, but it desired only to defend its territory and its independence—it accused the French Government of wilful offence, but not the French nation.

But of this feeling there was soon nothing more to be seen.

On the 13th of August the King of Prussia ordered that the conscription should cease in the districts of France occupied by German troops. This measure was perfectly in order; for manifestly in war it cannot be required of any one that he place weapons in the hands of his adversary, or leave him those which he can take away. Moreover, it was self-evident that the order was only provisional, and would cease to have effect as soon as through any circumstances the Germans ceased to hold the territory to which it applied.

On the 14th of August, two governments-general, Alsace and Lorraine, were instituted. To the former, General Count Bismark-Bohlen was appointed, who at first, until the capture of Strasburg, established his headquarters in Hagenau; and with him was associated, as civil commissioner and president of the government, Herr Kühlewetter. The governor-

general of Lorraine was General von Bonin, with his seat in Nancy, and with Count Villers as civil commissioner and president of the government.

These appointments also aroused no suspicion. The German governments could not leave the provinces they occupied without any administration; neither could they allow this to remain in the hands of their adversaries.

But it was somewhat different with an order of the 30th of August, by which a new department of the Moselle was formed, composed otherwise than the hitherto existing French one had been, and united with the government-general of Alsace.

This new department was to include the arrondissements of Metz, Thionville, and Saarguemines of the old French department of the Moselle, and the arrondissements of Chateau Salins and Sarrebourg of the old French department of the Meurthe.

By this opportunity it was intimated, in a very plain manner, that Germany intended to separate from France, and definitely to gain as a new province for the German Empire, the newly-formed government-general of Alsace, now augmented by the recently-created department of the Moselle (the so-called German Lorraine), which further included the French departments of the Upper and Lower Rhine.

The tone of the greater part of the German papers had also become very significant after the first victories of the German soldiers; and these journals now

demanded that "the old provinces of the German Empire, Alsace and Lorraine, which had been contumeliously torn away from Germany, should be again united to it."

The men who first from their comfortable easy-chairs sent forth this cry were old men of letters, whose views and doctrines had been long deemed to be defunct. But, alas! they began now to gain more followers than could have been expected.

In reply to the arguments which they published, we wish briefly to oppose the following facts:—

1. Alsace and Lorraine were not taken from the German nation, but from the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation, which notoriously troubled itself very little about the nationalities of those whom it took to its bosom, but, when possible, would have embraced, as ruler, all the world—Germans, French, Italians, Croats, Poles, and others. Alsace and Lorraine were torn from this Holy Roman Empire at a time when no German nation whatsoever existed, but only dynasties of a German name, which seized any territory that yielded anything without regard to its nationality — which daily conspired with foreign princes "against Emperor and Empire" to enrich themselves and forward their dynastic interests.

2. Alsace and Lorraine were ceded to France little by little, by treaties which were perfectly regular and universally recognised by the public law of Europe, and can therefore only be separated from it

and given to another state by similar treaties, as long as the present international law of Europe has a spark of validity.

3. Alsace and Lorraine only arrived, and could only arrive, at a feeling of nationality through the great French Revolution—and the feeling which they then gained was French. They attached themselves, with body and soul, to the great French nation. Language does much, but certainly not everything; for there are sympathies and interests which unite and bind without the aid of a common speech.

We believe that these three statements are indisputable, and that only a self-conscious partiality can deny their justice.

The historical arguments for the recovery of the "purely German" countries, Alsace and Lorraine, are of just as doubtful nature, and tend just as much to annihilate all historical truths as those of certain Poles for the restoration of Poland in her old boundaries as a middle-age, feudal state.

It is some satisfaction to us to be able to state that the leading German statesmen have not made use of the "historical" argument to justify the "recovery" of these provinces. They employed another, that of the public weal, against which in itself we, from our point of view, have nothing to say.

Count Bismark declared—may we be excused for anticipating events a little—"We demand the cession of the government-general of Alsace (including the

new department of the Moselle, German Lorraine) in the interest of Germany, in order to be able to combat France under circumstances favourable for us should the war break out again, as we presume it must."

Here manifestly the so-called strategical questions come into consideration. From the "higher strategical" point of view, however, nearly everything can be proved—the necessity for France of the "natural" Rhine frontier just as clearly as the necessity for Germany of the new Germanic-Lorraine-Alsatian boundary. These points are open to discussion; but we believe it is better to leave them to the young officers of both nations who wish to enter the general staff of their armies, and are desirous of showing themselves worthy of them, and who are permitted to bring prominently forward such elements of discussion as they may require for the one side, and take no heed of them for the other.

According to our belief, the best frontier, even from a strategical point of view, is that which encloses a nation which regards itself as solidly united.

Since, then, the Alsatians and the people of Lorraine have regarded themselves as completely French since the great Revolution, and as this feeling has continually grown stronger as time has gone by, we cannot deem the acquirement of Alsace and German Lorraine to be a gain for Germany.

Count Bismark has acknowledged this: he has

spoken of a heavy burden which Germany has taken upon herself with this annexation, but which she was obliged to assume. Wherefore?

Certain learned men in Germany undertook to make the load light. If the people of Alsace and Lorraine are not willing to be Germans, said they, they must be treated as Helots until they get understanding; if the French will not consent to separate from themselves the German Alsatians and inhabitants of Lorraine, the Germans must rack them till the blood squirts out from their nails. It is comprehensible how soldiers become imbittered in the heat of battle, even unto cruelty; but the endeavours of men who are safely sheltered themselves, and who pretend to be the advocates of liberty, to incite others to deeds of cruelty, and to give to war, which necessarily brings enough suffering in its train, a yet more barbarous character, can only make a most repulsive impression upon the impartial observer.

We have examined the one side of the abyss, let us now look to the other.

As early as the 6th of September, Jules Favre addressed a circular to the diplomatic agents of France abroad, in which he related the declaration of the Republic, and pointed out the position of the Government. In this writing he announced that both it and the country desired peace, and that this was possible now that the man who had conjured up this war to further his dynastic interests had been

displaced; for had not the King of Prussia himself in his earlier proclamations declared that he did not fight against France but against Napoleon?

"Will the King of Prussia continue a godless war," asked M. Favre, "which will be at least as ruinous to himself as to us? Will he exhibit to the world of the nineteenth century the cruel spectacle of two nations annihilating one another, and heaping up ruins and corpses—heedless of humanity, of reason, and of science? He can do it; but if he does, he must take upon himself the responsibility of answering for it before the world and in history. If he throws us a challenge, we shall accept it. We will not give up an inch of our territory nor a stone of our fortresses. From a shameful (*honteuse*) peace a war of extirpation would speedily arise, but we wish to treat for a lasting peace. Our interest is here that of all Europe; and we have grounds for hoping that the question will be so viewed without any dynastic prepossessions in the councils of the Governments. But even if we remain alone, we shall not be weak."

The Government had at first determined to allow the elections for a Constituting Assembly according to the election law of 1848, to take place on the 16th of October, but it afterwards reconsidered the matter, and named the 2d October as the day. To justify this measure, M. Favre issued another circular. In this he treated the question of peace as he had done in the former one, and denied the assertion which

was now made on the German side that the French nation had desired the war.

In fact, in the abandoned chambers of the Imperial house, in those of M. Rouher and of other dignitaries of the Second Empire, a correspondence had been found which was printed at the instance of the Provisional Government, and which gives the clearest explanation on this point. From it it is manifest that the French nation was just as astonished as the German by the commencement of this war; from it is seen also what disreputable personages, of various, especially of secondary nations, the French warlike Court party made use of, to gain information and to set the war in motion. It certainly requires an expert brain to discover from these writings that the French nation wished for the war of 1870, but some of the German papers possessed such necessary intellects.

But Jules Favre, while defending the French nation against such accusations, acknowledged, nevertheless, that it could not free itself from all responsibility, since it had for so long endured the Imperial Government, and that it must make sacrifices and recompense the victor—only not by cession of territory, as that would be shameful to France, and she must prefer destruction to dishonour.

Thus, while on the German side a resignment of land was, partly on historical grounds and partly from reasons of utility, most decidedly demanded, it was refused with equal decision by the French; and

hereby was formed the great gulf which separated the two nations.

It will be worth while to consider this stumbling-block — this question of the cession of territory — more minutely.

In the first place, it is established that the international law of the present day recognises fully the right of acquiring land by conquest. We will not examine whether this is good or not; it is sufficient for our purpose to state the fact. It can therefore be no disgrace to a nation conquered in war to cede to the victor some of its territory.

Notoriously Napoleon III. would, had he been victorious, have demanded from Germany the left bank of the Rhine; thereof there can certainly be no doubt. Germany, or the German governments, would scarcely have refused the required concession because it was shameful; they would rather have asked themselves whether they might yet hope for success in arms, and would have formed their resolve according to the answer which they must give.

Russia after the Crimean war was compelled by the terms of the Peace of Paris to give up territory, and one of the victorious Powers which forced this condition upon her was France.

France allowed Savoy and Nice to be ceded to her by Italy in 1860, in requital for aid rendered to the latter. It is true that this transfer was justified by a *plébiscite* in the territories in question, but the agree-

ment had been long before concluded between the Emperor Napoleon and King Victor Emanuel; and the *plébiscite* was as admirably arranged as possible.

After all this, why do the French maintain that it is shameful or disgraceful for them to be compelled to give up territory to the victor?

The answer is very simple. While in Germany the principle of legitimacy in respect to the relations between the Government and the people still completely dominates, in France, since the great Revolution, the idea of the right of the people to vote has permeated everywhere, and no Government has succeeded in driving it out. The French say, therefore, We are to give up Alsace and Lorraine; but they are no naked lands—upon them dwell people who are altogether French in sentiment, who desire to remain French. How can we cede them to another nation? Such an act would be nothing more than leaving our friends in the lurch, and therefore cowardly and disgraceful.

In their ideas of conquest, the French also take a very different view from the Germans. They cannot understand how any one can be so stupid as not to wish to be a Frenchman. We cannot find any other expression to describe the feeling. Now this may seem to many to be very ludicrous, but it has certainly not always been so laughable. At the time of the great Revolution, millions of Germans became Frenchmen not unwillingly; and who can say whether, if that

Revolution and the war consequent on it had not arisen, Germany would not to-day have been a great fallen state? Under any circumstances, we must confess that the *naïve* French assumption pleases us better than the ideas of some of the "learned men" and statesmen of Germany, who would willingly, though we believe wrongly, identify the German nation with themselves, and who would, with brutal humour, make the resisting people of Alsace and Lorraine into their Helots.

M. Jules Favre had allowed a sort of appeal to the European Powers to be manifest in his circular despatch of the 6th of September; and soon afterwards M. Thiers, the celebrated historian of the 'Consulate and the Empire,' commenced a journey to visit the European Courts, London, St Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence, to represent to them the situation of France, and invoke their mediation. The grey-headed statesman—he was then 73 years of age—moved by a touching love of his country, subjected himself without hesitation to the physical fatigues and the presumably moral unpleasantness of this long tour. In Germany the news of this appeal to the European Powers was very badly received, and, as though by command, a whirlwind of addresses signed by communities and corporations arose, all adjuring the King of Prussia not to allow the intervention of European nations in the quarrel between Germany and France. These Powers had not done anything earnestly to pre-

vent the outbreak of the war, or to deter Napoleon III., or, as was now ever more constantly said, France, from the attack; why should they then now arrogate to themselves the right to interfere?

We are inclined to doubt whether the Chancellor of the North German Confederation was well served by this language, which really demanded that Germany should stand alone in Europe.

The pride with which the French spoke was also displeasing to the Germans. They would willingly have seen the French nation bow down humbly and cover their faces before the brilliancy of the victories won by the German soldiery. It is, nevertheless, very easy to be kind, when successful, to those followed by misfortune—very easy, when victorious, to be lenient to the defeated. But in the tone of a great part of the daily press there was no clemency. After every victory gained by the German army, certain journalists became only more rudely and unreasonably abusive towards the French nation. But when one regarded them more attentively, it was found these "real German men" very often bore about them unmistakable signs of an Oriental origin.

It can be easily seen that, under these circumstances, the prospect of a speedy restoration of peace was in the month of September extremely small. But how noble would have been the position of the Germans had they now, even with pretended sacrifices, held out the right hand of fellowship to their foes!

But the events which really took place oblige us to ask again, how the declaration of the Republic would influence the further conduct of the war?

We have before remarked that, up to the time of the battle of Sedan, there were no symptoms of a revolutionary uprising of the French nation. Spite of the shutting up of Bazaine in Metz, spite of all past and prospective defeats, Palikao's Ministry had adhered in all its preparations as much as possible to the already existing—it had indeed talked of extraordinary efforts, but had not in reality taken any sufficient steps towards realising its promises.

Would the whole of France now be inspired with the revolutionary spirit? Would she, if peace as she desired it was unattainable, rise up as one man? Would she find leaders to organise her material forces, and to retrieve the long neglect of the past? Would the Germans allow her time for these things?

We only suggest these questions; the answer we leave to be found in the narrative of what followed.

But one thing was certain, if hostilities were continued, it would, precisely because of the imperfection of the French formations, and of the desperate struggle which would be thereby engendered, lead to the poisoning of the war, and to the increase of that national hate which has never yet served the ends of a nation, but only the dominion of some.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE MARCH OF THE GERMANS UPON PARIS—THE INVESTMENT OF PARIS—THE CONFERENCE OF FERRIERES.

IMMEDIATELY after the capitulation of Sedan, the Army of the Meuse (Fourth Army, Crown-Prince of Saxony) and the Third Army (Crown-Prince of Prussia) commenced anew their march on Paris.

The Army of the Meuse, on the right, moved along three roads—by Creil and Ecouen, by Compiegne and Senlis, by Soissons and Dommartin. Its advanced troops reached the neighbourhood of Pontoise on the 16th of September.

The Third Army turned at first southwards towards the Marne, crossed it at Epernay and Chateau Thierry, and advanced then along the left bank of the river, between it and the Seine, towards Paris. Its foremost troops arrived on the 15th of September at Nogent sur Marne and Creteil. The headquarters of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, which had remained on the 2d and 3d of September in Donchery, were moved on the 4th to Attigny, on the 5th to Warmereville, on the 6th to Rheims, on the 9th to Bour-

sault near Epernay, on the 12th to Montmirail, and on the 15th to Coulommiers.

The headquarters of the King of Prussia were at Varennes on the 4th of September, moved thence on the 5th by St Ménéhould to Rheims, on the 14th to Chateau Thierry, and on the 15th to Meaux.

The Prussians encountered no opposition on their march to Paris until they were under the walls of the capital. The 13th Corps (Vinoy) had certainly, upon the repeated representations of M'Mahon and of the Emperor Napoleon, been sent from Paris by Soissons and Laon in the direction of Mézieres and Sedan, to the support of the army of M'Mahon; but when he arrived at Laon, Vinoy received the news of the catastrophe of Sedan. He therefore only remained long enough in that neighbourhood to draw in the uselessly small garrisons from the fortresses in his vicinity, and a number of fugitives from the captured army, and then returned to Paris by the railway, his troops reaching the capital on the 6th and 7th of September.

Soissons, which refused to surrender, was obliged to be invested, and afterwards regularly besieged.

On the 8th of September the 6th division of cavalry, Duke of Mecklenburg, approached the neighbourhood of Laon, which was occupied by half a company of soldiers of the line and 2000 men of the Mobile Guard. Half a squadron of the 15th North German regiment of Uhlans was sent forward to

reconnoitre the town, and its leader gave himself the pleasure of summoning the town and citadel, which were under the command of General Theremin d'Hame, to surrender. The General requested a few hours for consideration, until 4 P.M. Upon being informed what had happened, the Duke of Mecklenburg sent forward Colonel von Alvensleben with the 15th brigade of cavalry, the divisional horse-artillery battery, and the terms of capitulation. At the same time a horse-artillery battery from the reserve of the 4th Corps was pushed forward to St Quentin, and the 4th battalion of Rifles to Eppes, to the east of Laon. On the morning of the 9th of September, the 14th brigade of cavalry and the horse-artillery battery of the 4th Corps also moved forward to Eppes.

Colonel von Alvensleben, on arriving at the town with the terms of the capitulation, had found fresh difficulties had arisen with General Theremin, and had granted him another respite until 9 A.M. of the morrow; but when, later on, the Duke of Mecklenburg arrived at Eppes, the capitulation was already signed, by which the citadel, with its troops and *matériel* of war, was to be delivered up to the Prussians at 11.30 A.M.

The Duke at once caused one company of Rifles to occupy the suburbs, two more the market-place, and the fourth the citadel, into which he and his escort entered to witness the surrender. When this and the disarming was completed in the court of the fortress,

the French infantry of the line were led out as prisoners of war, and the men of the Mobile Guard released under condition that they should not bear arms again against Germany.

As the last men of the Mobile Guard marched through the gate of the citadel, a terrible explosion took place. Nearly all the German and French officers who remained in the courtyard were killed or wounded; of the 4th company of the 4th battalion of Rifles 50 men were killed and 45 wounded; and of the French Mobiles nearly 300 were more or less injured. The Duke of Mecklenburg himself received a contusion on the upper part of the thigh, and General Theremin was so wounded in the head that he died from his injuries some time afterwards.

On the German side a suspicion was at first expressed that the explosion, which was caused by the blowing up of the powder-magazine, had been instigated by General Theremin; but a strict inquiry showed that this was unfounded, and that the magazine had presumably been ignited by a guard of the armoury (*garde d'artillerie*).

According to the general plan for the investment of Paris, the army of the Crown-Prince of Saxony was to surround it on the right bank of the Seine and lower Marne, somewhere on the line from Argenteuil by Montmagny, Le Blanc Menil, through the wood of Bondy to Gournay on the Marne. For the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia there remained then the

line on the left bank of the river from Gournay through Bonneuil (on the Marne), Choisy le Roy (on the Seine), Thiais, Chevilly, Sceaux, Meudon, Sèvres, to Bougival (on the Seine). The two armies were to join hands on the peninsula of Argenteuil.

From various signs it is apparent that immediately after the battle of Sedan the Germans did not calculate on any prolonged resistance from Paris. They founded expectations upon the want of a firm standing by the Provisional Government, and upon internal discord, expecting also, very possibly, the immediate fall of some of the forts.

The Fourth Army was allowed to take up its appointed positions without resistance, and was not much molested during the month of September. The Crown-Prince of Saxony established his headquarters at Grand Tremblay.

The army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, on the other hand, could not complete the investment without some fighting, and was also, later on, disturbed by sorties from Paris.

In advance of it, Prussian Uhlans showed themselves on the 17th of September on the height of Clamart.

On the same day, the 5th North German Corps had thrown a pontoon-bridge across the Seine between Villeneuve St Georges and Ablon. To protect its formation, General Kirchbach had posted the 17th brigade of infantry (Bothmer), reinforced by two squadrons and two batteries, on the right bank

of the river, on the heights between Limeil and Boissy St Leger. These troops were at 2 P.M. attacked at the wood of Brevannes by a French detachment from Creteil, but they repulsed the onslaught with small cost; and afterwards the 2d division of cavalry, followed by the 5th Army Corps, passed over the Seine.

On the 18th of September this last-named Corps, marching on Versailles, reached with the 9th division (right wing) Bièvre, and with the 10th division (left wing) Palaiseau—the former having to sustain a small skirmish with French detachments which pushed forward from Plessis-Picquet. A patrol of Hussars from the 2d division of cavalry reached Versailles on the same day.

On the 19th of September the 10th division started early in the morning from Palaiseau through Jouy en Josas for Versailles, the 9th division leaving Bièvre in the same direction, while the 1st Bavarian Corps followed the 5th North German.

The 9th division was attacked immediately after it set out, and was obliged to form front; and the way they encountered the enemy was this :—

On the 18th of September General Ducrot had taken up a position on the heights to the south of Paris, between Meudon and Villejuif, with four divisions of very varied composition, selected from the garrison of Paris. We have already frequently before made mention of this General. After M'Mahon was

wounded at Sedan, he succeeded to the command-in-chief, and when superseded in this by Wimpffen, again led the 1st Corps. He was included in the capitulation of Sedan, but escaped from his imprisonment at Pont-à-Mousson. On the German side it is most positively asserted that General Ducrot had then (on the 12th of September) already given his word of honour not to serve again against Germany in this war. On the French side, this is as energetically denied. But, in short, General Ducrot had taken the shortest road to Paris, and had there placed himself at the disposal of General Trochu, who had long been his friend, and who placed the greatest reliance in him.

On the 19th of September Ducrot undertook a great reconnaissance southwards, and they were his troops thus engaged on the plateau of Villacoublay that the 9th division met, and by whom its march was, as we have seen, retarded. The Germans repulsed them at first, and were continuing their advance, when large bodies of French troops appeared, and forced them again to form front.

The first support which the 9th division received was brought by the 1st Bavarian brigade of infantry (Dietl), which fell upon the left flank of the French; and, moreover, General Kirchbach ordered the 10th division to march to the rescue as soon as its head arrived at Jouy en Josas, to the north-east of Villacoublay.

The 2d Bavarian Corps was, on the 19th, on the

march from Longjumeau to Chatenay. The 3d division, which was at its head, reached the latter place at 10 A.M., and sent a brigade towards Petit Bicestre to the direct support of the 5th North German Corps, while the others advanced through Sceaux.

Of the 4th Bavarian division the 7th brigade moved upon Bourg la Reine, to the north-east of Sceaux, while the 8th brigade remained halted in a reserve position at Croix de Berni, to the east of Chatenay.

By 11.30 A.M. the 5th German Corps had thrown back the right wing of the French at Villacoublay and Petit Bicestre. The retreat of the French troops of the line engaged there degenerated into a disorderly flight, which rendered necessary the application of very severe measures. General von Kirchbach thereupon, complying with his instructions, marched with the 5th Corps to his left towards Versailles, to occupy the parts of the investing line assigned to him there, leaving the Bavarians to accomplish anything that might be further necessary on the field of battle.

At the same time General Ducrot was preparing an offensive advance with his left wing, which supported itself upon a newly-constructed intrenchment armed with eight guns, near Moulin de la Tour, upon the north-eastern spur of the heights of Plessis-Picquet.

General von Hartmann directed the 7th brigade and the one which was in Sceaux to confine them-

selves to the defence of Bourg la Reine and Sceaux, and pushed on the 8th brigade to Chatenay. A combat of firearms ensued, and towards 3 o'clock General Ducrot caused the guns in the earthwork to be spiked, and retired behind the detached forts, some of the troops of the 3d Bavarian division following him through Sceaux and Plessis-Picquet, and taking possession of the deserted intrenchment.

The 6th North German Army Corps had followed the 5th across the Seine on the 19th, partly by the bridge at Villeneuve St Georges, partly by another which had been thrown across for its use, and followed through Villeneuve le Roi towards the line Choisy le Roi-Chevilly. It was met with a fire from another newly-built advanced work at Villejuif, and contented itself with placing outposts on the front Choisy le Roi-Chevilly. These were repeatedly attacked by French detachments, but the latter failed to force a way through them.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia's headquarters were, on the 18th of September, at Corbeil. On the forenoon of the 19th he was present on the heights of Sceaux at the fight of the Bavarians, and established his headquarters on the same day at Palaiseau.

During the night from the 22d to the 23d of September, the Germans remarked that the French had evacuated the still unfinished intrenchments at Villejuif, and forthwith they occupied them themselves. On the morning of the 23d, the French from Forts Bicêtre

and Ivry commenced a heavy cannonade upon these works. The Germans were unable to maintain themselves in them under this fire, and so retired. Whilst they were thus withdrawing, the division of General Maud'huy emerged from the above-named detached forts and pursued them, but were checked at the German line of outposts, and afterwards compelled to turn back again.

On the same day Rear-Admiral Saisset on the north side undertook a yet greater reconnaissance towards Le Bourget and Drancy, and another was directed from St Denis against Pierrefitte.

On the 24th of September several of the French ironclad gunboats on the Seine cannonaded from Surênes the German outposts at St Cloud and Sèvres.

On the 30th the French made again a great sortie on the south side with the 13th Army Corps (Vinoy), when a main attack by the centre was prepared for and supported by two false attacks on the wings.

The demonstration on the right was directed from Fort Issy against the positions of the 5th North German Corps, that on the left from Fort Charenton against the 11th North German Corps.

The main attack from Montrouge and Bicêtre aimed at the 6th North German Corps, and especially at the 12th division (Hoffman). The fighting took place principally about Villejuif, Chevilly, Thiais, and Choisy le Roi, and by 11 A.M. the French had been driven back with considerable losses upon the detached forts. In

this encounter General Guilhem was killed, the officer who had commanded the French garrison brigade in the States of the Church.

The Crown-Prince of Prussia on the 20th of September removed his headquarters to Versailles; those of the King of Prussia were established on the 19th partly at Lagny on the Marne, partly at Rothschild's castle of Ferrières, famous for the many pleasant hours which Napoleon passed there when at the summit of his power.

We conclude here for the present the narrative of the military events about Paris, but append, before we pass on to the interesting diplomatic negotiations of Ferrières, some description of the great capital of France, especially in its aspect as a fortress.

If with the Louvre as centre, and with a radius of 7000 paces, a circle be described, it will give, very roughly certainly, the present circumference of Paris. The town is traversed by the Seine, which, in its course through it, forms a bow open towards the south, and divides the city into two very unequal parts, the larger on its right bank, and the much smaller one on its left.

The existing boundaries of Paris are formed by the main enceinte of its fortifications and by the new exterior Boulevards, and those of the town of Paris as it existed up to the year 1861, by the old exterior Boulevards, which follow the course of the ancient city toll- (octroi-) wall. These excluded from the town

a number of populous communities, who were, nevertheless, within the fortifications built in 1841. Lastly, the boundaries of Paris as they existed up to the time of the great Revolution are still marked by the interior Boulevards.

The town inside the old exterior Boulevards was divided into twelve arrondissements, to which eight more were added on the abolition of the old octroi-wall.

Of the fourteen arrondissements on the right bank of the Seine, four lie between the river and the interior Boulevards—namely, the 1st, L'Arrondissement du Louvre; the 2d, De la Bourse; the 3d, Du Temple; the 4th, De l'Hôtel de Ville: five between the interior Boulevards and the old octroi-walls—namely, the 8th, De l'Elysée; the 9th, De l'Opéra; the 10th, De l'Enclos St Laurent; the 11th, De Popincourt; the 12th, De Reuilly: five between the old octroi-walls and the main enceinte—namely, the 16th, De Passy; the 17th, De Batignolles; the 18th, Des Buttes Montmartre; the 19th, Des Buttes Chaumont; the 20th, De Menilmontant.

Of the six arrondissements on the left bank, three lie between the Seine and the old octroi-wall—namely, the 5th, Du Panthéon; the 6th, Du Luxembourg; and the 7th, Du Palais Bourbon: three between the octroi-wall and the main enceinte—namely, the 13th, Des Gobelins; the 14th, De l'Observatoire; and the 15th, De Vaugirard.

In the year 1801 Paris had 552,686 inhabitants inside the line of the inner Boulevards; in 1856 there were 1,174,346 of population within the octroi-wall; and in 1861 there were within the main enceinte, therefore, inclusive of the eight new arrondissements, 1,696,141 inhabitants. At the last census in 1866, 1,825,274 human beings were returned. This number had undoubtedly increased up to 1870, but it was diminished shortly before the investment by the compulsory and voluntary departures from the city; though, on the other hand, it was again increased by arrivals. The regular garrison was not reinforced; for, besides the Imperial Guard, another Corps—the Army of Paris—had always been quartered in the town and in its immediate vicinity; but the Mobile Guard, the sailors, the custom-house people, the wood-rangers, &c., who were called into Paris from the provinces, were all additions to its ordinary population. Further, when the investment became imminent, General Trochu ordered the demolition of the numerous buildings without the ramparts, but within the zone of defence of the main enceinte, or of the detached forts; and the greater part of their inhabitants entered Paris in the last days of August and the first of September, with their furniture and household gods. During the time of this migration from without to within the walls, a confused crush of wonderful and wonderfully-packed conveyances choked up many of the gates of the fortifications

from early morning to late evening, and, dragging their weary way along the Boulevards with long followings of men, women, children, dogs, domestic pets, and cattle, imparted a new and unwonted aspect to these resorts of the gay idlers of Paris.

Taking all these additions into account, the population of Paris at the beginning of the investment must be estimated at the least at 2,000,000.

The daily consumption of the capital before the investment is given from credible sources in the following numbers: 19,725 hundredweight of bread, and, moreover, 4990 sacks of flour; 490 oxen, 130 cows, 430 calves, 2963 sheep, 2150 hundredweight of salted and smoked meat, 1150 hundredweight of poultry and game, 1490 hundredweight of fish (two-thirds of which sea-fish), 2950 hundredweight of potatoes, 5000 hundredweight of other vegetables, 1120 hundredweight of butter, and 280 hundredweight of cheese. Of the quantity of groceries, the consumption of which in Paris is proportionately very great—of milk, eggs, and drinks of all kinds used daily—we have no reliable accounts; but still an estimate of them, taken at the average number of the population, and considering the average state of prosperity of the inhabitants, would be an enormous one.

The Seine above Paris flows mainly from south to north; shortly before its entrance into the town it receives the Marne at Charenton. The whole of the lower course of this latter river is very tortuous; and

just before it joins the Seine, it forms by a bold curve the peninsula of St Maur, which turns its contracted neck towards Fort Vincennes.

The Seine, on quitting Paris, flows in a south-westerly direction, but at Billancourt it makes a sharp bend, and runs to the north-east as far as St Denis, where, with another sharp turn, it again resumes its south-westerly direction, only to bend again to the north-east at Bougival. These windings form three peninsulas close below Paris. Upon the first, that of Boulogne, lies a part of the town (Auteuil and Passy) and the Bois de Boulogne, which extends up to the main enceinte; the second peninsula may be named after the principal point on it, the Mount of Valerien or of Nanterre (the favourite home of the queen of the roses); and so also may the third, the peninsula of Argenteuil.

The height of the level of the Seine at Paris above that of the sea is generally taken to be in round numbers 30 metres; more exactly, it is, with the average depth of the water, 27.4 metres where it enters the walls, and 25.9 metres where it leaves them. The width of the river at its exit from the city is about 600 feet.

The main enceinte of the town is formed by a simple bastioned line with revetted escarps, without ravelins or similar outworks. There are no permanently-casemated spaces in the bastions. Of these last there are ninety-four in the whole circumference of

the enclosing rampart; they do not bear names, but are distinguished by numbers. Bastion No. 1 lies on the right bank, and at the entrance of the Seine into the town. From that point the numbers run in succession along the right bank to the exit of the river, and then from the same point along those on the left bank to the entrance again, so that bastion No. 94 is exactly opposite to bastion No. 1.

The Lyons railway leaves the circumvallation between bastions Nos. 2 and 3; the Eastern railway (to Mülhausen and Strasburg), between bastions Nos. 27 and 28; the Northern railway, between bastions Nos. 34 and 35; the railway to Rouen, between bastions Nos. 44 and 45; the Western railway, by Versailles (left bank), between bastions Nos. 75 and 76; the railway to Orleans, between bastions Nos. 92 and 93.

These data offer an easy means of identifying individual bastions.

The bastions are not all alike in form, but the prevailing type is flat, the faces containing a very obtuse angle; they are very long, and the flanks are proportionately short. Owing to the great extent of the circumference, it is manifest that a considerable number of bastioned fronts must lie very nearly in one straight line. This is always advantageous to the defence, especially in the modern days of rifled ordnance and long ranges. The gain, however, is not so great in the enceinte of Paris as it would have been if the bastions themselves had been built with more

salient and acute angles. In the construction of the fortifications it was not so much intended that this main enceinte should withstand a regular siege, as that it should secure the town against a surprise or an attack *de vive force*. The real defence against a formal attack was intrusted to the detached forts, a girdle of which surrounds the circumvallation of the town.

Paris lies in a basin. It is surrounded on all sides by heights, the basis of which is a chalk formation, and the crests of which are at one time close to the town, at another time more removed from it—at one time towering up steep and sharply defined, at another time rising softly and imperceptibly—so that they appear to be almost depressions when compared with the neighbouring landscape. These heights could not be utilised everywhere as positions for the detached forts, especially at a time when the present range of guns was not dreamt of; but they all stand in close connection with the works, and therefore we must consider them somewhat more minutely.

The heights of Pierrefitte, to the north of St Denis, rise up to an altitude of 265 feet* above the level of the Seine; those of the Wood of Bondy, to the south-east of it, to an average height of 280 feet. Between these two there is a depression of about 80 feet, in which several brooks, especially the Sausset and the Molette, run down by St Denis to the Seine.

* The heights given in this description are above the level of the Seine, unless it is specially otherwise mentioned.

To the west of the heights of the Wood of Bondy, divided from it by the narrow and in some parts defile-like *col* through which the railway to Mülhausen and Basle reaches the Marne, are the two nearly equally high groups of hills of Montreuil and of Romainville. These fall to the north with rather steep slopes to the Ourcq Canal, and to the east towards the before-mentioned railway, but decline gently to the south towards the Seine and Marne, forming thus the almost flat plateau of Vincennes. To the westward the main enceinte continues along Belleville and the Buttes de Chaumont.

To the west of the heights of Belleville, separated from them by La Villette, and also within the main enceinte, rise the Buttes Montmartre, 330 feet high at their most elevated point.

In the south and south-west the pleasant chain of hills is to be remarked which, much broken, runs from Bourg la Reine towards Bougival, and separates St Cloud and Sèvres on the Seine from Versailles. The summits of this same chain at Clamart and Chatillon have an altitude of 440 feet. Spurs from them jut out also into the main enceinte at Vaugirard. In the hill of Vaugirard Napoleon III. has discovered the theatre of the battle which Labienus, after he had beaten Camolugenus between Sèvres and Meudon, fought with the Gallic reserves, which, originally destined to observe the right bank of the Seine, had hurried up when they heard the noise of battle at Meudon.

The chain of hills Bourg la Reine-Bougival throws out a spur on to the peninsula of Nanterre, and this ridge terminates in the Mount of Valerien, which rises up conically to a height of 300 feet.

To the east of Bourg la Reine, and on the right bank of the Bièvre brook, the chain of heights gradually subsides. Ascending to the west of Villejuif in a solitary elevation of 310 feet, it has to the south of Vitry sur Seine an altitude of only 240 feet, and then falls rather steeply to the valley of the Seine, which, to the east of Vitry, is 104 feet above the level of the sea.

The detached forts of Paris are, in plan, bastioned squares or pentagons. They are amply provided with casemated quarters, are well defiladed, and altogether are well arranged.

Smaller enclosed works exist here and there, separated from the forts, and placed to command points which cannot be seen from the latter. These are called redoubts. They are of various forms—some have a *tenaille* trace, others are merely salient angles, and others again have small bastions at the corners.

To get a clear idea of the whole system, the detached forts of Paris are divided into four groups, called after the four cardinal points of the compass.

The greater part of the works of the eastern group crown the outer edge of the heights of Bagnolet-Montreuil. Their extent is very approximately de-

termined by describing a semicircle with the Montreuil gate, between bastions Nos. 11 and 12, as centre, and with a radius of 6500 paces.

The works which form this group are :—

1. The Fort of Romainville, a square with an irregular hornwork, and an annexed work advanced to the north, which two outworks connect it with the Canal De l'Ourcq, and along it with the enceinte of the town towards bastion No. 27. Fort Romainville lies 1700 paces distant from bastion No. 19 of the main enceinte ;

2. The Redoubt of Noisy ;

3. The Fort of Noisy—a square with a hornwork pushed out in a north-easterly direction ;

4. The Redoubt of Montreuil ;

5. The Redoubt De la Boissière, a *tenailled* work ;

6. The Fort of Rosny—a square with a hornwork advanced to the eastward, 6000 paces from bastion No. 16 of the main enceinte ;

7. The Redoubt of Fontenay, in the form of a small hornwork closed at the gorge ;

8. The Fort of Nogent—a square with a hornwork thrown out to the eastward ;

9. The Redoubt De la Faisanderie ; and,

10. The Redoubt De Gravelle.

The two last-named works are joined by an intrenched line, and close the neck of the peninsula of the Marne from St Maur ; and all the works from Fort Romainville to the Redoubt De la Faisanderie

were connected in September by intrenched lines, which followed the crest of the heights, so that a sort of second enceinte arose there.

11. The Fort of Charenton—a pentagon in the angle between the Seine and the Marne. This work is 4000 paces distant from bastion No. 5 of the main enceinte, and answers the purpose of a *tête-du-pont* for the bridges thrown across the Seine and Marne near their junction.

Most of the works of the eastern group lie very far removed from the main ramparts; but a sort of *réduit* to the whole is formed by

12. The Fort of Vincennes, which is situated 2200 paces from bastion No. 8. This work, to the south of the town of Vincennes, is composed of the old castle, and of the new fort to the eastward of this latter. The former, whose origin can scarcely be traced, was built in 1183 essentially on its present plan, but has been continually improved up to the present day; and in 1832 especially, its fortifications were better arranged, and it was provided with military establishments. The centre tower, the donjon, which has walls 10 feet thick, and has frequently been used as a state prison, has a height of 183 feet; and from its roof an extensive panoramic view is obtained. The new fort, a long rectangle, with its longer faces running east and west, contains immense depots of all sorts for the artillery.

Within the eastern group stands the Wood of Vin-

cennes surrounded by a wall. In this park there are commodious ranges for infantry and artillery, and the manœuvring ground for the troops in the Camp of St Maur.

The southern group of forts extends from bastion No. 94 to No. 68 of the main enceinte. It consists of the five forts of D'Ivry, De Bicêtre, De Montrouge, De Vanves, and D'Issy. The forts of Montrouge and Vanves are bastioned squares, the other three bastioned pentagons. Of this group, Fort Bicêtre lies nearest to the main enceinte, only 1500 paces from the bastion No. 87; and Fort Issy, the most remote, being 3000 yards from bastion No 91.

As is apparent from our description of the country in the neighbourhood, there are comparatively important heights from 1500 to 2000 yards in front of this group, and these General Trochu, when he undertook the defence of Paris, determined to occupy with strong field intrenchments. Such a work was thrown up on the height of Moulin de la Tour, before Chatillon, and this was the one which the Bavarians obtained possession of on the 19th of September. A second intrenchment was constructed on the right bank of the Bièvre, between it and the village of Villejuif; a third to the east of Villejuif, near the Moulin Saquet; and, moreover, the villages of Villejuif and of Vitry sur Seine were fortified.

Behind this advanced line the five forts of the southern group were connected by lines of earthworks;

so that on this side also there existed a continuous exterior enceinte.

The labour on all these fortifications was continuously carried on, even after the investment had been completed by the besiegers.

The western group consists of only one, but that one a most important work—the fortress (*forteresse*) of Mont Valerien on the left bank of the Seine, on the peninsula of Nanterre. The work itself is a large bastioned pentagon, with exterior sides of 1200 feet long, with powerful batteries, and an ample supply of casemated spaces for all military requirements. But in spite of its size, it nevertheless, by reason of its solitude, leaves the west front apparently somewhat exposed. It is 5000 paces distant from the main enceinte, nearly 15,000 paces from the works of St Denis, and 9000 paces from Fort Issy. The designer of the fortifications of Paris must have calculated chiefly upon the reach of the Seine from Billancourt to St Denis for the covering of the west front. When General Trochu commenced his task, he held it to be expedient to strengthen somewhat the outer works of this front, and accordingly a *tête-du-pont* was constructed to protect the bridge of Neuilly; another work was thrown up on the hill of St Ouen; and yet another was projected for the heights of Montretout, near St Cloud, but this last was never executed. On the other hand, later on, an intrenchment was formed at Villeneuve la Garenne, opposite St Denis,

in connection with the fortifications of the last-named place.

The northern group is formed by Fort Aubervilliers and the fortifications of St Denis.

Fort Aubervilliers, on the road to Lille, 2300 paces distant from bastion No. 28 of the main enceinte, is a bastioned pentagon.

St Denis, a town of 27,000 inhabitants, is surrounded by a simple enceinte, rendered stronger by inundations and swamps, and by three forts. These are the Fort de la Briche, a bastioned rectangle open at the gorge, close to the right bank of the Seine; the Northern Double Crownwork (*Double Couronne du Nord*), with three whole and two half bastions, open towards the town; and the Eastern Fort (*Fort de l'Est*), a closed bastioned square in the south-east of the town. And to these must be added the recently-constructed intrenchment on the left bank of the Seine, before Villeneuve la Garenne, of which we before made mention.

The main communications of Paris were, as in these days they are for all the world, the railways, which radiate in every direction from the eight stations of the town. We have already named the points at which the principal ones quit the lines.

It was necessarily of paramount importance for the success of the German investment that these lines should be cut, and this was forthwith effected; so that Paris was now obliged to have recourse to other and

unwonted means of communication, which, however, could not supply all its requirements.

Very important for the defence of the capital was the girdle line (*chemin de fer de ceinture*), which ran round the town inside the main enceinte, and for the most part not very far distant from it.

To close this chapter, we have yet to speak of the interview of Ferrières, which was destined to widen the gulf which already yawned between France and Germany.

By the mediation of England a conference was brought about between Jules Favre, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chancellor of the North German Confederation. More than a week was lost in discussing matters of form which perhaps ought not to have been regarded as such. At last, on the 18th of September, when the Germans actually stood before the gates of Paris, Jules Favre resolved, being assured of the agreement of Bismark, to seek out the latter, and on the same day succeeded in arriving at Villeneuve St Georges, where the head-quarters of General von Tümpling (6th Army Corps) were established. There he learnt that the head-quarters of the King of Prussia were at Meaux, and he therefore sent a message to Bismark to inquire where he could speak with him. On the 19th, at six o'clock in the morning, an officer, who was to accompany him back, brought M. Favre the answer that Bismark awaited him in Meaux. He therefore at

once set out; but on arriving near that place, Jules Favre heard from an adjutant that the King's head-quarters had been removed to Ferrières.

The first meeting of Favre with Bismark actually took place in the chateau of Haute Maison at Montry. During it the two men did not arrive beyond a theoretical discussion about the principles for the conclusion of a peace; and we know what an abyss separated France from Germany in respect to these. In the interval which had elapsed between the battle of Sedan and the interview at the Haute Maison, the latter country had become yet more excited, especially by two circulars of the German Chancellor to his diplomatic agents abroad. In the first, dated Rheims, the 13th of September, Bismark spoke, contrarily to the earlier proclamation on the German side, no longer of a war against the French Government, but of a war against the French people. According to his view, the latter would, as soon as they could, even if a peace were now arranged, again take up arms; and to ward off this expected new attack, Germany required sureties, which could be found only in an advance of her western frontier. Cession of territory by France was therefore, from this time forth, officially demanded as a condition for the conclusion of peace. In the second circular from Meaux, on the 16th of September, Bismark expressed his fear that peace would only be still further postponed if the neutral European Powers should in any way strengthen

the hope of France of obtaining their diplomatic or material intervention, and that this might be occasioned by the journey of M. Thiers. He further most expressly stated that he required the fortresses of Strasburg and Metz for Germany.

In the general conversation in the Haute Maison, Count Bismark, as he says, could not succeed in convincing M. Favre that the honour of France was not differently constituted from that of other countries. Favre was willing to agree to any monetary recompense, but not to a cession of territory. Finally, the two came to discourse on the armistice, and were agreed that a cessation of hostilities would be desirable, in order to carry on the elections for a Constituting Assembly which could render the Government regular. The details were to be discussed in another conversation on the evening of the same day in Ferrières.

M. Favre arrived at 9.30 A.M. in Ferrières. There the armistice was again talked over, principally as to its duration, and in a more general way as to its conditions. Regarding the latter, Bismark desired to obtain military counsel; and the two statesmen agreed at midnight to continue their conversation on the 20th.

When the day arrived, Favre was again at Ferrières at 11 A.M. Bismark was still with the King, but returned from him at 11.45 A.M.

As a military equivalent for the consent to a cessation of hostilities, which must always be more or less

to the disadvantage of the victorious army, while under the existing circumstances it must necessarily be of great use to France for the organisation of her forces, Count Bismark demanded the evacuation of the fortresses of Toul, Pfalzburg,* and Strasburg. The garrisons of the two former were to be free to depart; but as Strasburg was already reduced to the utmost extremity, the soldiers within it were to become prisoners of war.

The surrender of these fortresses would give the Germans an assured railway communication, and was therefore important to them. For the rest, Toul and Strasburg were so near their fall, that with them it was only a question of holding out for a few days longer. Pfalzburg the Germans could dispense with for their object. But nevertheless Jules Favre would hear nothing of this condition, and became especially violently excited when Bismark demanded that the garrison of Strasburg should be regarded as prisoners. Bismark, who had merely spoken as a man of business, and was but little prepared for outbreaks of feeling, strove in every way to pacify M. Favre, and even promised him to speak again with the King on this point. This he also did, but the King of Prussia held firmly to the demand.

In and before Metz hostilities were to be continued

* In Bismark's report, Bitche is named; in that of Favre, Pfalzburg. Perhaps Bismark demanded both these places; at all events, Pfalzburg was, by its position, the more important.

within a certain cordon, to be afterwards more accurately determined. About this there was no controversy.

But now came the third point—Paris. Favre had already on the 19th expressed the presupposition that the Constituting Assembly would meet in Paris; and by this occasion the question arose whether Paris should be reprovisioned or not during the period of the armistice, the duration of which was assumed to be two or three weeks. If free intercourse was to be permitted during this time between Paris and the country, with a view to reprovisioning the former, Bismark again demanded a military equivalent—in this case the delivering over of the fortress of Mont Valerien to the Germans. At this M. Favre again lost control over himself; he declared—and certainly with reason—that Bismark might just as well ask for Paris at once. Bismark replied—also with reason—that the reprovisioning of Paris for three weeks implied that the Germans must remain just so much the longer before it, to reduce it by famine in case peace should not result from the meeting of the Assembly. For the rest, he proposed another expedient. He had no objection to the Constituting Assembly sitting at Tours, as Favre himself had suggested, in which case the *status quo* could be strictly maintained during the armistice, and neither Paris reprovisioned nor a detached fort handed over to the Germans.

M. Favre finally parted from Count Bismark firmly convinced that the Germans desired to humiliate France—to drive it under the Caudine Forks, and to annihilate it. Count Bismark remained behind in Ferrières, most fully persuaded that he had shown the greatest desire to meet the advances of the Provisional Government. He felt, we have not the slightest doubt, just as deeply as Jules Favre did, the endless misery which the continuation of this war would entail, in that it would again evoke the feeling of national hate without there being any original ground—a feeling which it is more difficult to exterminate when the masses are led away by it than when only some few highly-educated people are infected, and which certain journalists and writers incite all the more recklessly, from ignorance or interest, if they are able to keep themselves clear of its workings.

But—the Germans were the victors, and Bismark had already raised a storm which he could not altogether rule. Spirits had been evoked which, when once called up, are very difficult to lay again.

The Provisional Government in Paris, upon receiving the report of M. Favre, determined that an armistice under these conditions was not to be thought of, and that therefore the war must simply be continued.

When the Germans were approaching Paris, the Government had sent a delegation to Tours. This

was to maintain a regular correspondence with the departments in case Paris should be surrounded, and to endeavour to carry on the same with the invested capital. It consisted of directors and subaltern *employés* for each of the Ministerial departments. The members of the Government at its head were MM. Cremieux and Glais-Bizoin, to whom shortly afterwards Admiral Fourichon joined himself.

Upon receiving information of the negotiations of Ferrières and of their result, the Delegation issued from Tours the following proclamation to the French people:—

"Before the investment of Paris, M. Jules Favre determined to seek out Count Bismark in order to learn the intentions of the enemy. The following is the declaration of our foe:

"Prussia intends to continue the war, and reduce France to a Power of the second rank.

"On the grounds of the right of conquest, Prussia demands Alsace, and Lorraine as far as Metz.

"For her consent to an armistice Prussia dares to demand the surrender of Strasburg, of Toul, and of Mont Valerien.

"Rather would exasperated Paris bury herself in her ruins. To such arrogant demands there is no answer other than war to the last extremity.

"France accepts this combat, and counts thereby upon the assistance of all her children."

Count Bismark answered this proclamation by a

circular despatch dated Ferrières, 1st of October. In it he directed his reply exclusively against the assertion that Prussia wished to degrade France to a Power of the second rank. The territory, he said, which Germany demands from France, together with Metz and Strasburg, is of about the same superficial area as the provinces of Savoy and Nice, which France gained in 1860 without having been before only a second-rate Power. In population Alsace and German Lorraine certainly exceeded Nice and Savoy by about three-fourths of a million; but in 1866 France had, without Algeria, 38,000,000, and with Algeria, "which now supplied an essential part of the French forces" (the poor Turcos), 42,000,000 of inhabitants. How, then, could the loss of three-quarters of a million in any degree alter the importance of France with regard to foreign countries, and reduce her to a second-rate Power?

Negotiations were for the time broken off; M. Thiers was still on his diplomatic tour to the Courts of Europe; and when Bismark issued his answer of the 1st of October, Toul and Strasburg were already in the hands of the Germans.

CHAPTER XXIV.

TAKING OF THE FORTRESS OF TOUL.

TOWARDS the end of August the 17th North German division of infantry (Schimmelmann), together with the 17th brigade of cavalry (Rauch) and the 2d active (Brunswick) division of landwehr (Selchow), were sent into France, and there formed into an Army Corps (the 13th North German), under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

The 13th Corps was employed from the 4th (and in part also from the 1st) to the 10th of September in the investment of Metz, and on the latter day received orders to protect the rear of the armies marching on Paris by occupying Chalons and Rheims, and by surrounding and regularly besieging Toul.

Since the middle of August the fortress of Toul had been constantly observed by small detachments—in the last days exclusively of landwehr—and had also been several times cannonaded, but only with field-guns, and afterwards with old French garrison artillery which had been transported thither after the fall

of Marsal, but which was not even so effective as the German field-ordnance.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg directed his landwehr division, together with the 17th regiment of dragoons and two light batteries, upon Rheims; with the rest of the artillery of his Corps, with the 17th division of infantry, the 18th regiment of dragoons and the 11th of Uhlans, he marched upon Toul, before which he arrived on the evening of the 12th of September.

In order to undertake the siege, it was necessary to wait for the arrival of the siege-ordnance, which was to be brought up from Cologne and Magdeburg; and therefore at first the Grand Duke confined himself to drawing the investing line closer in than heretofore, at the same time disquieting the place with his field-guns.

The fortress was garrisoned by about 2500 men, mostly of the Mobile Guard, and had 197 guns, 48 of which were rifled. The commandant was Squadron-Chief* Huck, formerly of the 7th regiment of Fusiliers.

By a decree, dated Meaux, the 16th of September, the King of Prussia established a new government-general of Rheims. This was to embrace all territory occupied by German troops not already included in

* The squadron-chief on the General Staff has the same rank in the artillery and cavalry that the battalion-chief has in the infantry. In the cavalry the squadron-chief commands two squadrons.

those of Alsace and Lorraine. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was appointed to its command, and therefore repaired to Rheims, leaving the troops before Toul under the orders of Lieutenant-General von Schimmelmann.

Schimmelmann at once caused three rifled 6-pounder batteries to ascend Mont St Michel, which lies to the north of the town, and completely commands it, and thence he kept up an unceasing fire upon it. The artillery of the fortress answered vigorously, but without effect. On the afternoon of the 18th of September, Toul was bombarded for two hours by seven German field-batteries.

On the 19th of September Schimmelmann was ordered to send the 33d brigade of infantry (Kottwitz) and the 11th regiment of Uhlans to Chalons. He then retained before Toul the two Mecklenburg regiments of infantry Nos. 89 and 90, the Mecklenburg battalion of Rifles No. 14, the 18th regiment of dragoons, four field-batteries, and two companies of pioneers; and to these were added on the 20th of September the heavy siege-artillery, consisting of ten rifled 24-pounders and sixteen rifled 12-pounders.

On the 21st the positions for the siege-batteries were selected—they were to surround Toul on the north in a large semicircle, from Mansuy in the east over the slopes of Mont St Michel and the Mont de Barine away towards the road from Ecrouves in the west. On the 21st and 22d the battery depots were

built; and towards the evening of the 22d the siege-guns were transported to the rear of the points where the batteries were to be, and at dusk the construction of these was commenced without any opposition from the besieged.

On the morning of the 23d the batteries were not only completed, but also armed with the artillery which had been placed in readiness, and the bombardment was immediately begun, the field-guns likewise assisting in it.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had also come up from Rheims to witness the spectacle.

By 9 o'clock in the forenoon a part of the town was already in flames; an hour later three more fires broke out. The besieged kept up in reply an incessant but measured fire—by 11 o'clock they had set in flames the suburbs of Mansuy in the east and of St Evre in the west, which were occupied by the Mecklenburgers. But as afternoon came on, the garrison itself could no longer keep under the conflagration which the German artillery had caused, and at 4 P.M. the commandant hoisted the white flag upon one of the towers of the cathedral.

The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, who had looked on at the bombardment from the Mont de Barine, at once sent his chief of the staff, Colonel von Krensky, towards the Porte de France. On his way the Colonel was met by a flag of truce from the garrison, and the capitulation was arranged without difficulty by the

commandant and Von Krensky. The capitulation of Sedan served essentially as a pattern. The only defenders exempted from becoming prisoners of war were the officers, who were released on giving their word of honour, and men who had been inhabitants of Toul before the investment. Further, an article was added by which, in case of any event happening similar to that which had taken place at Laon, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had the right of dealing with the whole garrison as he thought fit. This condition seemed the more necessary, as the conqueror of Laon was also a Duke of Mecklenburg.

The delivering over of the *matériel*, and the marching out of the garrison, took place on the evening of the 23d; and at the same time the gates and public buildings were occupied by German troops.

On the 24th of September the Grand Duke, at the head of the whole investing force, entered the conquered town.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE SIEGE AND TAKING OF STRASBURG.

After Alsace had become French by the Peace of Westphalia, the old city of Strasburg still remained a German imperial town. On the 30th of September 1681, the French occupied the town; but long before that event, there had existed in it a considerable French party, as is only too explicable by the position of the town on the left bank of the Rhine, and by the miserable condition of the German Empire at that time. The French party, which was strongly represented in the Council, had laboured for years to bring about the dismissal of the mercenary troops, and the neglect of the military concerns of the town. The French, therefore, in 1681 found the town defenceless, in spite of its ramparts. Lately, much has been said of treachery, whereby Strasburg was lost to the so-called German Empire. But, historically, it would be more correct to talk of treachery committed by the Empire towards the town, and by which it delivered over the city to France. By the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, Strasburg was, in the most

formal manner, separated from "Emperor and Empire," and made over to France. For the rest, it maintained its old free-town constitution and privileges until the great French Revolution, when it lost these also. But then it attached itself most thoroughly —as did the whole of Alsace—to the great French nation; and though it is true that the lower orders of the tradespeople and the workmen still speak German, it must nevertheless be said that Strasburg, in the feeling of its inhabitants, is one of the most French towns that exist. And, in truth, what had the small dynastydom of the German tribes—which even to the present day is preserved, with all that appertains to it, as a precious jewel—to offer in comparison to the fact of belonging to a great nation, which has always understood how to preserve and cherish, if not political freedom, at all events the more humane feeling of equality—a feeling priceless to those who have once become acquainted with it.

Strasburg had, in the last census (1866), about 85,000 inhabitants. Its extreme eastern works lie on the left bank of the main stream of the Rhine, about a short two miles removed from it. The "Small Rhine," an arm which, separating from the river above the town, bends to the left and joins it again about two and a quarter miles below the point where it leaves it, forms with the Rhine the Ile des Epis, and at its most western bend flows close to the most eastern work, the citadel.

The Ill, which above the town runs nearly parallel to the Rhine and about four miles from it, divides itself in the town into two arms—the western one called the Canal des Faux Remparts—and flows lower down, at Wanzenau, into the Rhine. Above the town the Ill receives the Brüsch, which in parts is made into a canal.

Near Strasburg, on the south, the Rhine-Rhone canal joins the Ill, and near the town on the north the Rhine-Marne canal; and this latter, with an eastern continuation, unites the Ill to the Rhine at the lower end of the Ile des Epis.

The ramifications of all these waters form to the north and south a number of islands, especially on the eastern side of the town. Of these we must particularly name the island of Wacken, the Robertsau, and the Sporeninsel.

The greatest length of the town is from west to east, measuring, on the average, 3600 paces from the west to the citadel, which closes the fortifications on the east; in the west, the town is 2300 paces broad between No. 7 bastion and No. 12; and in the east, along the esplanade which separates the town from the citadel, only 800 paces.

The chief railway station lies inside the town, close to the west side of the fortifications. After the line has quitted Strasburg under arched tunnels, which in July 1870 were being altered and enlarged, it bifurcates close to lunette No. 44. One branch runs to the

north, to divide again at Wendenheim, whence one line goes by Zabern to Paris, and the other by Hagenau to Weissenburg and Saarguemünd; the other branch bends at first southwards and then eastwards round the town, and has another station close to the Austerlitz gate. It then crosses the Rhine by a magnificent bridge, a monument of modern architecture, traverses Kehl, and joins the Baden Railway. The bridge has a length of 801 feet between its shore buttresses, and has two tracks and two footpaths. The centre part is solid; the two ends are turn-bridges, so that communication can be stopped at pleasure, either on the French or German side; and both at the Baden and French end is situated a fortified post. The building of the bridge was begun in the year 1858, and finished on the 6th of April 1861. Of its destruction on the 22d of July 1870 we have already spoken. To the south of this permanent bridge is the older bridge of boats.

From the last-named line—that is, from the line which joins the Baden Railway—a branch separates close to the town and runs southwards to Basle; and from this other lines bifurcate to the Vosges, to Wasselonne, Mutzig, and Barr.

Besides the establishments directly connected with the fortifications, Strasburg has barracks for 10,000 men, a school of artillery, a military hospital with 1800 beds, a school for military physicians, a large armoury, and extensive military workshops for the

artillery and for the regiment of pontoniers quartered there. The most celebrated building in Strasburg is the cathedral or minster, which was begun as early as the year 1015, and essentially finished in 1439. The northern tower, the only one completed, rises up 492 feet above the surrounding streets. It is the highest building in Europe, and only 7 feet lower than the highest pyramid in Egypt. From the platform, which is 235 feet above the pavement, there is a most extensive view of the plains of Alsace and Baden, and the tower is therefore admirably adapted for a military observatory. The Strasburg library is renowned for its large collection of valuable and rare manuscripts.

The present lines of Strasburg were planned by Daniel Speckle, who was born there, the same who wrote the first good German book on permanent fortification—'Architectura von Festungen'—which was published in the year of his death, 1589.

After the town had passed into the possession of the French, Vauban, in the years 1682-1684, built the citadel, a regular bastioned pentagon of limited space, strengthened by two hornworks towards the north and east. From Vauban date also most of the outworks—hornworks and lunettes.

The main enceinte has, without the citadel, 17 bastions—therefore with it, 22. Nos. 1 to 7 (Fort Blanc) form the south side, numbering from east to west; Nos. 7 to 12 (Fort de Pierre) the west side,

numbering from south to north; Nos. 12 to 17 the north side, numbering from west to east. Of the 5 bastions of the citadel, Nos. 18 and 22 face the town.

The principal outworks are the hornworks Nos. 40 to 42 before the front 8 and 9, and Nos. 47 to 49 before the front 10 and 11; the lunettes Nos. 52 and 53 before the front 11 and 12, and the hornwork Finckmatt before the front 12 to 14.

In more modern times very little has been done on a large scale for Strasburg. In 1867 hollow traverses were commenced upon the ramparts there as in all fortresses; corrections were undertaken where the revetments were not sufficiently protected—the covering works were heightened and prolonged; the three powder-magazines of the citadel, and also some elsewhere, were altered so as to be more protected from the devastating effects of the fire of rifled guns. In the hornworks Nos. 40 to 42 and 47 to 49, as well as in No. 53 lunette, central traverses were constructed which divided each of these works into a right and left half, and thereby defiladed the whole better, besides affording, in their bomb-proof interiors, space for barracks and shelter for the unoccupied part of the garrison. Moreover, in bastions Nos. 7, 9, and 11 on the west side, new powder-magazines were formed.

No. 12 bastion, which is shut off from the town by a wall across the gorge, is an extremely weak

work, owing to its very small dimensions and to the acuteness of its salient angle; and yet exactly there, on the north-west corner, is the point of attack for an adversary.

The ground in front of the whole of the south side can be inundated and rendered impassable by damming up the waters of the Ill and Brüsch, for which purpose large sluices have been built between bastions Nos. 6 and 7; while before the eastern part of the north side, from the Finckmatt down to the Small Rhine, the country is traversed in the most confused manner by the ramifications of the Ill, and by canals and ditches of various widths.

But in spite of this, no improvement on a large scale of bastion No. 12 was undertaken, although such was very feasible. It was deemed sufficient to erect two hollow traverses, one on each face, for shelter and for expense powder-magazines, and to construct a casemated battery for one heavy gun in the salient of the work.

Considering the contracted size of the town, and the smallness of its lateral dimensions, even a thorough rebuilding of the main enceinte alone would not have been sufficient. It would have been much more to the purpose to have surrounded the town with a girdle of detached works at a considerable distance from it; but in 1870 there was not one of these, although projects for them had certainly been designed. About 6000 paces to the north-west of Stras-

burg, a chain of heights, the Hausberg, rises up to about 140 feet above the plain of the valley, and at their feet nestle the communities of Ober, Mittel, and Niederhausbergen, and of Mundolsheim. This chain was to have been crowned with detached works, which were to have joined on to the town, on the one side over the gentle slopes of Suffelweyersheim and Bischheim towards Schiltigheim, and on the other over the undulations of Oberhausbergen towards Königshofen. The distance from the latter was certainly rather great; but if the principal detached forts were made perfectly independent, and at the same time had a sufficient armament of heavy guns, no enemy would have dared to intrude within this magic circle without having first obtained possession of two or three of the works which formed it; and a bombardment of the town from the left bank of the Rhine would be impossible for a long time.

But the great distance of the detached works on the Hausberg, and perhaps more than anything else the question of expense, caused the execution of this project to be postponed; and the authorities determined to content themselves for the present with an advanced line before the north-west corner, with its right on the Ill at Schiltigheim, its left on the Brüsch at Königshofen, and lying about 1800 paces in front of the outworks of the enceinte. The central work of this line was to be built in the form of a hornwork, closed by a wall across the gorge, and situated, in

front of the connecting portion, between the railways to Paris and Basle and the workshops of the Eastern Railway, between the Paris line and the road to Mittelhausberg. The construction of this central work was to have been begun in 1871.

Projects were also made for a better covering of the east side. Two independent works were to be erected in the northern and southern corners of the Ile des Epis. These would have advanced the line of fire of the citadel about 1800 paces to the eastward; and had they existed in 1870, would certainly have rendered good service against the bombardment from the right bank of the Rhine. But in a moment of quietness, this scheme also was laid aside for a time, for the Government feared that its execution might unnecessarily cause a great outcry, in the spirit of Nicolaus Becker's melody.*

Thus it came to pass that the attack of 1870 surprised Strasburg in naked innocence; and certainly, at the outbreak of this war it did not, viewing the armaments of the present days, in the least merit the appellation of a fortress of the first class, much less of "one of the strongest places in the world."

If France had possessed a system of military service which would have allowed her to dispose of large garrisons, and if the war had not been undertaken by the Government of the Emperor Napoleon with such an

* "Sie sollen ihn nicht haben,
Den freien deutschen Rhein."

utter absence of political and military calculation as is scarcely elsewhere recorded in the history of the world, the weak points of Strasburg might have been remedied, at least to some extent; for a few weeks would have been sufficient to run up strong detached works on the most important points outside the enceinte, and particularly before the north-west corner.

The normal garrison of Strasburg was assumed at 15,000 men. In 1870 it was calculated by the Germans at about 18,000 men, but therein were included not only the Sedentary National Guard and the Mobile Guard, but also the numerous staff of the military establishments, of the engineers, of the artillery, of the military medical school, and of the workshops. Of regular troops of the line there were only 3000 in Strasburg.

When the war began, General Uhrich was named commandant of the place. Born in 1802 at Pfalzburg, he entered the French infantry, from the School of St Cyr, as sub-lieutenant in 1820. He served in the campaign in Spain in the year 1823, and in many in Africa after 1834. In 1852 he became brigadier-general, and in 1855 led a brigade of the Imperial Guard to the Crimea, but, nominated to general of division, returned to Paris in the same year. At the commencement of the Italian campaign he stood at the head of a division of the Army of Paris, which then became the 2d division of the 5th Corps of the active army.

We have already seen how, two days after the encounter at Wörth, the Baden cavalry appeared, on the 8th of August, before Strasburg.

The total besieging force was formed gradually by,—

The Baden division, which was commanded at first by General Beyer, and, he falling sick before the bombardment, by General Laroche afterwards;

By the Prussian landwehr division of the Guard (Loën);

By the 1st Prussian Reserve (landwehr) division (Treskow);

By 37 companies of fortress artillery, among which were 2 Bavarian, 2 Würtemberg, 4 Baden, and 29 North German companies; and by 1 Prussian combined company, and 1 Bavarian company of Pioneers.

The command-in-chief of the collective siege forces was given to General von Werder. Born in 1808, he entered the cavalry of the Prussian Guard, the regiment of Life Guards, in 1825, and was afterwards, in 1826, transferred as an officer to the 1st foot regiment of the Guard. In the years 1842 and 1843 he served in the Russian army during the campaigns in the Caucasus; and after his return he was in 1846 appointed as captain to the General Staff, but in 1848 returned again to the infantry. In 1863 he became major-general, and in 1866 lieutenant-general, in which rank he in the same year commanded the 3d division of infantry in the army of Prince Frederic Charles, and by his behaviour at

Gitschin and Königsgratz won the order "pour le mérite."

With him were associated Lieutenant-General von Decker as chief of the siege-artillery, and Major-General von Mertens as chief of the engineers—the latter had in 1864 conducted the siege-works against the Düppel intrenchments.

General von Werder, on his arrival at Strasburg, established his headquarters at Mundolsheim on the Suffel.

From the 11th to the 17th of August the Baden division was alone before the fortress, and the investment therefore could not be completed; but on the 15th Werder caused Schiltigheim, and on the 18th Königshofen, to be occupied; and after the latter day the Prussian reserves, and after the 21st of August the siege-guns, began to arrive.

On the 23d Werder determined to commence on the morrow to bombard the town with the 40 disposable Prussian siege-guns and with the Bavarian field-artillery, and the citadel with the 32 Baden siege-guns from Rastatt, which had been placed in batteries on the right bank of the Rhine at Kehl.

Since the first shell fell into a besieged town, there has always been much controversy as to the admissibility and utility of a bombardment. In France itself the question has been much argued in recent days by an engineer officer of great length of service, and by an old artillery officer. The first, Chief of

Battalion Prevost,* commandant of engineers for the eastern forts of Paris, has come forward as the decided opponent of bombardment; but Blois,† General of Artillery, has defended the practice with great vigour. It will not be uninteresting to give here a short summary of the arguments which the latter adduces in favour of the practice. He says :—

1. During the bombardment the besieger will suffer but little loss, being protected by his breastworks, and sheltered in his parallels and batteries.

2. If the bombardment does not effect its purpose, and the besieger has to advance to the regular attack, he commences this with unweakened forces against a garrison which has suffered greatly, and which probably has been already brought into conflict with the citizens by the bombardment; and therefore the resistance to be overcome will not be so great as it would have been had the besieger at once commenced a regular attack.

3. If the besieger, out of pure philanthropy or from other reasons, spare the inhabitants of the town, these will not be grateful to him for his clemency, but will rather support the garrison, and thus increase the resistance, to the prejudice of the attacker.

4. By the inevitably long duration of a regular

* Etudes Historiques sur la Fortification, l'Attaque, et la Défense des Places. 1869.

† De la Fortification en Présence de l'Artillerie nouvelle. Paris, 1865. Examen critique des Etudes Historiques sur la Fortifications, l'Attaque, et la Défense des Places. Par F. Prevost. Paris, 1869.

siege, the besieging troops, and also a corps of observation, will be rendered immovable, and prevented from making other useful movements in the open field.

5. If the attacker obtains possession of the place after a regular siege, he will only find empty magazines, which he must at once refill, and demolished ramparts, which he must at once rebuild.

In all ages the practice of bombardment has found more adherents in the artillery than in the engineers. This cannot be explained by saying that the corps of engineers is composed of more humane elements than the artillery. It rather arises from the fact that each arm of the service naturally strives a little *pro domo*. The engineer will hear nothing of bombardments, because he wishes to render of value his good choice of the points of attack, his saps and trenches, his indication of the right position for batteries; and not only that, but he wishes to try how the works of defence will hold out, which certainly were not planned by himself, but yet were constructed by comrades of the freemasonry on the other side. The artillerist, on the other hand, despises professionally all these cunning contrivances, and trusts much more to the big mouths of his large-calibre guns, and to the dread which their thunder inspires—a fear which he must always regard with a certain inward satisfaction.

A bombardment is certainly a cruel affair; but its application cannot therefore be rejected on principle

—for war itself is essentially a barbarous proceeding, and it is its rule that the innocent suffer much more than the guilty. Compare only the prisoner of Wilhelmshöhe and his followers with the noble French nation, which he and those followers excited to this hapless war.

We arrive, then, necessarily at the conclusion, that to judge of the admissibility and utility of a bombardment, we must consider the particulars of each separate case where it is employed. If we do this with regard to Strasburg, we shall find that the application of a bombardment there was not expedient, and we will give our grounds for this assertion :—

1. If the inhabitants of Strasburg had been burning with desire to throw themselves into the arms of Germany, a few shells from German ordnance would have sufficed to cause them to exercise pressure upon the commandant. Then the bombardment would have been neither cruel nor inexpedient. But this hypothesis was not true; on the contrary, the inhabitants of Strasburg were more French in their sentiments than the people of the interior of France, and it was to be assumed that they would only be imbittered against the Germans by the destruction wrought by German artillery.

2. At the time that the bombardment was undertaken, it had already been expressed with sufficient clearness that the victorious Germans meant to retain Alsace as a "German Brotherland," to keep for them-

selves that "land German at heart," and especially Strasburg, that "thorough German town;" and we have certainly never before heard that a bombardment was the right means to evince or to awaken brotherly love.

3. Although the conduct of the Prussian field-artillery in 1866 was very sharply criticised, it has nevertheless been universally acknowledged since 1864, the time of the attack of the Düppel intrenchments, that the Prussian siege-artillery has attained to a degree of perfection in the accuracy and effect of each single shot hitherto unknown. Its destructive power has been established beyond all doubt. Under these circumstances, the bombardment of the town might undoubtedly have been omitted; and it certainly ought not to have taken place, especially considering the relative incompleteness of the preparations of the defenders; because, as we said before, such an act can never be a convincing proof of brotherly love.

General von Werder, however, determined to bombard the town, because he knew that there was no excess of bomb-proof shelter in the town, and assumed, therefore, that the citizens would compel the commandant to surrender. This calculation was false; but it would have been thoroughly correct if the population of Strasburg had been composed of those men of Jewish origin who in the present day give themselves out to be the true Germany, and cry out for the annihilation of France,—who, as contractors, gain an ill-earned

pelf by the continuation of a destructive war, without themselves incurring any danger—or, as professors, disgracefully degrading science by the name, hunger after better posts, and are ready to commit any meanness, even to defaming the German nation in the history of the world.

Werder informed General Uhrich beforehand of his intention to bombard the town, and at the same time summoned him to surrender, which he refused to do. Thereupon Werder entered into further details, and requested the General to remove the observatory established upon the minster, so that the Germans might not be compelled to fire upon this monument of Gothic architecture; he besought him also to change the position of the military hospital, which was near the citadel, as it stood in the line of fire from the German batteries, and yet could not be distinctly seen from them. But Uhrich declined to comply with either of these entreaties.

The fate of the brave old town of Strasburg must touch the heart of every feeling man, to whatever nation he may belong, or whatever his political feelings may be. But this compassion must not cause us to forget to be just. In France, the bombardment of the city was regarded as an act of German barbarity; but when General Uhrich said that if the Germans succeeded in entering the town he would himself retire into the citadel and thence destroy the town, the speech was praised in all the French journals as heroic.

We must confess that we cannot reconcile these two views; and we can say this the more openly, as we have before most decidedly declared that a bombardment in this case seemed to us on good grounds to be inexpedient.

On the forenoon of the 24th of August the bombardment was begun. Fearful devastations were caused by it, and the venerable cathedral was shamefully injured; the valuable library was destroyed; many private dwellings were ruined; and innocent, unarmed, grey-headed men, women, and children, were killed or crippled. The defenceless inhabitants sought refuge in the cellars, while those capable of bearing arms strove with heroic courage to keep under the flames, and to save as much of their father-town as could yet be rescued.

The Bishop of Strasburg sought to mediate. At his entreaty Werder intermitted the bombardment on the 26th of August from four o'clock in the morning until noon. But the negotiations of the Bishop led to no result; he could obtain no concessions from Uhrich, and could only make requests of Werder. At noon, therefore, on the 26th, the bombardment was recommenced, and carried on throughout that day and the whole of the following one; but the desired end was not gained, for commandant, garrison, and citizens remained unshaken, and no one urged General Uhrich to surrender.

While the German batteries on the left bank of the

Rhine directed their fire upon the town, the Baden artillery on the right bank to the north of Kehl bombarded the citadel with great success, and reduced the dwellings and magazines within it to a heap of ruins.

The French guns in the citadel answered with vigour, and for their part set the town of Kehl on fire. From the German side the French are reproached for having directed their fire upon this open place unnecessarily, as the Baden batteries were not situated in any way before Kehl, but by the side of it. This last statement is certainly true; but it must be admitted that Kehl, so hard by the position, would have been an only too comfortable shelter for the men of Baden had it been perfectly tabooed to the fire of the French.

We must here further relate that General von Werder, during his negotiations with the Bishop, had expressed his willingness to allow the women, children, and old men to leave Strasburg. But this offer was declined by General Uhrich, as it would be difficult to make a selection out of 85,000 human beings.

When it became evident that the bombardment would not gain quickly the end in view, General von Werder resolved, on the 27th of August, to begin a regular siege with the abundant materials at hand; and the establishment of engineer depots, the preparation of fascines, gabions, &c., were at once taken in hand.

The artillery *matériel* which was on the spot was both plentiful in quantity and excellent in quality. There were altogether 241 siege-pieces, 44 of which were from Baden, and the total was composed as follows:—

58 rifled 24-pounders (16 of which were from Baden—12 short pieces particularly adapted for pitching-firing);
80 rifled 12-pounders (among them 16 from Baden);
20 rifled 6-pounders;
2 rifled mortars of 21 centimetres (8 inch);
8 smooth-bore 60-pounder mortars (from Baden);
19 smooth-bore 50-pounder mortars;
24 smooth-bore 25-pounder mortars (4 from Baden);
30 smooth-bore 7-pounder mortars.

In the night from the 29th to the 30th of August, the first parallel was opened by flying sap, about 700 to 800 paces from the north-west corner of the fortress, with its left on Schiltigheim, and its right extending towards the Paris railway. At the same time, 10 batteries for rifled guns were constructed about 200 to 300 paces in rear of it. These were armed with 44 guns, and were ready to commence work on the morning of the 30th. When they opened fire on the works of the north-west corner, they were supported by the German batteries which

had been thrown up for the bombardment and were not yet disarmed.

The artillery of the defenders was surprised by the fire of the besiegers, which commenced on the morning of the 30th. The armament which they had on the works for security against an attack *de vive force* was not sufficient to answer with effect, and the armament to withstand a regular siege had not yet been completed. By the Germans it is supposed that the French expected the attack to be made on some point other than the one chosen. But this is scarcely possible, for Strasburg offers but one easily assailable front, and that is the one which was selected by the Germans. We must therefore assume that the French did not anticipate that the regular siege would be commenced so soon as the morning of the 30th of August; but be that as it may, the fire from the point attacked was completely silenced in two hours, and was only able to reopen in the afternoon.

During the whole time of the siege, and even throughout the nights, a constant fire of shrapnel and of mortar shells rendered it very difficult for the besieged to repair their injured batteries, or to construct new ones even for mortars; but nevertheless they did their utmost, and placed their works again and again in a condition to answer.

In the night from the 31st of August to the 1st of September, the besiegers formed the approaches from the first to the second parallel, and opened this latter

on the night from the 1st to the 2d of September in the churchyard of St Helene, by common sap, at a distance of 400 paces from the fortifications of the town.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 2d September, the defenders made the first sortie of any importance. One column issued northwards upon the islands of Wacken and Jars, to attack the left flank of the siege-works of the Germans, while another debouched southwards against the railway station before the gate of Austerlitz. Both were repelled after a short combat; but the Badensers, pursuing too hotly, suffered considerable losses. Sorties on a large scale by the garrison of Strasburg were in general very difficult to carry out, owing partly to the total want of detached works, partly and principally to the smallness of the number of troops of the line which General Uhrich had at his disposal.

As the siege progressed, and as the approaches were pushed forward, so did the artillery increase the number of its batteries, and remove them constantly nearer to the front. Thus, on the 9th of September the Germans had, including the Baden guns on the right bank of the Rhine, 178 pieces actively at work, of which 48 were mortars.

In the nights from the 9th to the 10th and from the 10th to the 11th of September, the approaches from the second to the third parallel were made; and during the night from the 11th to the 12th, the

greater part of the third parallel itself, which ran along the foot of the glacis of Nos. 53 and 52 lunettes, was opened.

But these labours in the trenches were not executed without sacrifices. By the 5th of September the Germans had lost 57 killed, 327 wounded, and 30 missing. Of the engineer officers employed, 2 were killed, and 2 wounded.

By the 11th of September the artillery had armed a breaching-battery, battery No. 25, with four short 24-pounders against the lunette No. 53. This breaching-battery was on the highroad to Weissenburg, behind the first parallel, and about 1100 paces removed from its object, which it could strike by a pitching-fire across a moderately wide ditch. It fulfilled its object in an unexampled manner.

As soon as the catastrophe of Sedan was heard of in the German camp, General Werder had communicated the news to General Uhrich; but it was barely credited in the garrison, and produced no effect whatever. Meanwhile unions for the assistance of Strasburg had been everywhere formed in Switzerland, which sought to do its best in every way for a town which had been in such brotherly connection with it in former centuries. The centre of these unions was naturally Basle; and a delegation went thence to the German headquarters to do any good it might be able to. By order of the German commander it was admitted into the city, and then the inhabitants readily

believed from the Swiss that which they had refused to give credence to when it came from their besiegers, and the messengers were fortunate enough to be able to take back with them to Switzerland 800 of the defenceless citizens.

While the Germans were, as we have seen, continually drawing nearer to the north-west corner of the fortifications of the town of Strasburg, they did not at all neglect to approach towards the eastern side also—towards the citadel; and with a view to drawing nearer to this, the Badensers crossed from the right bank of the Great Rhine to the Ile des Epis, while Prussian battalions passed over the Small Rhine to the same island from the Robertsau.

On the 15th of September, the besieged, who were also molested by German field-batteries from the south side, made a sortie upon the Ile des Epis, but were repulsed by the Badensers. On this occasion Colonel Fievé, the commandant of the French regiment of pontoniers, fell—a man of extraordinary corporeal dimensions, who was known throughout France for his unnatural erectness, which would have been remarkable even in Prussia.

On the 12th of September the Germans armed the breaching-battery No. 42 with six short 24-pounders, with intent to domolish the escarp of the right face of bastion No. 11. The battery was 1000 paces removed from its object, lying to the south of the road which branches off at the churchyard of St Helene

from the Weissenburg highway, and runs to Schiltigheim. Afterwards battery No. 58 was constructed, between the Oberweg and the Unterweg, 900 paces from its object, and armed with four short 24-pounders, to breach the left flank of bastion No. 12.

As the guns in most of the batteries had to fire over intervening objects, and therefore with rather considerable elevations, the German artillery employed perfectly level trough-shaped embrasures instead of the ordinary revetted ones. Owing to this, and to the cover they derived from their position behind and in the parallels and approaches, the batteries offered to the besieged a very unfavourable target. Pitching-fire, to breach masonry which could not be seen from the batteries, was employed before Strasburg for the first time, with how great success we shall see later on. It is almost superfluous to remark, that the difficulty of breaching at great distances when the masonry is visible from afar—as, for example, was the case in the artillery attacks of the English on the fortresses in Spain—cannot be compared with that of breaching by a pitching-fire. The gun chiefly used for this pitching-fire was the short rifled 24-pounder (15 centimetres).

On the 17th of September the Prussian sappers effected by sap the crowning of the covered-ways of lunettes Nos. 53 and 52, the system of mines before the former having been luckily discovered and unloaded. It was found to be unnecessary to construct

breaching and counter batteries on the crest of the glacis, as the pitching-fire had already done its work on lunette No. 53. When the breach was ready, the sappers descended by a blinded-gallery to the level of the water in the wet ditches of both lunettes, blew down by means of two mines the revetted counter-scarp of lunette No. 53 opposite the breach, and began to form a dam, 20 feet wide, across the 60 feet wide wet ditch.

But before the dam was finished, it was discovered on the 20th of September that the work was abandoned by the French. The breach was at once occupied, and on the evening of the 20th the interior of the lunette also. The sappers forthwith commenced to establish themselves there; but this having to be accomplished under the fire of the works in rear, could not be effected without loss. The lunette was found to be in a state of utter ruin, and even the bomb-proof barrack-traverses on the capital of the work had not been able to withstand the effects of the German artillery. And as lunette No. 53 was destroyed and forsaken, so also was lunette No. 52; and a bridge of barrels having been thrown across the 180 feet wide wet ditch on the evening of the 21st of September, the latter work also was occupied.

The German artillery had, on the 24th of September, 229 pieces of ordnance in their batteries, among which were 83 mortars. The last battery which was built was called No. 60, and was constructed in lunette

No. 53 for three rifled 6-pounders. On the whole, the Germans made 68 batteries during the siege; and the reason that the last one thrown up nevertheless only received the designation No. 60 was this, that when, in the course of events, a battery had to be moved forward, it retained its old number with an *a*, and, if necessary, a *b* also, appended.

By the 29th of September the works on the front attacked were no longer tenable. In bastion No. 11, a breach 80 feet wide, and perfectly practicable, had been formed. The interior was a heap of ruins, and communication with the town was nearly impossible. In bastion No. 12 the breach was also cut, and it only remained to batter down the masses of earth which remained standing. This was to be done shortly before the storming. The casemated battery in its salient, and the wall which closed the gorge, were reduced to shapeless masses. The advanced lunette No. 44, before the front 9-10, and the barracks and parts of the town abutting on the front attacked, were in the same condition. The arch of the Stone Gate (Porte de Pierres) in the curtain 11-12 was on the point of falling in, and, to prevent this, it became necessary for the besieged to fill it up with sand-bags. The works lying next to the front attacked, the hornwork Finckmatt (58-60 and 47-49), were not so utterly battered down as the front itself, but were nevertheless very materially damaged.

On the 27th of September, at 5 o'clock in the

afternoon, General Uhrich caused the white flag to be hoisted on the minster and on bastions No. 11 and 12.

The German artillery at once ceased their fire. They had, since the commencement of the attack, thrown 193,722 shot and shell into the town and fortress—6249 for each day, 260 for each hour, 4 to 5 for every minute.

Among these were 28,000 common shell and 5000 shrapnel-shell from the long rifled 24-pounders; 45,000 common shell and 11,000 shrapnel from the rifled 12-pounders; 8000 common shell and 4000 shrapnel from the rifled 6-pounders; 3000 common shell from the short rifled 24-pounders (guns of 15 centimetres); 600 shell from the 21-centimetre (8-inch) rifled mortars; 58,000 shell from the smooth-bore mortars — namely, 15,000 from the 50-pounders, 20,000 from the 25-pounders, and 23,000 from the 7-pounders.

The capitulation ensued without delay. The terms, especially as regards the officers, were similar to those of the surrender at Sedan; the troops of the line became prisoners of war, the National Guard and Franc-tireurs were disarmed and set free upon giving a bond. At 8 A.M. on the 28th of September, the citadel, and the Austerlitz, Fischer, and National gates, were to be given over to the Germans. At 11 A.M. the garrison was to march out to the square in the Gallgass, between redoubt No. 37 and lunette No. 44; and at noon the giving over of the *matériel* was to commence.

Much disorder took place during the marching out: many of the soldiers destroyed their arms, and some of them could not be removed from the town until 3 P.M.; but the transfer of the stores was more speedily effected, and 1070 cannons were given over to the Germans on the first day.

Lieutenant-General von Ollech was appointed German governor of the fortress, and Major-General von Mertens commandant. General von Werder, now nominated to the command of the newly-formed 14th Army Corps, was to operate southwards on both sides of the Vosges into the valley of the Saone, to prevent the formation of troops there, and to cut the railway communication from Mülhausen to Paris, and from Pontarlier by Dijon to Paris.

Even during the siege of Strasburg various detachments of troops had been sent from the investing forces into the Vosges to break up and scatter the bodies of Franc-tireurs who were beginning to collect there in ever-increasing numbers; but they had, as can be easily understood, but very imperfectly effected their object.

After the taking of the town, the inhabitants of Strasburg, although they did not openly rebel, nevertheless showed by their whole behaviour that they were but little disposed to accept the "brotherly love" of the Germans.

Certainly this "brotherly love" did not show itself in a very captivating form. An unfeeling curiosity

rather than a sympathising compassion for the unfortunate brought crowds of people to the ruined city. It seemed almost as though many were charmed thither by the pictures of desolation which were to be seen everywhere. The ruins were photographed; sketches of them adorned the various illustrated periodicals, and were even collected together in albums, which were recommended as suitable Christmas gifts. Literary would-be warriors wrote with brutal imbecility the text for these pictures in the papers which pretended to represent German civilisation. It was not a bad thought which prompted the authorities to set aside the citadel as reserved. Whoever wished to inspect closely the devastations wrought there, had to pay three shillings entrance; and the sum thus collected, which was to be spent in restoring the cathedral, amounted in a very few weeks to £7500.

An intelligent man of Leipsic formed the ingenious idea of collecting the splinters of the shells which had laid the town in ruins, and casting them into "patriotic medals," which were sold at a shilling each. To the advertisement of this tender memorial he added an authenticating certificate from the mayor, to the effect that on the 9th of November he had bought 50 hundredweight of the fragments of shell.

Whoever enters into the spirit of the words,

"silent sympathy is asked for," * can scarcely find pleasure in such manifestations, which, however, were not here apparent for the first time.

The people of Strasburg, at least those whose position and occupation allowed them to, retired silently into their dwellings while the town was thus crowded with sight-seers—even those whose mother-tongue was German avoided speaking it when conversing with the conquerors. Many, hoping for better times, sought an asylum in Switzerland; and from Strasburg, as from the whole of Alsace, many young men went into the south of France to join the Mobile Guard and partisan corps which were forming there.

* The words which usually accompany the notice of a death in a German newspaper.

CHAPTER XXVI.

STATE OF THE WAR AT THE END OF THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER.

At the end of September the military activity of the Germans was confined to three main centres—Strasburg, Metz, and Paris.

Strasburg fell. The troops which had been necessarily employed in the attack were for the most part set free, and could be used for other purposes; and as Germany had declared that she intended to retain Alsace after the conclusion of peace, their chief work must next be to subdue Upper Alsace, and especially the fortresses of Schlettstadt, Neu Breisach, and Belfort, which were still in the hands of the French. But it was to be assumed, also, that new formations would be organised in the south and west of Alsace, and therefore the additional task must be undertaken of destroying these in the bud where possible. This might very likely, at that time, be effected with small forces, and therefore flying-columns were sent out in the above-named directions into the valleys of the Rhone and Saone.

Metz was, and had been since the 18th of August, surrounded by two German armies—the First Army and the Second Army—but it had not been regularly attacked, neither had any attempt been made to bombard it. The Germans were waiting to subdue the fortress by famine, an end which they foresaw that they must sooner or later attain. For even if the fortress had been fully provisioned, and its future requirements provided for, at the commencement of the war, there had been a field-army using its supplies during the latter days of July and the earlier part of August; and since then the army of Bazaine had been daily consuming at least as much as the inhabitants and the regular garrison together. Since the arrival of the news of the catastrophe of Sedan, and of the declaration of the Republic in Paris, the offensive defence of Bazaine had become very languid, as we shall see later on in our narrative. But the Germans could not calculate upon the continuation of this lethargy; it was, on the contrary, only prudent to assume that Bazaine might rouse himself for a desperate stroke. Considerable forces were therefore tied down before Metz, and having to be always in readiness in case of need, they dared not undertake any secondary enterprises which would remove them for any length of time from the investing lines. On the other hand, such collateral undertakings were not required from the besiegers, as there was no important point in the neighbourhood where the French

Republic could endeavour to organise any formations worth mentioning.

Paris had been invested since the 19th of September, but a speedy surrender was no longer to be hoped for. After the first bewildered surprise caused by the news of the catastrophe of Sedan had passed away, and a new order of things had been formed; after this had been accepted by the masses—we will not say more; after the conference of Ferrières, instead of awakening hopes of a speedy peace, had rather shown the gulf which now yawned between France and Germany,—the Germans were compelled to acknowledge that they would have to encounter an earnest resistance if they advanced to any more or less regular siege of Paris. To bring up the material necessary to overcome this would require much time. On the other hand, if they wished to allow hunger to do the work of battle, they must be prepared to allow months to pass away before it would begin to make its terrors felt.

If the French could no longer hope for peace, they must apply themselves to forming new armies—national armies; for of the Imperial army but little remained, and that little was either imprisoned or split up into useless fractions. The objective of these newly-to-be-formed armies must be, in the first place, the relief of Paris—of that town which, taking into account only the number of its inhabitants, and dis-

regarding all else, completely outweighs many a German kingdom or grand duchy.

Where, then, must these armies be formed—and how?

The parts of France really overrun by the Germans, and which could be easily dominated from their centres of operations, scarcely amounted to a seventh of the whole country. But in the north the district unoccupied by the Germans formed but narrow strips, because of the nearness of the Belgian frontier and of the sea. This portion was therefore unsafe, and the points of concentration in it had too little territory around them to allow of their being used for the formation of new armies.

These, therefore, must necessarily be collected and organised in the south of France.

And in the south of France, again, two divisions are sharply defined — the one to the east of the Sevennes, the Rhone district; and the other to the west of the Sevennes, comprising the district of the Loire, the mountains of Limousin, and the basin of the Gironde.

Of these two divisions, again, the eastern has never been in such intimate connection with the capital of France as the western.

In the valley of the Rhone, we, even to the present day, still feel ourselves in the world of Greek colonies and of Roman provinces. A large town, Lyons, has

sprung up there, which, although far inferior in the number of inhabitants and in all other respects, still stands next to Paris in France. A second great town has arisen also, Marseilles, the third in France; but Lyons and Marseilles together have but little more than a third of the population of the capital, although they leave all other towns of France far behind. Still, with these large and important cities in it, the fate of the basin of the Rhone has never been so intimately bound up with that of the centre of France as that of the west has been.

There, on both sides of the Loire, that Carnuten land spreads out which the Druids declared to be the navel of Celtic Gaul. Thence, from Orleans, went forth the deliverance of France from the English invasion, wrought by Joan of Arc. Behind the Loire the wreck of the French army retreated after the defeats of 1815; and the nickname of Brigands of the Loire, which was given them by the followers of the Bourbons, became a name of honour for them among the people of France. More to the south, in the mountains of Auvergne, arose Vercingetorix, the hero who made such manful, although unsuccessful, attempts to free his country from the dominion of the Romans.

The south-western land cannot boast of such large towns as exist in the basin of the Rhone, but still there are not wanting many, such as Nantes, Bordeaux, and Toulouse, which, important by their population,

offer by their commerce and industry centres where the clothing, equipment, and arming of considerable forces would be facilitated.

And in the then existing state of affairs, the district of the Loire possessed a special importance, owing to its nearness to Paris.

If it be asked what character the new French formations would assume, it will be found that it must by necessity be a revolutionary one. Even the new formations of the line, which were to be gathered together round the nucleus of the still existing or hurriedly-collected depots, would consist partly of old soldiers, partly and mostly of the young conscripts of the year 1870. To these would be joined the Mobile Guards, and other corps of troops gained in some way or other, since every means must be adopted to obtain men. The *matériel*, articles of equipment, horses, and suchlike, would be procured by requisition. As there was a want of experienced officers, such would have to be improvised; and as the opinion was ever gaining ground that the old generals who had been soldiers from their early youth had been the cause of all the misfortunes, it was very likely to happen that the rulers of France would fall into the error of making generals and officers of men who were utterly ignorant of military matters.

As the great end was to obtain masses and large numbers of soldiers, the armament could not be uni-

form—arms would be taken wherever they were found, wherever they could be obtained.

The matter was urgent. The relief of Paris was the first objective; for however favourable the condition of Paris might be painted, it could not be denied that the sooner the time of relief came, so much the more chance would there be that Paris would hold out until its arrival.

The Government, therefore, made desperate efforts in military affairs. The passion for war penetrated into the masses, who were purposely excited by every means. The more the theatre of war became extended, and the more the communications of the Germans were lengthened, so much the greater field would there be for the working of national passions. The Germans would be obliged to make many small detachments, and these could be attacked again by small French detachments and partisan corps, especially if the rural population supported them actively and secretly, at the same time opposing a stubborn passive resistance to the Germans. Every success of such a partisan enterprise would lead to reprisals, and these again would call for vengeance. Thus it can be said that the more success seemed to vanish from the cause of the now highly-excited French people, so much the more cruelly, and with so much the more bitterness, would the war be carried on.

And at that time, also, superstition began to play its part. Inspired men came forward and began to

prophesy great disasters, which were, however, finally to be followed by so much the more glorious successes. The masses listened willingly; the journalists, who were not credulous, also spread abroad these prophecies, and took care not to allow their scepticism to appear.

The Germans before Paris, at the same time that they kept up the investment of the town, must also send out expeditions from this centre in all directions, partly to acquire information of what was going on in their vicinity, partly to prevent new formations arising, or to nip them in the bud, if it were possible to do so without too great an expenditure of force. But they must ever keep their gaze principally directed towards the line of the Loire; and if it were possible, they must establish themselves on that river in order to earnestly oppose any serious attempt to relieve Paris which might be made from the south-western district of France.

Such was the military situation of the belligerents at the end of September, and such were the cheerless prospects of both parties after the shipwreck of any hopes of peace which the catastrophe of Sedan may have awakened—prospects cheerless for the French, who could now barely hope any longer for a victory in the open field, and cheerless also for the Germans, who could no longer hope for a speedy peace, but could only look sorrowfully forward to the kindling of the most bitter national hate, and to fresh wars in the future, which perhaps, spite of or because of

Alsace and Lorraine, would not be commenced under such favourable auspices as that of 1870.

Many a German looked back already from the theatre of war to his own home, and asked himself whether anything useful would be gained by so many and great exertions either for it or for the German nation, or whether the fruits of this war might not fall short of what was expected, as those of the wars of 1813 and 1815 did.

CHAPTER XXVII.

THE BATTLE OF NOISSEVILLE ON THE 31ST OF AUGUST AND THE 1ST OF SEPTEMBER.

When the troops which were destined to form the army of the Crown-Prince of Saxony quitted the neighbourhood of Metz, the forces remaining behind to oppose Bazaine were at once reinforced by the strong division of General Kummer, which was only then called up from Germany, and consisted of a brigade of infantry of the line and Schuler von Senden's division of landwehr.

Prince Frederic Charles, to whom the command of the German "Army of Metz" was intrusted, did not expect to subdue the fortress by a regular siege; and a bombardment of the town was rendered impossible by the strong detached works so long as the French held possession of them. But, on the other hand, the Germans could calculate with great certainty upon the effects of hunger. They therefore kept the place completely shut in, and watched it closely, throwing up intrenchments, so that they could guard the long investing lines with comparatively few men, and keep

strong reserves in rear, ready to follow Bazaine instantaneously in any direction in which he might succeed in breaking out.

Moreover, to the bridges which already existed above Metz, they added another below the town at Hauconcourt, where at other times there was only a ferry, to complete the communication between the investing troops on both banks of the Moselle.

It was to be assumed as most probable that any attempt which Bazaine might make to escape, during the time of the operations of the armies of M'Mahon and of the Crown-Princes in the Argonne and on the banks of the Meuse, would be to the west or north-west. If the French, under the then existing circumstances, made any effort to break through the lines in any other direction, it could only be regarded as essentially a demonstration, intended to draw some of the German forces across to the right bank of the Moselle, and so render it easier for M'Mahon, on arriving before Metz, to decisively defeat such of the Germans as remained on the left bank. Consequently the number of German troops on the left bank during the last days of August was much greater than on the right.

The 8th Army Corps, supported by the 3d division of cavalry, stood on both sides of the Moselle above the town. Their *vedettes* extended on the right to the Seille, and on the left northwards as far as the wood of Plénois. There the outposts of the 10th

Corps joined on to them, whilst its left rested on the river below Metz.

Behind this screen three Army Corps were concentrated—namely, the 3d Corps, on the road through Doncourt and Conflans; the 2d Corps, on the road to Auboué-Briey; and the 9th, between this last road and the one to Thionville,—all equally prepared to form front, either to oppose Bazaine or to meet the advance of M'Mahon.

On the right bank of the Moselle the 7th Corps joined on to the right of the 8th, being posted on both sides of the highway to Strasburg. On its right, again, stood the 1st Corps, on the roads to Saarbrück and Saarlouis; and lastly, on the right of this, was Kummer's division, on the road to Bouzonville and resting on the Moselle below Metz, being in communication with the 10th Corps by the bridge at Hauconcourt.

Thus there were about 70,000 men, infantry and cavalry, on the right bank, and 120,000 on the left.

The headquarters of Prince Frederic Charles, who commanded not only his own army, the First, but also the Second, Steinmetz's, were at Malancourt, on the left bank, in the district of the 9th Army Corps.

An investment such as was now intended must necessarily be somewhat wearying. The men must always be in readiness to move or to fight, but have not the variety which a march brings with it, and, if the adversary remains quiet, are but seldom

roused by the excitement of a battle. And in addition to this, they have to remain for a lengthened period in a neighbourhood which is soon laid waste by such a massing of troops; they must consequently submit to many privations, and this does not tend to keep the troops fresh and in good spirits.

At first, certainly, the Germans found enough to do: they had to intrench themselves in order to obtain in some degree security from attack; and as they did not carry tents, they had to build huts to protect themselves as much as possible from the rain and from the chilliness of weather, which was just then becoming unpleasantly autumnal.

And besides all this, a great work had been undertaken, which, although it certainly did not directly concern the soldiers, still gave them some occupation.

Even at the commencement of the war, the Prussian General Staff had assumed that Metz would be able to hold out for a protracted space of time, and that it would be necessary to keep considerable forces before it while others were operating in advance in the direction of Paris. In that case Metz would break the railway communication between these latter troops and the frontier of Germany. It was therefore resolved to restore this by a field-railway; and in the beginning of August the line for it was sought for, and it was determined to construct it from Remilly on the Saarbrück railway to Pont à Mousson on the Metz-Frouard line—a distance of about 18 miles in a

straight line, or nearly 22 if the windings are taken into account. On the 14th of August, the day of the battle of Borny, the survey of the ground and the levelling were commenced by the officials of two railway detachments; and on the 17th the execution of the work was taken in hand. The construction was begun, as far as the advance of the special preparatory works allowed, in many places at the same time, and not merely carried on from the two ends.

In this task there were employed two field-railway companies (450 men), four fortress pioneer companies (800 men); 3000 miners from the coal-districts of Saarbrücken, who were thrown out of work by the war; a park of 250 vehicles, to which were shortly afterwards added the waggons, 84 in number, of the two pontoon-trains of the 7th and 8th Army Corps; and a squadron of cavalry, which was apportioned to the building corps to perform patrol and requisition duties.

The workmen, as they arrived at the various points of the work, erected barracks and depots—the waggon-park bringing up the implements and building materials to the different portions of the line. The weights to be transported amounted to 175,000 hundredweight, in which are included the materials necessary for making two bridges—across the Seille and the Moselle—and two viaducts between Remilly and Bechy.

Although gradients of 1 in 40, and curves of only

250 paces radius were allowed, still the irregularities of the ground, as may be seen from our former description of it, were so great, that in some places it was necessary to make very considerable cuttings and embankments. On the 23d of September, however, although five days had been lost owing to heavy rains, the railway was completed, and traversed by a locomotive; and on the 26th regular traffic along it was commenced.

From the 19th of August to the last day of the month, Bazaine remained quiet. His troops imperatively required repose, and lay encamped under the protection of the detached forts, but separated from the garrison of the fortress. Although the communication of Bazaine with the outer world was not completely cut off—for some of the brave and loyal people of the neighbourhood still contrived to slip through the Prussian lines, both from without into the fortress, and from the town to the exterior—it was nevertheless very imperfect. But still, from such information as he did receive, and from the conclusions which he could draw therefrom, Bazaine must assume that the relieving army of M'Mahon would be in the vicinity of Metz towards the end of August, if indeed it should ever succeed in arriving there.

He resolved, therefore, on the 31st of August, to make a great sortie, and that on the right bank of the Moselle. The object of it could be nothing more than to draw German troops across to that side of the

river, and thus facilitate M'Mahon's victory on the other. For this enterprise along the right bank the Corps of Canrobert and Lebœuf were destined, and they consequently deployed behind Fort St Julien and near Fort Bellecroix. The Guard and the 4th Corps (Ladmirault) remained on the left bank, to reach the hand to M'Mahon should he come up, while the 2d Corps (Frossard) formed the reserve on the right bank.

The French attack was directed in the first place upon Kummer's division and the 1st Army Corps (Manteuffel). On the evening of the 30th of August these troops stood thus: the brigade of the line belonging to Kummer's division was posted along the line Malroy-Charly, with a detachment in the chateau of Rupigny; the landwehr division was in reserve behind it, and the headquarters of General Kummer were at Olgy, on the road to Thionville. Of the 1st Corps, the 1st brigade of infantry stood on the front Failly-Servigny-Noisseville; the 2d brigade in reserve in rear, to the east of Fremy, where were also the headquarters of General Bentheim, chief of the 1st division of infantry; the 4th brigade of infantry was on the front Colombey-Aubigny-Ars Laquenexy-Mercy le Haut; the 3d brigade behind it, at Courcelles on the Nied, where were also the headquarters of General Pritzelwitz, chief of the 2d division of infantry. The space between the 1st and 2d divisions on the Saarbrück road, on the front Noisseville-Montoy-Colombey, was covered by the two

divisional regiments of cavalry of the 1st Corps, the 1st and 10th regiments of dragoons. The reserve artillery of the 1st Corps was at St Barbe.

From half-past seven on the morning of the 31st of August the Prussian observation-posts on the comparatively high ground of St Barbe remarked the deployment of the French; and in the forenoon the advanced-guards of the latter attacked on the one side the front of Kummer's division, and on the other that of Pritzelwitz's division, in the following way:—

At 9 A.M. French troops appeared before Colombey, and compelled the Prussian detachment posted there to evacuate the village; but, on the other hand, the Germans maintained themselves in Aubigny and Mercy le Haut, which were also attacked. At noon the French relinquished their efforts there also, and consequently for many hours stillness prevailed on that part of the battle-field.

Meanwhile, at 10 A.M., Kummer's division was assailed by French cavalry and by a French battery. These were quickly repulsed by the artillery of the Prussians; and afterwards the landwehr troops were only molested by the fire of Fort St Julien.

From the commencement of these attacks, a massing of considerable numbers of French troops had been observed on the road from Fort Bellecroix to the farm of the same name, at the point where the highways to Saarlouis and Saarbrück separate from one another. This caused General Manteuffel to sus-

pect that the main attack would presently be developed in that direction, and therefore, immediately that the news arrived of the dispositions of his adversary, he gave orders which would place yet greater forces in readiness on these roads. His directions were that the 3d brigade of infantry (Memerty) was to march from Courcelles on the Nied to the Saarbrück highroad at Puche, accompanied by two of the divisional batteries; the 3d division of cavalry was to despatch its 6th brigade from Pouilly to Retonfay, between the roads to Saarbrück and Saarlouis; and General Kummer was directed to detach one regiment of cavalry and one battery to St Barbe.

At the same time Manteuffel sent information to Prince Frederic Charles and to General Steinmetz of what was going on, and of the measures which he had taken.

Upon hearing these things, General Steinmetz at once ordered that the whole of the 3d division of cavalry should march upon Retonfay, and also sent the 28th brigade of the 7th Army Corps from Pouilly to Courcelles on the Nied, where it arrived at 3 P.M., when for a time all was tranquil.

Events, as they went on, confirmed General Manteuffel in his first assumption; and as the 1st division of infantry was now no longer molested, he caused its troops to cook their dinner in succession, believing that the attacks in the forenoon upon the fronts of Kummer and Pritzelwitz were merely demonstrations

which would probably, later on, be followed by a central thrust; and as the numbers of the French concentrated at the farm of Bellecroix was continually increased, he caused the 3d brigade of infantry to move from Puche to Retonfay, and the division of Schuler von Senden to St Barbe, to form a reserve for Bentheim's division.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the French advanced, as had been anticipated, from St Julien and Bellecroix against the front which Manteuffel had prepared to oppose them on the line Failly - Servigny - Montoy. The battle was commenced by the guns of Fort St Julien, and of a few field-batteries to the south of it, opening fire upon the 1st Prussian division at Servigny-Failly. The Germans answered at first with the four divisional batteries, and these were soon reinforced by one horse and two field batteries from the reserve of the 1st Army Corps. The last two came up on the west of Servigny, posting themselves on the flank of the French artillery; the horse-battery took up a position more to the north at Poix; and after the seven batteries thus placed had kept up a steady fire until 5 P.M., they advanced, and obliged the French guns to withdraw.

Meanwhile, soon after 3 P.M., Lebœuf moved forward through the farm of Bellecroix upon Montoy, threatening with his right wing Colombey and Aubigny; while, on his left flank, detachments of Canrobert's Corps moved up the valley of the stream of

Vallières against Nouilly and Noisseville. When this movement was developed, and Aubigny attacked by Lebœuf's right, the 28th brigade of infantry, which since 3.30 P.M. had been employed in cooking at Courcelles on the Nied, was called up to support the 4th. It at once marched by way of Laquenexy, but arrived too late to join in the contest, as the French speedily relinquished their attack on the village to throw their whole force upon Noisseville and Servigny.

The head of Lebœuf's main column as it advanced came at Montoy upon the troops of the 3d Prussian brigade (Memerty), and was soon engaged in a heavy musketry combat with it. Whilst this was going on, the French, shortly after 5 P.M., developed their attack from the valley of Vallières, and made an onslaught upon Noisseville, which was only defended by one Prussian battalion from the 1st brigade. After a prolonged resistance this single battalion was obliged to withdraw, and retired upon Servigny. Upon this the French skirmishers at once occupied the vine-clad hills to the north of Noisseville, and kept up thence a spirited and well-directed fire upon the Prussian batteries, which had advanced at 5 P.M. from Servigny in the direction of St Julien as far as the heights to the north of Nouilly. The fire from the Chassepots obliged the Prussian artillery to retire upon Servigny, where it again took up a position to cover the retreat of the battalion driven out of Noisseville.

Under cover of the garrison of Noisseville and of the increasing darkness, French batteries now moved up to Mey and Nouilly, and coming into action against Servigny and the batteries there, literally showered shrapnel upon them; but the Prussian artillery maintained its position, and directed a portion of its fire upon Noisseville.

At this time—that is, at about 8 P.M.—the musketry combat in which Memerty's brigade was still engaged began to abate along the front, and thereby Memerty became free to move towards his flank. Of this he at once availed himself, and proceeded to attack Noisseville and drive the French out of that village.

Towards nine o'clock in the evening the battle subsided, the French appearing to have withdrawn at every point. Manteuffel, however, in order to be prepared for any emergency, caused the whole of the troops of his first line to remain under arms. The 2d brigade of infantry and the reserve artillery of the 1st Corps were sent back to their bivouacs; and, on the other hand, Schuler von Senden's landwehr division, which had not come into action, was directed to move from St Barbe nearer to the front upon Failly and Poix.

At ten o'clock in the evening the French again assumed the offensive, and advanced to an attack by surprise. Their right wing pushed forward through Montoy to Flanville and Puche, wheeled then to its left, and attacked simultaneously Retonfay and Noisse-

ville. Memerty's brigade was compelled to evacuate very hurriedly its position in those villages, and to retreat northwards upon Chateau Gras.

At the same time the French left wing had thrown itself upon Servigny, Poix, and Failly. The struggle for these villages was carried on with varying results, Servigny especially being several times lost and won, while the West Prussian brigade of the landwehr division had to be called up to support the garrison of Failly. When the fighting ceased, shortly after 11 P.M., Servigny, Poix, and Failly remained in the hands of the Prussians; while, on the other side, Noisseville, Flanville, Montoy, and Retonfay were occupied by the French.

Prince Frederic Charles, in his headquarters at Malancourt, had received information from the outposts on the early morning of the 31st of August, of extraordinary movements in the French camps, and the reports soon left no doubt that the enemy was watching for an opportunity to attack on the right bank of the Moselle.

The commandant of the 10th Corps, General Voigts-Rhetz, had been before directed that in case this should happen he was to cause such of his troops as were not in the investing line, and were therefore disposable, to cross to the right bank by the bridge of Hauconcourt; and he had at once, without waiting for further orders, acted in accordance with these instructions.

Between half-past eight and half-past nine o'clock in

the forenoon, the Prince gave more detailed commands. General von Manstein was to concentrate the 25th (Hessian) division of his Corps, the 9th, at Pierrevillers, and the 18th (Wrangel) at Roncourt, while the reserve artillery of the Corps was to be also assembled at the latter place. The 2d Corps (Fransecky) was to be collected between Briey and Anboué; and the 3d Corps (Alvensleben) was to march from Doncourt and Conflans upon St Privat la Montagne.

Prince Frederic Charles was at 11 A.M. upon the Horimont, an eminence to the north of Féves, and 570 feet above the valley of the Moselle. As from that place French forces were observed to be continually passing over to the right bank of the Moselle, he sent a direct order at 11.35 P.M. to the 25th division to cross by the bridge of Hauconcourt to Antilly, on the right bank, and there place itself at the disposal of Generals Kummer and Manteuffel. Accordingly, at 2.30 P.M. the head of the Hessian division reached Antilly, and deployed to the south of the village. There it remained until 5 P.M., when Schuler von Senden's division having marched away to St Barbe to support the 1st Prussian division, General Kummer requested the Hessians to advance against Charly and Rupigny. Upon this Prince Louis of Hesse caused the 50th brigade to occupy the corner of the wood of Failly, to the east of Charly; while the 49th brigade placed itself in reserve between Charly and Antilly. An attack, however, at this point did not take place,

as we have already seen. The 50th brigade remained in its position during the night preceding the 1st of September, while the 49th brigade was withdrawn to its bivouacs to the south of Antilly.

In the afternoon, General Voigts-Rhetz received orders to withdraw again to the left bank the troops he had sent across the Moselle. The Hessian division was directed to remain under any circumstances on the right bank; and, moreover, Prince Frederic Charles resolved, at 1.30 P.M. on the 31st of August, at all events to place reserves on the left bank, in readiness to cross over to the right should the battle which had subsided about noon be again recommenced. For this the 18th division, with the reserve artillery of the 9th Corps, and the 3d Corps were chosen, the former being directed to cook at Roncourt, and the latter at St Privat la Montagne.

The 2d Corps, on the other hand, was ordered at 1.30 P.M. to stop the concentration before directed, and to push forward detachments again to Longuion and Aumetz, on the road to Montmedy and Longwy.

From the Horimont a better idea of the general state of the battle could be obtained than from the right bank itself. The staff of Prince Frederic Charles observed that the French did not employ nearly all the troops concentrated at St Julien and Bellecroix in the fight in the afternoon, and it was therefore to be concluded that Bazaine wished to defer his main attack until the 1st of September.

In order, then, that the forces necessary to ward it off might be ready on the right bank of the Moselle by the early morning of the 1st, Prince Frederic Charles sent an order at 7.35 P.M. to Manstein at Roncourt, directing him to set out with the 18th division and his reserve artillery by Marange and Hauconcourt to St Barbe. This order reached Manstein at 9.15 P.M., and he at once set out, being himself with the 6th regiment of dragoons at the head of the column. He had to make a night-march of fourteen miles, and that, too, along roads which were in parts extraordinarily bad. It was therefore a remarkable achievement to reach St Barbe, as he did, with the 6th regiment of dragoons, at 4 A.M. on the 1st of September, barely seven hours after receipt of the order to march. The infantry and artillery were, it is true, still behind, and they rested for some time at Hauconcourt.

General von Alvensleben II. had the mass of his Corps in the evening at St Privat and St Ail, with the 5th division pushed forward to Marange.

The morning of the 1st of September was very foggy; but, standing on a height, the summits of the hills could be seen. Early in the day the dull thunder of cannon was heard in the headquarters of Prince Frederic Charles, in a north-westerly direction. It was that of the battle of Sedan, which was being fought about sixty-five miles away from Malancourt; but shortly afterwards the fighting began again close

at hand, on the right bank of the Moselle, and diverted attention from this distant cannonade.

Only in the morning did the Prince receive information from Manteuffel of the night attack of the French, and shortly afterwards further intelligence arrived of the recommencement of the battle. The Prince, therefore, before he left Malancourt, sent orders to General Voigts-Rhetz to move again with his disposable troops to the right bank of the Moselle to support Kummer and Manteuffel; while General Alvensleben was to send the 5th division of the 3d Corps from Marange, and the reserve artillery from St Ail, to Mézieres, to oppose the sortie on the left bank. These troops commenced their march at 9 A.M.

After 8 A.M. the Prince had again repaired to the Horimont; thence at 9.15 A.M. he instructed General Zastrow, by telegraph, to keep only a brigade of his Corps, the 7th, in the line of the investment, and to move all the remainder to the support of Manteuffel's left wing. Goeben was to push forward the reserves of the 8th Corps close up to the left bank of the Moselle, in order, in case of need, to undertake the guarding of the whole length of Zastrow's line, and thus set the 7th Corps entirely free.

Kummer was to be ready to support Manteuffel's right wing as soon as the disposable troops of the 10th Corps should have arrived behind his line.

At 4 A.M. Manteuffel gave the order to attack—the

immediate objective being the reconquest of the villages occupied by the French during the night, especially that of Noisseville. Advancing against this latter place, Memerty's division came first into action, but it could not make any progress, and was obliged to be contented with repulsing a forward movement of the adversary beyond the village.

When, then, General Manstein arrived at St Barbe, he and General Manteuffel agreed that the 49th brigade of infantry and the 25th brigade of cavalry (Hessian), as well as the reserve artillery of the 9th Corps, should at once march to St Barbe; while the 50th brigade, which stood in the Bois de Failly, should also move to the same place as soon as it should be relieved by the arrival of the 18th division (Wrangel) in rear of Kummer's line. This movement was carried out; and at 8 A.M. the 49th brigade with five batteries came up to St Barbe, followed soon afterwards by the 25th brigade of cavalry with its battery of horse-artillery, and at 9.30 A.M. by the reserve artillery of the 9th Corps.

At 6 A.M. the 18th division appeared upon the left wing of Kummer's position. The leading brigade, the 36th (Below), was at once sent to the Bois de Failly, and relieved the 50th brigade there, whereupon this latter was collected and despatched to St Barbe, where, however, it only arrived at 11 A.M. The other brigade of the 18th division, the 36th (Blumenthal), was placed in reserve to the north of Charly.

We must also remark here, that the 6th regiment of dragoons, which had arrived with Manstein, and afterwards the 25th brigade of cavalry, were sent in the course of the morning to Retonfay to support, in concert with the 1st regiment of dragoons, Memerty's brigade.

As soon as Manteuffel received information that his orders were being carried out, and that the 49th brigade was marching upon St Barbe, he directed the 2d brigade of infantry (Falkenstein) of Bentheim's division to attack Noisseville. The 43d regiment, which was leading, penetrated into the village at about eight o'clock, but was soon driven out again, losing many men by the French mitrailleuse fire. The attack was supported by the 3d regiment, and afterwards by Posen's brigade of Schuler von Senden's landwehr division. Thrice the Prussians partially forced their way into Noisseville, and thrice they were again driven out.

Manteuffel now saw that the attack had not been sufficiently prepared for by artillery fire. He therefore at once brought nine batteries into action on the line from Poix to Chateau le Gras; among them, on the left wing, were five Hessian, before St Barbe and near Gras.

While these guns played upon Noisseville, the 28th brigade of infantry was set in motion against Flanville. It had marched at 6 A.M. from Laquenexy upon Puche, had posted two batteries there, and had

cannonaded Flanville with them. At 9 A.M. the French began to evacuate the latter village; the 53d regiment advanced to the attack, and drove them out completely; the brigade then turned against Coincy, drove the French thence, and took up a position diagonally across the Saarbrück road. At 9.30 A.M. it received the order to march to its right, to support Memerty; but as it was about to comply with these directions, it was itself again attacked from Montoy, was obliged to form front, and had to confine its endeavours to repelling the new assault.

Soon after 10 A.M. Noisseville was on fire in several places; the French began to evacuate it; and at half-past ten the Prussian infantry, penetrating into it, found but little opposition — the village was abandoned to them.

But to compensate for this, the French had now begun to develop greater forces against the right wing of the Germans.

Shortly after the 36th brigade (Below) had relieved the Hessians at the Bois de Failly, the French pushed forward through Failly, Vany, and Chieulles. General Wrangel opposed them at the Bois de Failly with his artillery, brought forward a regiment of Below's brigade against the right flank of his adversary, and caused the 35th brigade (Blumenthal), which stood in reserve, to make a movement upon Rupigny. At this last place, and at Failly, violent local encounters ensued; and finally, towards ten o'clock, these points

remained in the hands of the Germans. The French withdrew at first upon Vany-Chieulles, then, threatened simultaneously by Blumenthal's brigade and by the line brigade of Blankensee, which General Kummer had directed to advance from Charly, they continued their retreat upon Grimont.

Now, for the first time, the reserves posted by Fort St Julien advanced to the attack, manifestly only to receive the retiring left wing. Their onslaught was feeble, and was repulsed at Poix by the German artillery, while at Servigny an infantry combat ensued. Afterwards, between eleven and twelve o'clock, when the Prussians on this side were pursuing the retreating French line, a heavy fire was opened from Fort St Julien, and was kept up until 1 P.M., when it subsided, as the Prussians did not continue their pursuit into its sphere.

Quite unconnected with the fighting on the right and centre of the Germans was an attack which the French made with a detachment on their right wing upon Mercy le Haut. The village was taken by them in the forenoon, reconquered by the Prussians at 11 A.M., but had to be again yielded to the French at noon, and was only given up again by them when they were ordered to withdraw from it in consequence of the retreat of the centre and left.

As, on the 31st of August, the fighting had ceased at noon, and had yet been renewed during the later hours of the day, the German leaders did not know

whether the same game might not be again played on the afternoon of the 1st of September.

The 3d division of cavalry had been already, on the morning of the 1st, sent back to Pouilly and towards the right bank of the Moselle, because the formation of the ground, and the position of the battle-field upon the roads to Saarbrück and Saarlouis, did not promise a field for its successful action. On the other hand, at 1 P.M. Prince Frederic Charles sent orders to General Zastrow to march with his whole Corps upon Mercy le Haut to the support of Manteuffel. His posts on the right bank of the river were to be occupied by three brigades of the 8th Corps, Goeben, one brigade only of the same Corps being left on the left bank, between Chatel St Germain and Jussy. The posts which Goeben quitted between Chatel St Germain and Saulny were to be occupied by General Alvensleben with the 6th division of infantry, while Fransecky was to send a division of the 2d Corps in the course of the afternoon to Amanvilliers to form a reserve for the position.

At 2.30 P.M. the staff of Prince Frederic Charles observed, from the left bank, before it was possible to discover it on the right bank, that the French had given up the battle for the day, as they had already commenced to withdraw troops from the right to the left bank of the Moselle. Accordingly, at 2.45 P.M., General Voigts-Rhetz was directed to remain on the right bank, with such troops of the 10th Corps as he

had there, until 5 P.M., and then, if the fighting was not seriously renewed, to return to the left bank. At the same time General Alvensleben was commanded to withdraw the reserve artillery of his Corps at 4.30 P.M. from Mézieres to Marange and St Ail.

When, in the first hours of the afternoon, everything was quiet, Manteuffel had first retired Memerty's brigade, which for two days had had no leisure to cook, from the line, and replaced it by a Hessian brigade; the 28th brigade, Woyna, of the 7th Corps was relieved in the afternoon of the 1st of September by the head of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin's Corps—5 battalions of Selchow's landwehr division—which, coming up from Germany, reached Gras le Chateau at noon.

The French did not undertake anything more on the 1st of September, and remained quiet also during the 2d. On the latter day the Hessian division marched to the left bank of the Moselle to Pierrevillers, and the division of the 2d Corps, which had been called up to Amanvilliers, to Auboué. Bazaine also, after the failure of his attempt, sent the 4th, 6th, and Guard Corps again to the left bank, and the French commenced to intrench themselves in their more advanced positions.

The loss of the Prussians (1st Corps, Kummer's division, Wrangel's division, and Woyna's brigade) amounted to 123 officers and 2870 men in killed, wounded, and missing. Of the French losses nothing is known.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE ENCOUNTERS AT WOIPPY ON THE 2D AND 7TH OF OCTOBER.

AFTER the 1st of September a long and almost perfect quietness reigned around Metz.

On the 1st, 3d, and 7th of September, Bazaine sent like-worded despatches to Napoleon III., informing him of the unsuccessful issue of the events of the 1st, of his desperate condition by reason of want of supplies, and promising to continue his efforts to break out. Naturally he received no answer; and, meanwhile, the result of the day of Sedan, and the events of the 4th of September, became known both to the investing army and to the invested. Bazaine could now no longer hope to be relieved, at all events for the present; and every attempt to break through, whatever direction might be chosen, must be frustrated. He now calculated upon a speedy peace, and, during the first days of September, upon one which might be concluded by the Imperial Regency. Even when he received intelligence of the declaration of the Republic, he did not abandon his hope. Whether the Provisional Government concluded the peace, or whe-

ther, as was very probable, it was soon overthrown, and either some old or new power succeeded in obtaining peace, was very indifferent to him. Under any circumstances he would have a brilliant part to play if he succeeded in preserving Metz and his troops until peace was arranged. His army was now the only real army of France. With it he could, according to circumstances, either restore order for the Regency, or, if France would not hear anything more of this latter, step himself to the head of affairs, supported by an easily-bought press, which would applaud to the skies his military genius and his French feeling.

The better the condition of the army of Metz when peace should be concluded, and the less it had suffered, so much the greater weight would it place in the balance. The former "Chief of the Government" had himself confided to Bazaine, before taking the last step to the fatal abyss, the fate of the main part of the French army, and, as he expressed it, of France herself. The inactivity of the Marshal during the first weeks of September is therefore perfectly explicable, without having recourse to any elaborate expositions, or without waiting for enlightenment from a side which, later on, will have no interest in stating the truth. Bazaine, without expressly declaring his position with regard to the Republic and the Provisional Government, avoided entering into any connection with them, or arousing

any prejudice against himself, and prevented his soldiers being engaged in any way with the subject.

On taking stock of the provisions in Metz and in the adjacent territory commanded by the French army, it was found that there was sufficient stored up for about four weeks more; and by making use of horse-flesh, limiting the rations, and foraging by small sorties, the supplies might be made to suffice for twice as long.

Eight weeks! In calculations such as must be made in this case that was an eternity. The theory of short wars, decided by a few powerful blows, which in reality was based solely upon the modern wars of Austria, had taken firm root in Europe, especially in military circles; so much so, that if a man asserted that this theory was only true so long as a people did not exist upon both sides, or at least upon one side, he might be well content if he escaped with the appellation of a decided blockhead.

The real war of 1866 had only lasted four weeks; that of 1870 had already, on the 1st of September, continued for that length of time; and now another eight weeks! was not that truly an eternity? And if the idea of obtaining Alsace and Lorraine had not sprung up in the German headquarters, would not Bazaine have probably been right,—would not, at all events, a preliminary peace have been concluded by the end of September?

On the German side it was presumed, after the

catastrophe of Sedan, that Bazaine would still endeavour to break through, and now in the direction of Strasburg. Everything may certainly be attempted, but it is not easy to see what Bazaine would gain in Strasburg, or how he could accomplish the hundred miles thither with any considerable portion of his troops, when pursued by the Germans. And if he succeeded in reaching and relieving Strasburg, what could he undertake next? To remain stationary and to manœuvre was still less practicable at Strasburg, which has no detached forts, than at Metz. But be that as it may, the Germans now observed with special attention the direction from Metz to Strasburg; and on the 9th of September Prince Frederic Charles removed his headquarters to Corny, on the right bank of the Moselle above Metz. At the same time, General Steinmetz prayed the King of Prussia to relieve him, "for the benefit of his health," from the command of the First Army. It is said that Steinmetz had latterly become discontented with his position as commander of an independent army, which yet was not one, and could not agree either with the Prince his superior, or with General Manteuffel his subordinate. The King complied with the wish of the old general by nominating him, on the 12th of September, Governor-General of Posen for the districts of the 5th and 6th Army Corps. Steinmetz took leave of his troops in an order of the day, dated Jouy aux Arches, the 15th of September. His post

was not for the present filled up, but the First Army was preserved intact as an independent body, with a view to future operations.

The Germans utilised the repose which Bazaine gave them to draw their investing line closer in, and to strengthen it by intrenchments; and thus the communication of the French in Metz with the outer world became extremely limited. A few messengers whom Bazaine sent forth managed to slip through the Prussian lines, but were unable to return into the fortress; perhaps they did not make any great efforts to succeed. After the middle of September, the French again, in and about Metz, made use of balloons to forward letters. We shall see later on how this medium of communication was made use of on the largest scale by the Parisians. The balloons sent up from Metz were unoccupied ones, without cars, carrying only a small basket, in which were the packets of letters. It was calculated that the greater number at least would fall outside the districts occupied by the German troops; and the honest finder was entreated to deliver the letters to the nearest post-office that they might be forwarded to their destinations. Unfortunately, letters could not be brought into Metz by the same means.

After the 22d of September, Bazaine again commenced a series of sorties, at first against the positions of the 1st and 7th Corps on the right bank of the Moselle. These sallies were made with small bodies

of troops, purely for foraging purposes, and to destroy the German supplies where they could not be taken away. Bazaine had caused the railways leading from Metz to be repaired as far as he commanded them, and he now made use of them to push forward the troops which were to carry out the surprises. The trains had then to bring back into Metz the supplies seized in the enterprise.

On the 22d and 23d of September, the French undertook such sorties upon Peltre; on the 27th, upon Mercy le Haut; and on the same day, along the left bank of the Moselle, against the troops of the 10th North German Corps at La Maxe, which, on this occasion, was burnt down.

On the 28th of September Strasburg fell. Bazaine was at once informed of the fact by Prince Frederic Charles. In the German headquarters it was now assumed that Bazaine, if indeed he still purposed to undertake anything at all, could only attempt to break through in the direction of Thionville. In reality, Bazaine could no longer hope, under any circumstances, to be relieved for a very long time. If he could not defeat the Prussians before Metz, all larger military undertakings were only so much lost trouble to him. At Thionville he would find even fewer resources of all kinds than in Metz; if he took that direction it could only be with the idea of gaining the neutral territory of Luxemburg by Thionville and Frisange, which is barely 28 miles from Metz.

On the 1st of October Prince Frederic Charles moved over Kummer's division from the right to the left bank of the Moselle, and the 10th Corps from the left to the right.

Kummer's division took up its main position along the front Fèves-Semécourt-Amelange. Two landwehr battalions were pushed forward to the line of the woods at Bellevue, St Remy, and the two farms of Les Tapes; in their front they occupied St Agathe and Ladonchamps with weak field-posts, and in their rear again towards Semécourt and Agathe stood two more battalions of landwehr as their nearest support.

On the right the outpost line of the 3d Army Corps joined that of Kummer's division at Villers les Plenois; while on the right, between the 1st and 2d of October, two companies of the 10th battalion of Rifles from the 10th Corps still remained with the outposts of Kummer's division, not having as yet been drawn across to the right bank.

At midnight between the 1st and 2d of October, detachments of the French Guard advanced to attack the position held by Kummer's division. The field-watch at Ladonchamps was thrown back upon St Remy; that of St Agathe, which was thus left isolated, withdrew of its own accord. The French next proceeded to the attack of St Remy, which was occupied by a company of the 3d Posen landwehr regiment (No. 58); to reinforce it two other companies of the same regiment were pushed forward.

These three companies offered some resistance; and the French not being able to find their way properly, owing to the darkness of the night, gave up the attack for the time being.

On the Prussian side four companies were now sent to St Remy, and one battalion (Freistadt's) of the 1st Lower Silesian landwehr regiment, No. 46, to Bellevue.

At 5 A.M. the French infantry renewed their attack, supported closely by a mitrailleuse battery, and at a greater distance by other batteries which took post at St Eloy. The position of the Prussians, who were gradually reinforced, was in the beginning only supported by a battery to the north of Semécourt; but soon after nine o'clock this was joined by two others,—the one on the right, to the south of Semécourt—the other on the left, at Les Tapes. This last one was, however, very soon compelled to retreat, by the fire of the French batteries at St Eloy.

Meanwhile the infantry combat had been carried on with varying success, but, on the whole, its course was in favour of the Prussians. The landwehr battalion which held possession of Bellevue, retook St Agathe from the enemy; and the well-aimed fire of a company of the 10th battalion of Rifles also wrought much damage among them.

At 11 A.M. the French still maintained themselves in Ladonchamps and St Agathe, which they had again occupied. With this success they contented them-

selves for the 2d of October. The infantry ceased to fight, and the artillery alone continued to fire until dusk from St Eloy, and set St Remy and Franclochamps in flames.

The losses on both sides were inconsiderable. The Prussians give theirs at 115, including 5 officers.

On the 3d of October the Germans set fire to the village of St Ruffine, to destroy the enemy's supplies collected there, and the French fired from Fort St Quentin upon the Prussian depots at Ars la Moselle at a range of nearly 8000 paces.

On the 7th of October the French undertook another attack upon the positions of Kummer's division at Bellevue, St Remy, and Les Tapes. The onslaught commenced at 1.30 P.M., and at three o'clock the Prussian landwehr were obliged to yield the above-named points after a stubborn resistance.

Meanwhile General Kummer had developed his reserves and his artillery. Voigts-Rhetz, too, posted batteries of Kraatz-Koschlau's division and of the reserve artillery of the 10th Corps on the right bank of the Moselle at Argancy, Olgy, and Malroy, and sent the 38th brigade of infantry (Wedell) of his Corps on to the left bank of the river, to support Kummer at the farmhouse of Amelange; while, on Kummer's right, Alvensleben concentrated the 9th brigade of infantry (now Conta's) and two batteries of the 3d Army Corps at Norroy le Veneur.

As soon as Kummer knew that he was supported,

he at once took measures to regain the lost positions. In the first line he deployed Schuler von Senden's landwehr division and two battalions of his line brigade (Blankensee). In the second line he placed two battalions of Wedell's brigade of the 10th Corps in support on the right, and the remainder of Wedell's and Blankensee's brigades on the left.

And whilst he advanced with these troops against the front Bellevue - St Remy - Les Tapes - Franclochamps, he attacked simultaneously, at 4.30 P.M., the woods of Bellevue and Woippy with Conta's brigade.

In consequence of these combined manœuvres, the line Bellevue-Franclochamps was at 6 P.M. again in the hands of the Germans, who now repulsed several attacks made upon it by the French. On the other hand, an attempt which the Germans made soon after seven o'clock to gain the Chateau of Ladonchamps was unsuccessful, for the French had strongly fortified it since they had obtained possession of it on the 2d of October.

Simultaneously with their advance on the left of the Moselle, the French had also developed troops on the right bank. Against Charly they had moved forward artillery, which was successfully answered by batteries of the 10th Corps. Detachments of French which showed themselves at Villers l'Orme, caused General Manteuffel to alarm the 1st Corps. Nothing more ensued there than an artillery and musketry com-

bat, and even this died out at half-past six o'clock, after 10 batteries had come up on to the line of the 1st Corps from Failly to Montoy, and had been shortly afterwards further reinforced by 4 batteries from the 7th Corps.

The losses were by no means inconsiderable. That of the Germans on the 7th amounted altogether to 1730, among whom were 65 officers.

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE CAPITULATION OF BAZAINE.

THE sortie of the 7th of October was the last military effort of the army imprisoned in Metz; and the condition of the troops, and also that of the town generally, certainly became most deplorable and hopeless after that day. The total loss of the army of Metz since the 14th of August, amounted at this time, according to Bazaine's account, to 25 generals, 2099 officers of all ranks, and 40,339 non-commissioned officers and men. The most difficult point now was that of supplies; for the sorties for foraging purposes, the one of the 7th October also included, for which numerous trains of waggons had been prepared, had resulted in very little profit. It was calculated that if every means of supply were used—if the daily allowance to each soldier was reduced to 300 grammes*—if the inhabitants of the town were also put on fixed rations—if the reserve two days' allowance of biscuit, which the soldiers carried in their knapsacks, was also reckoned in—and if only one sort of bread was baked, with

* 300 grammes is equal to about 10¼ oz.

as much bran mixed with it as was in any way admissible,—then, with all these precautions, it was estimated that the bread might last until about the 20th of October.

Dry forage had long ago failed, and the horses were driven out to keep themselves alive by grazing in the meadows on the territory which the French still commanded, the extent of which, at the utmost, was about 20 square miles. Naturally they became lean, and it was the interest of the army to lessen their number. They were therefore freely slaughtered; and there was so little lack of horse-flesh, both for the garrison and for the inhabitants of the town, that the rations of meat could be increased without hesitation, although, after the end of September, horses ran over in large numbers from their pasturage to the Prussian camp. But if meat was plentiful, there was by this time an utter want of salt and fresh vegetables, and the deprivation of these necessaries was very keenly felt.

On the 8th of October there were about 19,000 sick in the hospitals and partly also in private houses, for the infirmaries could not contain all. Necessaries for them—bedding, drugs, and doctors—began already to fail. The smallpox, which had been raging in France since the autumn of 1869, had also broken out in Metz; and in addition to this, typhus fever, diarrhœa, and dysentery, now appeared, being brought on by the poorness of the nourishment; and these diseases threatened to spread more and more as their preven-

tion and the proper treatment of those attacked became ever more difficult.

Great losses of horses were to be also expected in the next following days; and those which escaped the shambles or a natural death, at least lost their strength. By this a great portion of the really good artillery and cavalry which had been originally shut up within the works of Metz was rendered ineffective. The number of men, also, who could be counted capable of bearing arms, became ever smaller, through bad food and despondency; so that it may be estimated that the total strength of the army which was disposable for any enterprise without the walls—therefore, also, for breaking through the German lines—would be, at the most, 70,000 men.

Still, many may reproach Marshal Bazaine for not having used the time before the 8th of October for an earnest, desperate endeavour to escape; and such a reproach would be just in speaking of the first weeks which elapsed after the 18th of August. Defenders of the Marshal have asserted that his sortie on the 31st of August and the 1st of September was undertaken with a view to escaping to Thionville; and to strengthen this statement they pretend that his ignorance of events outside was much greater than it really was. But, at all events, if such was his design on the 31st of August, his actual proceedings would prove a want of capacity to lead, both in himself and his advisers, which we should hesitate to believe to exist

even in the most subordinate of educated officers. But we have related the events of the day in detail, and every one can judge for himself.

But, be that as it may, after the 8th of October the army of Marshal Bazaine was indubitably not in a state to undertake a serious attempt to break out; it lacked physical force, and there was also a want of halting-places outside Metz which could be easily reached. It might still make sorties, to allow itself to be slain and to sell its life dearly, but for no other object: if that was not desired, nothing remained but to consider by what means it might obtain the most favourable terms of capitulation.

On the 8th of October the commanders of the Army Corps assembled their divisional generals by order of Bazaine, explained to them the situation, and pointed out the necessity of seeking a capitulation. The minds of most certainly revolted at the idea, but they were at the same time compelled to admit that nothing else remained; and they now became possessed with the hope that the army would receive in the capitulation liberty to depart with arms and baggage to the south of France, only under the obligation not to serve again against Germany during the remainder of the campaign; and they trusted that the fate of the army could be separated from that of the fortress and of its garrison, to the advantage of the latter. If these conditions were not acceded to by the leaders of the Germans, it was

assumed by most of the divisional generals, and also by the mass of the officers subordinate to them, that a desperate effort must yet be made to cut a way, sword in hand, through the investing forces.

In a moment such as had now arrived for the army of Bazaine, it cannot be expected that every one should reason logically; but the calm observer must instinctively ask himself what was really meant by the separation of the fate of the army from that of the fortress and its garrison. Even if negotiations were at once set on foot with the German chief command, and even if they ended well, yet some days must at all events pass away before they could be concluded, and more days again would elapse before the departure of Bazaine's troops; so that, in the happiest course of events, some day about the 16th of October would have arrived. But we have seen that the provisions would only hold out to the 20th of that same month, so that the garrison of Metz certainly would only be able to make the supplies left with them last some five to eight days more, especially as they must necessarily retain the sick. Was such a gain worth much parley?

After the divisional generals had been thus prepared beforehand by the commanders of the Corps, Bazaine, on the 10th of October, assembled a great council of war. This was composed of the Corps commanders—General Desvaux (Guard), General Frossard (2d Corps), Marshal Lebœuf (3d Corps), General

Ladmirault (4th Corps), Marshal Canrobert (6th Corps); and, in addition, Soleille, General of artillery, the General of engineers, and commandant of the fortress of Metz; Coffinières de Nordeck, and the Intendant-general of the army, Lebrun.

General Desvaux, who at the beginning of the war commanded the cavalry division of the Guard, was at this time chief of the Guard in place of General Bourbaki, who, acting with the agreement of Bazaine, had shortly before secretly left the fortress, to endeavour to originate some new political combinations which might give fresh hope to the army of Metz.

The divisional generals were not included in this council, neither had they been summoned to any former ones, nor were they to any future ones; and this, considering the difficulties of the position in which the army and fortress stood, was certainly a mistake. Discontent with the behaviour of Bazaine had already manifested itself here and there among the officers of the army, and the feeling threatened to spread. Many of them had no great confidence under the present changed circumstances, either in Bazaine, or in the Marshals, or in the Corps commanders, who all stood in too close connection with the Empire. The pursuit of their own personal interests was attributed to them, and to this was ascribed the inactivity of their behaviour since the 19th of August. If, then, Bazaine had collected the divisional generals around him—had listened to their opinions, and com-

municated to them his own—he would so have best combated the evil spirit, and would either have gained courage for, and a justification of, a last desperate effort, to the reckless execution of which the divisional generals would stand collectively pledged, or he would have obliged them to acknowledge their conviction that such an attempt would be useless and impossible.

After the military situation had been explained to the council of war which actually met, three questions were proposed—namely: 1. Shall the army remain in Metz until all the supplies are consumed? This was answered with "Yes;" and thereby much was said of the good service which the army of Bazaine was rendering France by tarrying in Metz, in that it detained before it the army of Prince Frederic Charles, and gave time to the country to undertake new military organisations in the interior. 2. Shall sorties be made into the environs to procure provisions? This question was answered with a negative, it being considered as very improbable that the success of such enterprises would be in any way commensurate with the certain loss which they would involve. 3. Shall negotiations be entered into with the enemy, with a view to obtaining such a military convention as could be accepted? The reply to this was in the affirmative. It was also urged that the necessary steps should be taken within the next forty-eight hours, and not postponed to the hour of the utmost need; and it

was further resolved, that if honourable conditions such as might be accepted could not be obtained, the attempt must yet be made to seek a retreat sword in hand.

Very much in these proceedings is remarkable, but it is chiefly noticeable that the word "capitulation" was not employed, but in its place the term "military convention" was introduced, from which it is sufficiently manifest that an especial part was claimed for the army of Metz. It is further apparent that, with the acknowledged state of the means of subsistence, the commencement of negotiations had been already too long delayed, if it were really seriously intended to force a passage by hard fighting. No man in the French camp could imagine that within a few hours the extraordinary conditions which were claimed could be obtained from the Germans after their previous successes—conditions such as have scarcely ever been conceded to an army in the position of Bazaine's.

With the consent of Prince Frederic Charles, Bazaine now sent his first adjutant, General Napoleon Boyer, to the great headquarters of the German armies in Versailles, so that he might obtain information of the true situation of France, and ascertain what concessions the German leaders might be disposed to make in the interest of the army of Metz and of a general peace.

From this last it is apparent that the mission of

General Boyer was by no means purely military, but that, on the contrary, it was eminently political. This must be remarked here, as the defenders of Bazaine have repeatedly asserted the contrary.

After Boyer had set out on his journey, General Coffinières announced to the town of Metz, on the 13th of October, that thenceforward only one sort of bread—with bran—would be baked; that every adult inhabitant would receive daily 400 grammes* of this bread—every child between four and twelve years of age, 200—and every child under four, 100 grammes—and that at the price of 45 centimes the kilogramme.† This announcement, in connection with the uncertain and mysterious intelligence of the mission of Boyer, excited great consternation among the inhabitants of Metz. The citizens did not complain of the privation which they were to submit to, but they murmured much about the obscurity which shrouded every proceeding, and about the state of dependence upon mysterious powers into which they had been gradually brought; and they began to be filled with an uneasy fear lest they should be treacherously betrayed in the night to Prussia at the caprice of some few individuals.

The municipal council of the town gave expression to these feelings in an address to General Coffinières. The latter answered it in a manner which said abso-

* 400 grammes is equal to about 14 oz.

† About twopence a pound.

lutely nothing. He counselled the people of Metz to abstain before all from meddling in politics, "as politics exercise a very disturbing influence." Still he advised them to unite in the cry, "Vive la France!" which was certainly a political expression; for when the men of Metz shouted "Vive la France!" they thereby acknowledged their adherence to the policy of national resistance to the Germans. They therefore only followed different politics to what they would have done had they cried aloud, "Vive Napoleon III.!" or even "Vive le Roi de Prusse!" But there are unfortunately a great mass of men who understand by "politics" solely all that is disagreeable to them, and designate by the name any expression of feeling which is unpleasant to them.

Boyer arrived at Versailles, and began to negotiate there with Bismark and Moltke. He naturally first expressed a wish that the army of Bazaine—no mention was to be made of the fortress of Metz or of its garrison—should be allowed to depart, unhindered, with arms and baggage, to the south of France, under the condition that it should not again serve against Germany during the war. Hereupon he was answered by the question, Who was to guarantee such a treaty? Marshal Bazaine was simply a general. Which Government did he obey? Since the Emperor Napoleon had surrendered himself a prisoner, the only Government of France which Germany could recognise was the Regency of the Empress Eugenie. The Allied

Governments of Germany could not possibly treat with the "Government of National Defence"—at all events, not until a Constituting Assembly had been convened. But they could deal with the Empress Eugenie, and if she accepted the conditions proposed to her, they could also consent to the free departure of the army of Metz, under the further conditions that it—the army—should proclaim the Regency, and as an "Army of Order," with Bazaine as "Monk" at the head of the Government, make an end of the "Reds."

Boyer was just as little adverse to this conception of the state of affairs as Bazaine was, as facts will soon show. It may indeed be asserted with great positiveness, without having been present at the most confidential interviews, that he entertained this view of matters much more seriously than the leaders of German politics did themselves. For was it really to be supposed that Bismark reposed an unconditional confidence in the authority of Bazaine over his troops when once these were free and without the precincts of Metz, or that he regarded as sufficient surety the declarations of the Empress Eugenie? Certainly not. He must necessarily say to himself that the army of Bazaine, once free, would renounce its obedience to its leader, even if he himself wished to keep his word, and would place itself, with bag and baggage, at the disposal of the Provisional Government.

General Boyer returned from his journey to Ver-

sailles on the night from the 17th to the 18th of October, and announced the failure of his mission to the council of war, which was composed as on the former occasion. The generals assembled now determined, with seven voices against two, that General Boyer should return to Versailles, and repair thence to Chiselhurst to the Empress Eugenie, in order that by her intervention favourable terms might yet be obtained for the army of Metz; and it was afterwards unanimously resolved that Bazaine could not sign any treaty which did not refer solely to the army, as this last must be kept free from any connection with political questions.

It is very apparent that these two resolutions were directly contradictory; either the latter was not seriously meant, but was only designed to pacify the masses, should it become necessary to make them acquainted with the determinations of the council, or else an alarming confusion prevailed in the ideas of its members. That the majority certainly had not absolutely clear consciences may, however, be deduced from the involved and obscure manner in which the Corps commanders made known these decisions to their divisional generals.

Boyer then journeyed a second time to Versailles, and thence proceeded to Chiselhurst. The Empress Eugenie, after much wavering and hesitation, declared finally that she would not engage herself to anything. She mistrusted Bazaine; she would not give herself

blindly into his power in a way which would allow him in the end to do solely what was his interest and pleasure; and she would not compromise the future of her son, in which she still believed, by declaring her consent to a peace which would appear to the mass of the French to be shameful.

On the 23d of October, King William was informed by General Boyer that his negotiations had led to no result; and as, according to all the information that the German headquarters had received, the means of subsistence for the French army in and about Metz must now be reduced to the lowest ebb, Prince Frederic Charles was ordered to communicate to Marshal Bazaine that the royal headquarters had given up all hope of arriving at any result by "political" negotiations.

It is interesting to see how this expression "political negotiations" here appears in Bazaine's pamphlet of justification itself, while elsewhere it is throughout asserted—in every possible turn and twist of language—that the mission of Boyer had no political end in view.

During the time of Boyer's journey to England, preparations were made in and about Metz as though the departure of the army of Bazaine with arms and *matériel* of war was assured; and it was announced to the superior officers that the army would now have the task of proclaiming and supporting the Regency in France. This intelligence was received by most of

them with a silent, inward reservation to do what they thought fit when they were once outside the fortress and free again.

On the 24th of October, Prince Frederic Charles executed the commission intrusted to him, and Bazaine forthwith summoned another council of war for the 25th.

In Metz, and with the army of Bazaine, was old General Changarnier, who, born in 1793, and therefore now 77 years old, had entered the army in 1815, and had made a brilliant military career, especially under Louis Philippe. At the outbreak of the February Revolution in 1848, Changarnier was commandant of the military division of Algeria. When a junior general of division, Cavaignac, was nominated governor-general of the province, Changarnier returned to France, and although one of the most declared opponents of republican institutions, nevertheless offered his services to the republic. Lamartine desired to send him as ambassador to Berlin, but this he declined; and shortly afterwards, when Cavaignac was returned for the Constituting Assembly, Changarnier was again sent to Algeria to supply his place there; but, elected himself soon afterwards for the same Assembly, he was obliged to return again—and when Cavaignac became the head of the Government, received from him the command of the National Guard. This he retained when Prince Louis became President, and, in addition, was made

chief of the Army of Paris; but the latter command was taken away from him again in the beginning of 1851. No one really trusted General Changarnier, who had always shown himself in the character of a *miles gloriosus* and of a future Monk; and even those whom, as such, he might have served, had no confidence in him. After he was relieved from the chief command of the Army of Paris, he still continued to talk very loudly, but without, however, in any way giving proof of possessing either military or political penetration. On the occasion of the *coup d'état* he was arrested, imprisoned at first in Mazas, and afterwards exiled from the country. Thenceforward he resided at Malines, in Belgium, in the enjoyment, after 1859, of the revenues of his property in France. When, in 1870, the majority of the Princes of the House of Orleans tendered their services to the French Government, General Changarnier also did the same. The offer of the Princes was not accepted; but Changarnier was received at the headquarters of Napoleon III. at Metz, and accompanied them as *spiritus familiaris*, without, however, the good results of his advice being anywhere perceptible.

In the council of war of the 25th of October, it was now resolved that General Changarnier should repair to the headquarters of Prince Frederic Charles to obtain a free departure for the army of Bazaine to Algeria, or an armistice, with liberty to reprovision

the fortress. During this, the old Corps Legislatif (the majority of which consisted of the Mamelukes of the Empire) was to be reassembled to elect a new Government, which the army of Metz should then, as an "army of order," cause to be acknowledged throughout France.

Of this mission of Changarnier's the divisional generals were also informed by the Corps commanders, and to them the whole affair seemed, as it necessarily must do, only laughable. General Bisson declared openly to Marshal Canrobert that Bazaine and the Corps commanders, let them say what they might, had no other thought than that of delivering themselves up as prisoners of war. They knew right well that they dared not show themselves again in France, and they only wished to rescue at least their "savings" by a compact with the enemy.

Changarnier went to Prince Frederic Charles. The latter had already received instructions—and besides, he knew full well that now, two weeks after the 10th of October, the army of Metz was no longer in a condition to propose terms; and in truth, if there was, as was certainly the case, any talk now of a great attempt to sally out, such would, in the present state of affairs, be simply insane. An effort which could not be attempted eight weeks before with the army of Bazaine when it was still comparatively superb, certainly could not be made with the miserable re-

mains to which hunger and suffering had reduced it. The Prince, therefore, demanded simply the surrender of the army and fortress, and Changarnier was obliged to return with this answer.

Later on, on the same evening, the 25th, another meeting took place in the chateau of Frescaty, to the south of Fort St Privat, between the Chief of the Staff of Prince Frederic Charles and General Cissey of Ladmirault's Corps. In this conference, as in the others, the main subject of conversation was the separation of the fate of the field-army of Bazaine from that of the fortress. Bazaine had now sent a divisional general, in order that no one might find occasion to say that anything was kept secret from the army. As we have before remarked, this separation of the fate of the field-army from that of the fortress meant practically nothing; and moreover, on the other hand, it was alleged on the German side that if the army of Bazaine had not been present before Metz, it would have been impossible to place the very incomplete new forts in a state of defence.

On the evening of the 26th, the final negotiations took place between Generals Stiehle and Jarras in the chateau of Frescaty, when the only delay arose in discussing whether the officers should be released on parole or not. As it had come to pass that French officers who had given their word of honour not to serve again against Germany in this war had never-

theless accepted commands in the French army, Prince Frederic Charles was unwilling again to concede the favour, and therefore telegraphed to the King of Prussia to learn his decision. The answer, however, was favourable to the French demand.

On the 27th of October the terms were ratified by the commanders-in-chief on both sides, and the capitulation could finally be signed. The conditions were in principle the same as those granted and accepted at Sedan; but special clauses provided for the protection of the inhabitants of Metz, and regulated the marching out of the troops.

When, on the 27th, Bazaine and Coffinières communicated to the army and to the town the conclusion of the capitulation, great excitement and scenes of disorder ensued, although such an ending must for a long time have been foreseen to be inevitable; and Bazaine, the Corps commanders, and Coffinières, were accused of treachery, and even threatened with violence. By Bazaine's own wish, only the Guard was to march out with arms and colours; the other Corps were to give up their weapons in the town. The eagles were deposited in the armoury on the evening of the 28th, and it was given out that they were to be burnt there; but in reality they were all, 53 in number, handed over to the Prussians.

On the forenoon of the 29th, after a detachment of sappers had made diligent search for any mines which might perchance still exist, the Germans occu-

pied the detached forts and the gates of the fortress. At noon the French troops began to march out: the 6th Corps and Forton's division of cavalry along the road to Thionville on the left bank of the Moselle to Ladonchamps; the 4th Corps between Forts Plappeville and St Quentin along the road to Amanvillers to the Prussian lines; the Guard, the great reserve of artillery, the equipage train of the great headquarters, on the right bank of the Moselle along the highway to Nancy, as far as Tournebride, near Frescaty; the 2d Corps, with Laveaucoupet's division and Lepasset's brigade, along the road to Noménу, through Magny sur Seille, as far as the farm of St Thiébault; the 3d Corps along the Saarbrück road, as far as the farm of Bellecroix; the Mobile Guard and all the other troops composing the garrison along the Strasburg highroad to Grigy.

As the troops arrived in their bivouacks the officers returned to the town, and the French soldiers passed under the command of German officers and non-commissioned officers. Provisions were ready on the spot, having been provided by the German commanders. The sending off of the prisoners of war along the lines by Saarbrück and Saarlouis was supervised by General von Zastrow, whose Corps, the 7th, was to remain in the neighbourhood of Metz; and General von Kummer was appointed commandant of Metz, his division, at least so much of it as was not

employed in escorting the prisoners of war, being annexed to the 7th Army Corps.

The Germans give the number of the prisoners of war taken in Metz at 173,000 men, but this must be regarded as a very "round" number, even if in it were included the 20,000 sick in the hospitals, the Sedentary National Guard, the Mobile National Guard, all the local officials, and every one connected in even the most remote way with the army. It would in reality appear to have been taken solely from a writing which General Coffinières addressed on the 15th of October to the Municipal Council of Metz to justify the capitulation which was impending. In it he naturally gave the highest estimate possible of the number of people to be fed in and about Metz, and reckoned them at 230,000. If from this the ordinary civilian population of 57,000 souls be subtracted, there remained, certainly, exactly 173,000 for the military forces. But it is very possible that Coffinières allowed himself to exaggerate: in the first place, because such an exaggeration was useful to him; and, secondly, because he probably counted in all who could be, or ought to have been, in and around Metz; and, moreover, it must be noticed that the civil population had been increased to far above 60,000 by the influx of the peasantry and of the inhabitants of the environs into Metz, and that Bazaine himself gives the number of serviceable men

whom he had at the time of the capitulation at 65,000 men, which coincides with other credible information which we have received.

The value of the *matériel* of war which, by the fall of Metz, passed into the hands of the Germans, is estimated by them at 80 millions of francs—a sum which may be considered to be rather too small than too great.

King William celebrated this new success of the German arms by nominating the Crown-Prince of Prussia and Prince Frederic Charles field-marshals. Heretofore this title had purposely and by tradition never been given to a prince of the Prussian royal house. For a long time Field-Marshal Wrangel had alone attained, in Prussia, to this highest military rank; but he could only regard himself as honoured by being associated with such princely colleagues—a feeling which the old man expressed in a characteristic way. General von Moltke also received the title of Count.

In France the fall of Metz aroused such a storm of excitement and rage as might have been expected if it had never before happened that a fortress, even when defended by an army, had been compelled to surrender. And yet, but fifteen years before, Sebastopol had fallen, although the Russian army was never so completely shut in and thrown upon the resources of the place as Bazaine's was.

The delegation of the Government at Tours, to which now, as will be more fully described afterwards, M. Gambetta also belonged, proclaimed without more ado that Bazaine was a traitor; and M. Gambetta instructed the prefects and state officials to pursue and arrest him and his officers wheresoever they might find them, and deliver them over to the proper authorities.

CHAPTER XXX.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE UP TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER.

In the period between the beginning of October and the middle of November, the capitulation of Bazaine was the greatest, and by far the most striking, military event. For whatever else took place in the operations of the campaign during that time led to no decisive result, but, on the contrary, all the circumstances bore about them more or less a character of uncertainty. In order, however, to make the narrative of them as connected as possible, it is necessary now to relate shortly the political occurrences which took place in the interim.

The Government of National Defence had originally, on the 8th of September, fixed the 16th of October as the day for the elections for the Constituting Assembly; afterwards, during the negotiations which preceded the Conference of Ferrières, they advanced the time to the 2d of October, in order to put an end to the reports that they desired to delay or hinder the elections in order to retain office.

But when the conversations at Ferrières failed to bring about any result, the Government in Paris again postponed the elections, and this time indefinitely, or until such a day as they could take place freely in the whole territory of the Republic.

It is not easy to perceive why the delegation of the Government in Tours departed again from this resolve on the 29th of September, and once more appointed the 16th of October as the day. As soon as the members of the Government remaining in Paris heard, on the 1st of October, of this, they resolved to declare the decree of the delegation null and void, and also to send one from among themselves to Tours, where, being from longer co-operation better acquainted with the whole policy of the Government, he would be able to represent it without a constant correspondence being necessary. For this office M. Gambetta came forward; and his colleagues were the more willing to send him, as they believed that his fire and ardour would animate the endeavours of the provinces to continue the war.

Accordingly, on the 6th of October, Gambetta quitted Paris in a balloon. The balloon has for a long time been employed for military objects, but never before to so great an extent as in this war. When first used they were employed to reconnoitre the enemy, and for this they were employed by the French in the wars of the Revolution, especially at Maubeuge in 1793, and at Fleurus in 1794. A special

corps of aeronauts was founded, which Moreau took into the field for the last time in 1796. The balloons then used were held down by ropes (*ballons captifs*), to which horses were harnessed. This arrangement prevented them from mounting higher than was wished, and also from drifting into regions whither they were not intended to go. Such captive balloons were again employed for like purposes in Paris in 1870. But before this campaign free balloons (*ballons libres*) had also been occasionally employed: in such a one, for instance, M. Godard went up from Castiglione on the 23d of June, the day before the battle of Solferino, but, as is well known, saw nothing. A reconnoitring balloon must naturally always be an occupied one (*ballon monté*)—that is, provided with a car in which men can be carried. Balloons also were used for yet other purposes by the Austrians before Venice in 1849. There they made fast shells to them, which, the balloons having been blown over the town by favourable winds, were to detach themselves and fall into it. This contrivance was, however, not very successful, but still it was not condemned as altogether impracticable.

In the year 1870, balloons were especially used as a means to enable besieged towns to communicate with the outer world, and for this they were used on the largest scale by the Parisians. Regular workshops were very soon constructed, under the superintendence of M. Godard, in the station of the Orleans Rail-

way; and in these, many hundreds of workmen and workwomen were constantly employed. A model was constructed after which the balloons were to be essentially formed, and simple patterns were provided for the rapid and uniform cutting out of the separate sectors. These balloons had a diameter of about 50 feet, so that they could carry in their cars a net weight of 1000 kilogrammes* for a long journey, and therefore could easily convey a considerable number of letters and papers, besides two or three men and the necessary ballast. Each one had in the upper cap a valve which could be opened by means of a string by the aeronaut in the car, and thus the descent could be regulated. The strips were of the national colours of the Republic—red, white, and blue; and each balloon received a name, as a ship does before leaving the slips. The aeronauts received a practical and theoretical instruction—the former in captive balloons—and were chosen in preference from among the numerous sailors who had been called in to Paris.

Every aerial voyage is in itself attended with many dangers, which become especially great during the descent. A perfectly free selection of the place where he shall touch the earth is impossible to the aeronaut, owing to the rapidity with which the balloon travels—a speed which depends upon the force of the wind, but which, on the average, exceeds that of an express railway train, and cannot suddenly be

* 2200 English pounds avoirdupois.

checked; so that it is rarely that aerial voyagers land without sustaining some bodily injuries. But now, during the war of 1870, the perils were manifoldly increased for the Parisian aeronauts. The Prussians fired with rifles and cannon at the balloons as soon as they quitted Paris; and at last it even came to this, that Herr Krupp constructed, in the arsenal in Essen, a special balloon-gun, which, of small calibre and mounted on a stand as a telescope is, could be readily turned in any direction and fired with any elevation. These pains and inventions, however, could only lead to a comparatively small number of successful shots, owing to the rapid motion of the object, and to the great height which a balloon coming from Paris had already attained before crossing the line of detached forts.

But in order that the aerial post might fulfil its end, it was further necessary that the balloons should descend outside the district of the Germans, so that the voyagers might place the mails they carried safely in a post-office, or on the railway, to be forwarded to their destination; and necessarily the more the invasion of France extended, so much the more difficult was it to comply with this condition. Many balloons, which, for the sake of safety, fixed upon a distant point of descent, fell in Germany. Often the men in them were for hours uncertain of the direction they were travelling in, and of the speed of their movement, as by order of General Trochu they generally set out in the dark, between midnight and two o'clock in the

morning, in order to escape the Prussian bullets, and to prevent their arrival being unpleasantly announced beforehand. They were, it is true, supplied with apparatus for generating electric light, but these did not always act properly, and, moreover, they by no means supplied the place of the light of day in determining a position in space.

The Prussians increased the military codex by a paragraph in which they announced that all aeronauts who fell into their hands would be treated as prisoners of war and sent to Germany.

And although, spite of all dangers and hindrances, the balloons which ascended almost daily from the capital carried much news from it into the provinces, still they could not be employed for the opposite purpose of conveying intelligence from the country into the town. To do this it would be necessary to be able to steer them, and that is still an unsolved problem. France, and especially Paris, is rich in thoughtful and studious aeronauts. Besides MM. Godard and Nadar, who have acquired a professional celebrity throughout Europe, we must here mention the mathematician, Wilfrid de Fonvielle, who has made many aerial voyages for the purpose of physical observations, and who quitted Paris during the blockade in a private balloon of his own construction. These, and many others, among whom was the celebrated marine engineer, Dupuy de Lôme, have given much study to the question of the possibility of steering

balloons. It has also been repeatedly asserted that the problem was solved, and very recently M. Vallée claimed to have invented a steerable balloon capable of carrying 60,000 kilogrammes (54 tons). Certainly no one can venture to affirm in these days that anything is impossible; but until something entirely new is discovered, of which hitherto no man has thought, it is certain that the great difficulty consists in constructing a balloon which shall have a sufficient lifting capability to carry a steering-apparatus of the strength requisite to overcome the resistances to be encountered; so that up to this time no aerial machine has come into use which can be steered, and, what is equally important, can be easily stopped. We must therefore wait patiently.

The attempts, then, of bold aeronauts who endeavoured to reach Paris from the provinces in ordinary balloons, without steering-apparatus, by skilfully utilising the currents of winds in different atmospheric strata, all failed, and it was necessary to contrive other means to procure the desired intelligence. These ways were: 1, subterranean telegraphs; 2, messengers; 3, carrier-pigeons; 4, despatches by the water-courses.

Subterranean telegraphs existed in the environs of Paris, but as they were only underground for short distances and then came to the surface, they were soon cut by the German cavalry.

Messengers were frequently sent with concealed

despatches from the provinces, especially from Tours to Paris. At first many succeeded in passing the German investing lines; but the more the besiegers established themselves, reconnoitred the neighbourhood, and intrenched themselves, so much the more rarely did these successful journeys occur, and not a few of these brave and self-sacrificing men were either seized in the execution of their enterprise or shot, the last not always by the Germans.

Pigeons have been used since the days of antiquity, and especially in the East, to carry news. The Turkish pigeon (*Columba Turcica*) was for a long time the favourite carrier-bird; but the ordinary field-pigeon (*Columba livia*), and our domestic pigeon, which springs from it, render the same services. They fly at the rate of about thirty miles in the hour, and therefore would travel from London to Paris in from five to six hours. Before the existence of the electric telegraph, they were bankers who mostly employed carrier-pigeons to convey important exchange despatches. But these aerial messengers must not be heavily or uncomfortably loaded, if they are to execute their task properly. The simple banking messages were very short, and could be written on the smallest fragment of silk-paper. To preserve these documents from destruction by moisture or similar causes, they were enclosed in a small quill, hermetically closed at both ends, and this was then carefully and securely fastened to one of the tail-

feathers of the letter-pigeon (*pigeon voyageur*). In 1870 the French made use of the same expedient, but it then became desirable to forward by one pigeon much more comprehensive intelligence than had been hitherto sent. M. Steenackers, who administered the postal and telegraphic departments at Tours, discovered a simple means, which had certainly only been rendered practicable by the advances resulting from modern industry, of fulfilling this requirement without distressing the pigeon. He caused, namely, a great number of despatches to be copied on to one sheet, and then photographed this on such a reduced scale, that about 70,000 words could be contained on a very small scrap of silk-paper. By this device a single bird could carry as much as stands upon about 300 pages of the book which the reader has now before his eyes. The officials at the receiving office in Paris could naturally only read the messages by means of a strong magnifying-glass, and the messages had to be written out again and forwarded to the respective destinies. But, spite of its ingenuity, the institution did not render all the services that might perhaps have been expected from it. The pigeons had to be in the first place conveyed out of Paris in balloons, and then forwarded by the railway to the places whence they were to carry the despatches. When the wind was very strong the birds would not fly, but sought shelter from the weather, and on such occasions were liable to be cap-

tured or killed. The Prussians in the neighbourhood of Paris procured birds of prey (falcons) to swoop down on the letter-pigeons, and there is no doubt that many were thus prevented from reaching the capital, while others, which succeeded in arriving, came without their burdens. It is possible that the Prussians may have taken away the despatches, and then set the carriers free again; but often the letter-holders (quills) were unskilfully attached, and the birds themselves being incommoded, freed themselves from their loads by their beaks. Many pigeons, again, were delayed by bad weather in a most unaccountable way, and to such an extent that they sometimes arrived many weeks late.

Letters enclosed in sealed bottles were also intrusted to the waters of the Seine and other streams above Paris, and carried by them into the capital. But this medium was also very uncertain, and its successful employment for any long distance required at least the attentive watchfulness of trustworthy people at fixed points, not too far distant from one another.

We have here described the several ways of communication to which it is well known that recourse was had: many others have been talked of—as, for example, vessels or boats propelled under water—but we have not yet succeeded in penetrating the mystery in which they are involved.

Gambetta then, as we said, left Paris in a balloon on the 6th of October, and descended in the neigh-

bourhood of Rouen, whence he proceeded by railway, arriving in Tours at nine o'clock in the morning. Thence he on the same day issued a proclamation to the French, in which he described the situation of Paris, the condition of the fortifications, the number of combatants, and the abundance of resources of all kinds. Paris, he said, could hold out for many months, and thus the provinces would have time to organise their military forces and come to the aid of the capital. In addition to this, the partisan war must be carried on with energy, to cut off the enemy's resources and render his employment of them difficult. The task which the French had before them was difficult, but by no means impracticable: hitherto its execution had only failed through default of determination and consistency.

The Ministry of War had been undertaken by Admiral Fourichon as soon as he arrived in Tours about the middle of September, in addition to the Ministry of Marine which he already held; but in the first days of October he again resigned the first-named office to Cremieux. It can easily be imagined how ludicrous it must have appeared to the Prussians that this ancient advocate, whose anything but pleasing exterior was a picture of the Oriental type in its most unlovely form, should be a Minister of War. But he did not long fill the office, for Gambetta now undertook it as well as the Ministry of the Interior, which had fallen to him in the beginning—a plurality of

offices which is especially important, as by it Gambetta had all the land forces of France at his disposal, including the Sedentary National Guard, which is dependent upon the Minister of the Interior. We shall presently consider Gambetta's work of reconstructing the French forces; but first we must make a few remarks on other matters.

At the end of October, M. Thiers returned to France from his journey of visits to the Courts of the Great Powers, and proceeded to Tours. The four Powers he had visited—Austria, England, Russia, and Italy—had all expressed a wish that there should be an end to the shedding of blood, and that meanwhile, at least, an armistice should be concluded that would give France an opportunity of electing a Constituting Assembly, and thereby of acquiring a recognised Government with which the Germans could treat without hesitation. But in view of the addresses which were being signed in great numbers throughout Germany, protesting against any interference of other States in the strife between their country and France, the Great Powers were naturally reluctant to act, although, by the intervention of England and Russia, Thiers received a safe-conduct from the German headquarters to enter Paris in order to obtain instructions from the Government, with the view of afterwards conferring with the Chancellor of the North German Confederation in Versailles.

Thiers quitted Tours on the 28th, and journeyed

by Orleans and Arpajon to Versailles, where he only remained a short time without having any interview with Bismark. On the same day he crossed the Seine at Billancourt, entered Paris, and at once placed himself in communication with the Government there. After receiving instructions as to the conditions of the proposed armistice, he returned on the 1st of November to Versailles, and at noon commenced negotiations with Bismark.

The matter to be arranged was now much more limited and more precisely defined than it was when Jules Favre took part in the conferences of Ferrières, The conclusion of an armistice was the sole affair to be arranged; but notwithstanding this, the course of these second negotiations was exactly similar to that of the former ones.

At the commencement of the conversation Bismark remarked, merely as an historical fact, and without laying any special stress upon it, that there still existed in Wilhelmshöhe the ruins of a French Government, which alone was recognised by the Great Powers of Europe, and which was still thinking of re-establishing itself. And this statement was perfectly true; for in those days the Empress Eugenie made a short visit to her imprisoned consort, and the Bonapartists were beginning to agitate violently. To these agitations two new journals owed their birth—'La Situation' (the name of a former French Guelphic paper) and 'Le Drapeau.' The latter journal was published

in Brussels by Granier de Cassagnac, and distributed gratis, especially to the French officers who were prisoners of war in Germany. But to every right-thinking Frenchman these audacious efforts must have appeared to be infamous. The majority believed, though we are convinced wrongly, that they were made with the connivance of the Chancellor. They originated solely from Wilhelmshöhe, as did the movement to convoke the General Councils of the Departments to constitute a government—that is, to call together for that purpose the bodies from which the official candidates for the Corps Legislatif were usually nominated under the Empire.

Bismark and Thiers were soon in accord as to the assertion of the latter, that the prisoner of Wilhelmshöhe and his followers could no longer represent France; and they then commenced to discuss the conditions of the armistice, which Bismark consented should continue for twenty-five or twenty-eight days, the period which Thiers declared to be necessary for the orderly and regular conduct of the elections for the Constituting Assembly. In regard to these elections themselves, Bismark only made reservations in respect to Alsace and German Lorraine, and even there he was willing to concede that those provinces should be represented by notables. He declared, also, that he was content that neither the future position of these districts nor their separation from France, both of which points could only be determined by

the treaty of peace, should be mentioned in the terms of the armistice. For the positions of the belligerent forces, the *status quo* on the day of the signing of the treaty for the cessation of hostilities was to remain unaltered; and accordingly a line of demarcation was to be marked out, though Bismark remarked that this condition was very disadvantageous for the Germans, as the investing army of Metz, the troops composing which were set free by the capitulation of Bazaine, would be prevented from making any movement towards its future sphere of action. Still, on the 2d of November the two negotiators believed that all these difficulties were arranged, and that now only the question of reprovisioning the fortresses, and especially Paris, remained to be discussed. Here Bismark pointed out the material difficulties of the undertaking; and this remark was not wholly answered by the reply of Thiers that the procuring of supplies was the affair of the French. For the provision-trains certainly could not be allowed to enter Paris altogether uncontrolled by the Germans. The destruction of the railways around Paris would undoubtedly render the transport very difficult and tedious, and this would bring with it many inconveniences for the investing army; and, lastly, what measures were to be taken to prevent the provisioning of Paris from affecting very prejudicially that of the German armies in France? Viewing all this, therefore, Bismark determined to consult once again

the German military authorities, after which, on the 3d of November, a definite conclusion was to be arrived at.

While Thiers was in Paris, a socialistic demonstration had taken place there against the Government of National Defence. When intelligence arrived of the capitulation of Metz, and the news spread of the negotiations which were about to take place for an armistice, armed bands proceeded from Belleville to the Hôtel de Ville, took possession of it, and made prisoners of the members of the Government who were assembled there. The leaders of the movement —Flourens, Pyat, Joly, Blanqui, and others—desired to institute a so-called "Commune," and naturally to undertake themselves its government. On this project they commenced to deliberate amid great confusion, some of the members of the Government of National Defence being more or less ill-treated. But the Minister of Finance, M. E. Picard, had contrived to escape, and he at once took measures to free the prisoners. In consequence of his activity, the 106th battalion of the Mobile Guard (from Brittany) succeeded at 8 P.M. in rescuing General Trochu; and at the same time MM. Jules Ferry and Pelletan made good their flight. The Ministers who were now free assembled in the Luxembourg to take counsel as to what measures must be adopted; and soon after midnight General Trochu placed himself at the head of the Mobile and National Guards, who were collected

in great numbers, and at 3 A.M., on the 1st of November, cleared the Hôtel de Ville, and set free the captives, the insurrectionists flying in all directions.

On the 3d of November the Government demanded from the citizens of Paris, from the troops, and from the National Guard, a vote on the question, whether it still enjoyed the confidence of the inhabitants or not. It obtained an enormous majority, and could now regard itself as doubly established. Nine chiefs-of-battalion of the National Guard who were implicated in the revolt were dismissed from their posts. Among them was M. Gustav Flourens, chief-of-battalion of the Volunteer Rifles of Belleville. This very eccentric man, who is notorious throughout Europe chiefly as an inciter of brawls, although he can fairly claim the title of scholar, had acquired his military education during the Cretan insurrection, in which he played a very prominent part. In the meetings which took place before the elections of 1869, he made himself noticeable by his furious hatred of the Empire; and in the beginning of 1870 he was, being at the time a fugitive, accused of complicity in Beaury's attempt.

General Tamisier, Commandant of the National Guard of Paris, was reproached with having at the least acted very feebly. The rebels had, without his consent, placed his name on the list of the members who were to compose the proposed Provisional Government, and he now tendered his resignation; which,

being accepted, he was superseded by General Clement Thomas, an old Republican, who had once before, after the February Revolution of 1848, held for a time the same command.

Rochefort, who on the 31st of October had made promises to the insurrectionists which the Government of National Defence in no way intended to ratify, resigned office, and thenceforth devoted his services to the defence of Paris as a gunner in the National Guard.

Thiers naturally was cognisant of the events of the 31st, but did not deem it expedient to inform Bismark of them. The latter heard of them from other sources on the morning of the 3d of November, and at the meeting on that day interrogated Thiers as to the extent of his knowledge. But the French representative evaded the question by expressing his conviction that, even if disturbances had arisen, they must have been quelled in a very short time.

On renewing the discussion of the question of reprovisioning Paris for the period of the armistice, Bismark at once returned to his original statement, that the matter was one which affected military interests, and must be considered and settled from a military point of view. For the Germans the arrangement would be in itself disadvantageous; they therefore could not agree to it without obtaining "a military equivalent" which would in some degree compensate them, and Bismark demanded that this

should be the surrender to the Germans of one or two of the forts of Paris. With this the negotiations of Versailles were shipwrecked on the same point as those of Ferrières. Thiers strove to prove to the Chancellor of the North German Confederation that, although France would certainly derive military advantages by a cessation of hostilities, still, on the other hand, Germany would gain polifically; for to her profit would be the calming of the passions of the two nations, who, during the armistice, would have time to reflect, and would be thus preparing for peace; and moreover, the whole of Europe would be compelled to acknowledge the readiness of Prussia to concede terms, and would no longer be able to deny her genuine and proved love of peace. But the attempt was vain; and Thiers in his report allows it to be understood that Bismark, being altogether dependent upon the military authorities, could no longer allow his own political ideas to govern him.

Thiers, who thus saw his efforts frustrated, now expressed the wish to be allowed to proceed again into the French lines with a view to a conference. Bismark willingly assented to this, and moreover desired him to inform the Government that if they wished the elections to proceed without an armistice, no difficulties should be laid in the way of their being carried on in the districts occupied by the Germans, and that every facility should be given to the fractions of the Government in Paris and Tours to

correspond freely on the subject. Accordingly, on the 5th of November, Thiers had an interview with M. Favre inside the French lines, and a long conversation ensued about the state of affairs as they then existed; but on the 6th he received an official notice from the Government in Paris to break off all negotiations; and the proposition of continuing the elections for the Constituting Assembly without a temporary cessation of hostilities was also rejected.

Thus, then, another hope was frustrated, and the war assumed ever more and more the character of an inevitable calamity which was destined to run its course in Europe. Political and strategical combinations lose their value under such circumstances, and men begin to ask themselves whether the much-lauded military organisations, which make use of a principle, to a certain extent, without fully recognising it, deserve the prize which they have won. The world becomes thoughtful, and asks itself whether the hour can have struck when it must be decided whether Europe shall be republican or Cossack. Sympathies, which were hotly enlisted on one side or the other, become cool, or even turn to the other party. Much that was lately held to be wonderful ceases to be marvelled at, already seeming too insignificant to be regarded in view of the more recent phenomena which are originated by the significant greatness of general situation. But ever more and more it becomes manifest that those men were right who held that this

war, under any circumstances, and whatever might be its issue, would be a great European disaster. Evermore in the land of the victor the cry arises that, however hapless may be the situation, so much the more necessary is it to fight out this time the strife between France and Germany to the very end; and, nevertheless, the fear evermore arises whether the *væ victoribus* which was uttered at the outbreak of the war will not cause its truth to be acknowledged. War is always a political means; but is the policy on either side the same in the beginning of November that it was in the middle of July? A peace may now be concluded in one, two, or three months. Various causes may bring it about; but no one now believes that it can be a lasting one, even to the extent of securing ten years of peace, or that it can lead to a thorough settlement of the strife; and this uncertainty of what will happen next prevails everywhere.

But this very uncertainty, again, gives room for hope that affairs may finally turn out better than man may venture to predict.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

We have seen how, after the first misfortunes happened to the Imperial army, the fact was accepted that great things must be done to reinforce it. Palikao's Ministry occupied itself principally with the multiplying and augmentation of the marching battalions and regiments, some of which we have already found embodied in M'Mahon's army. It laid particular stress upon obtaining old soldiers. With these and the conscripts it endeavoured to re-establish the different Corps' depots, which had been almost altogether absorbed into the old field-army. Moreover, the Mobile Guard of the northern and eastern departments was to a great extent assembled, and a small beginning at least was made towards the concentration of that of the western and southern provinces, where heretofore even a paper organisation had not existed. For it was true of the whole of France that, up to the time of the fall of the Empire, the Mobile Guard remained in a very bad state, insufficiently

exercised and armed, unless by chance they had been called into a fortress, and there trained by some prudent commandant to assist in its defence.

The reorganisation of the Sedentary National Guard, also, remained in a very backward state, spite of all the promises and decrees of Palikao's Ministry, and partly, indeed, because this Ministry did not believe that a universal arming would be for the good of the Empire.

After the fall of the Regency, the Government of National Defence continued the labours of Palikao's Ministry, but at the same time they gave greater heed to the organisation of the Mobile Guard, seeking to press it rapidly forward; and at the same time they endeavoured also to reorganise the Sedentary National Guard, so that it might take part in the service of public security in large towns, and assist in the defence of the fortresses. But hereby the want of an adequate supply of well-constructed weapons—a want which had been hitherto denied, but which really existed—made itself felt. The Government therefore took measures for the manufacture of greater numbers of breech-loaders in France itself, by employing private industry; and at the same time it made arrangements for purchasing abroad, especially in England and America, whence weapons were naturally obtained constructed on different systems. Similarly the rearming of the artillery was taken in hand; for, independently of the fact that many of the French

field-guns had been lost, the German artillery had, by its accuracy and length of range, made itself much respected by the French; and the opinion ever gained ground among them that their artillery also must be provided with breech-loading ordnance to be able to cope with that of the adversary.

But in spite of the multiplicity of the endeavours of the Government of National Defence, we cannot recognise any revolutionary character in them until after the fall of Metz. Up to that time only customary means had been employed, and only ordinary processes applied. Only with that event did this change, and then only did the Government begin to adopt revolutionary measures.

On the 2d of November the delegation in Tours issued a decree by which all men between 20 and 40 years of age were mobilised, unless, indeed, they had already been called out by former statutes. The men thus obtained were to be organised by the prefects of the departments until the 19th of November, and then placed at the disposal of the Minister of War. All exemptions on social grounds, such as being the sole support of a family, were abolished. Only bodily incapacity, and the holding of certain public offices, were now admitted as grounds for a dispensation. The Republic was to provide for the families of the Mobiles, and to adopt the children of those who fell. By the same decree the Minister of War was empowered to employ all workshops and

manufactories for the making of arms and other necessaries of war.

This ordinance, which was described by many as a call to the masses to rise (*levée en masse*), although it was properly only a considerable extension of the conscription, was much assailed. It was said: "There is no lack of men, but of what use are they when everything is wanting to prepare and equip them for war, especially when winter is close upon us? What end can be served by such a general calling out of the masses, when as yet the Mobile Guard is neither armed nor exercised, and when there are neither weapons nor leaders even for it; when such of its men as are summoned are destroyed by idleness; and when, up to the present, it has been impossible to gather round the colours even those men who have been called out by former decrees?"

The Government in Tours was not deaf to these and similar objections raised by the press, and shortly afterwards elucidated its decree of the 2d of November by another. By this latter one the men already called out were to constitute a first levy, while those affected by the decree of the 2d of November were to form a second. This second levy was to be divided into three classes—the first to include men from 21 to 30 years of age; the second, those from 31 to 35; and the third, those from 35 to 40,—and these three classes were to be called up in succession; for the present only the first.

We will now consider the numbers which France could place in the field through this most comprehensive decree of the 2d of November. Altogether, France possessed 38 millions of inhabitants, without including those of her foreign possessions. In every 20,000 inhabitants there were 832 men between 20 and 25 years of age, 802 between 25 and 30, and 1475 between 30 and 40. In the whole of France, therefore, there would be before the war began—

1,580,800	men	between	20	and	25	years of age.
1,523,800	„	„	25	„	30	„ „
2,802,500	„	„	30	„	40	„ „

But from the first class (20 to 25 years of age) at least 200,000 must be subtracted to allow for the killed in battle, the wounded, and the prisoners, up to the 1st of November.

From this class again must be taken the men of it still serving in the active army, perhaps 50,000 in number; also the contingents for the year 1869 and 1870—the first of 60,000 men, the latter, where no freedom by lot or on account of social position was allowed, of at the most 160,000 men; and lastly, in this class must be included the whole mass of the Mobile Guard.

The prescribed battalions and batteries of the Mobile Guard were by this time all called out, even if they were not in any way completely equipped and armed. The strength of the battalions on a field-

footing was most varied. The strong battalions were, owing to the want of good leaders, of no more value than the weak, for there was a greater lack of consistency in the former than in the latter. The battalions were arranged in regiments of three each, and the surplus ones in the different departments were similarly disposed. The formation of depot-battalions of the Mobile Guard was also commenced in the proportion of one to every three or four field-battalions. The idea of now placing these depot-battalions in a fit state to take the field, and replacing them by newly-raised ones from the yet disposable masses of this annual class, was first made mention of in the decree of the 2d of November; and its execution was now taken in hand.

We may assume that in round numbers about 400,000 men were taken, up to the 1st of November, from the class of men between 20 and 25 years of age, for the Mobile Guard. The fact that these had suffered losses—for example, in the capitulation of fortresses—does not concern us here; and just as little do we inquire in this place whether all these men were capable of rendering real service in the field.

If now we add together all these different deductions, we obtain the number of 870,000 men (of whom about 600,000 were still forthcoming). As now the whole class only included 1,580,800 men, and as, according to the usual calculation, only half of these could be estimated to be capable of bearing arms; and

as, moreover, owing to the occupation of so many provinces by the Germans, it may be reckoned that the Government in Tours could only dispose of at the most three-quarters of the population,—it is manifest that in this first class which we are now considering, nothing more remained to be mobilised.

In the second class—men from 25 to 30 years of age—we are first interested in the old soldiers. To these belong the men of the reserve up to the age of 29, who were called in in the beginning of the war. Altogether, there were 260,000 such men in this category, and of these 150,000 were killed, wounded, or prisoners. There remained, then, at the most, 110,000, and these were in part already serving in, or were to be drafted into, the depots of the active army, to leaven the masses of Mobile Guards and Mobilised National Guard, and to restore the special arms of the service, the cavalry, artillery, and engineers.

Deducting the old soldiers, there still remain of the second class (25 to 30 years of age) 1,264,000 men. Assuming, as before, the half of these to be fit for service, we have 632,000 men, and taking the three-fourths of them obtainable from the uninvaded territory of France, we have 474,000 men; and these really formed the main part of the male population which remained to be mobilised by the decree of the 2d of November.

These men were to be, in the first place, mobilised by the prefects, as picked troops of the Sedentary

National Guard. They were formed into battalions, and these were to be assembled as a rule by threes into marching legions. This work progressed but very slowly, and was by no means completed by the 19th of November: in some departments it was scarcely regularly begun even so late as the end of December; and in others, again, the scarcity of serviceable weapons was much felt, as the Mobile Guard had to be first armed. The most backward were certainly the southern departments, along the coasts of the Mediterranean and in the Pyrenees; but there, as elsewhere, much depended upon the zeal and energy of the individual prefects.

Of the third class—men between the ages of 30 and 40—at least 50,000, who had been employed with the army in various positions, were killed or wounded or made prisoners of war. The remainder of this class, then, numbered 2,750,000. Of these, 300,000 old soldiers may be taken as disposable, although perhaps the number is estimated rather too high, if it be remembered that in France many men who have served always pass from the army into various civil offices, from that of mayor to that of field-guard, and that the whole French territory was not free. But let us accept this number, and there remain then 2,450,000 men of whom we assume the half to be fit for service—that is, 1,225,000; from these we must subtract a quarter for men in the occupied provinces;

so that of this third class—that is, of the second and third divisions of the second levy—there remain 918,000 men, of whom 500,000 may be estimated to belong to the second division (from 31 to 35 years of age), and 418,000 to the third (from 36 to 40). These men, when mobilised, would also be embodied as selections from the Sedentary National Guard, therefore as marching legions for the Mobilised National Guard.

The total number of disposable men in France, without falling back upon those corporeally unfit, amounted to 2,302,000 men; and if of those between 30 and 40 years we only count in the old soldiers (300,000), it still amounts to 1,384,000.

We have already remarked that the work of mobilisation, being dependent upon various conditions which cannot be instantaneously realised, must always progress gradually; but here, in addition to this inevitable retardation, many of the men bound to serve became deserters.

In the larger towns it is comparatively easy to collect the men called out, but in the country it is very different, especially in remote districts and in mountainous territories, where news barely penetrates, where but few people can read, where reluctant authorities display but little zeal, and where perhaps even those officials who strive to do their duty have not the means necessary to enforce the law, especially since the later French Governments have been often obliged

to employ detachments of the *gendarmerie* on active service. When, therefore, in such districts the men called upon were not possessed with any great desire to serve, the contingents were very meagre. Many young men of the better classes left the country. Such behaviour has been branded, and rightly so, as disgraceful; for certainly all of these absentees could not urge in justification that they or their parents were Bonapartists, and that scruples of conscience prevented them from serving under the Republic. Still the number of these fugitives was, after all, but small, not only because the rich and wealthy are but relatively few in all modern European States, but also because a Frenchman is more unwilling than any other European to leave his native country. Much more considerable was the number of young men of the better classes who procured freedom from active service by obtaining, through interest, civilian posts which exempted them from being called upon to bear arms, or who entered the numerous, strong, and useless staff of the National Guard, either as clerks of the contractors, or in some other capacity. But still all these means of escape could not very materially reduce the numerical strength, for at the most they who were able to do these things would only amount to some tens of thousands; and therefore, if a great outcry arose about these evasions, it was because exceptional cases are often the most striking, and offend most greatly the sense of justice in the masses. And

it must further be remembered that when an entire nation takes up arms under such circumstances as the French people did, it is not merely the active soldiers who have to be considered, but the administration, the manufacture and procuring of arms and articles of equipment absorb much labour, and workmen of every kind cannot be included in the category of those physically unfit for service. Lastly, it must also be borne in mind that the really disposable forces must necessarily be much disseminated, that strong bodies are required for local purposes, such as the defence of Paris, Lyons, Lille, and the great sea-port towns, and thereby the numbers available for the composition of the real operating armies become much reduced. It is not therefore a matter for surprise that these should be relatively weak, and only increase in strength very gradually.

After all these necessary preliminary remarks, we will return to the consideration of the separate formations—the Active Army, the Mobile Guard, the Mobilised National Guard (marching legions), and the Volunteer Corps—and will then add a few notes about the several armaments of the different formations, about their organisation in Army Corps, and about their camps.

First of all, however, we must turn our attention to the old soldiers who were forthcoming. We have seen that of these there were—

50,000 in the class between 20 and 25 years of age.
110,000 „ „ 25 and 30 „
300,000 „ „ 30 and 40 „

or 460,000 altogether.

To these numbers we may add 20,000 men from the older classes, over 40 years of age, who were employed in various positions. We obtain thus 480,000 men in this category; but however much importance we may be inclined to attach to this supply, we must remember that the greater number—namely, those from the age of 30 upwards—had left the army after the Italian and Crimean wars, and were utterly ignorant of the use of modern arms; and, moreover, the majority had given themselves up to family life, from which they would sever themselves with regret. The value of their assistance in actual warfare would therefore be very doubtful.

From these 480,000 we must deduct at least

80,000 for the formation of the staff of the several administrative branches, including so much *gendarmerie* as was imperatively necessary;

40,000 for the training of the Mobile Guard;

50,000 for the training of the Mobilised National Guard;

80,000 indispensable for the Sedentary National Guard, the later mobilisation of a greater part of which was anticipated. There remained,

then, 220,000 old soldiers to be distributed among the troops of the active army.

In addition to these, there would be 220,000 conscripts of the two classes of 1869 and 1870, and these 440,000 men would form for the present the active army. All other troops—Mobile Guard, Mobilised National Guard, and Volunteers—must be designated as the auxiliary army. Of the active army, again, a part was localised, for example, in the defence of Paris and in the depots. If we estimate the troops thus detained at but 120,000, there remain only 320,000 men of the active army to form the operating armies. To these we must add the Mobile Guard, who, including the old soldiers employed to form the *cadres*, would amount to 350,000 men. But of these, again, at least 100,000, including the defenders of Paris, were localised by various circumstances; so that altogether 570,000 men would be able gradually to take the field before the end of 1870. And we must here passingly remark that the conscripts of 1869 and 1870 were, in regard to their military education, in no way better than the Mobile Guard, and that, moreover, the above-named mass could not be collected at one point.

The first division of the second levy (men from 21 to 30 years of age), 530,000 men, including the old soldiers employed in forming them, must be regarded as being during the whole of 1870 essentially in a state of formation. It is true that before the expira-

tion of the year, individual marching legions of the Mobilised National Guard were actually called up to the battle-field; but these were quite exceptional and chance occurrences, and may be neglected in considering the general state of affairs. As a rule, these men of the first division were assembled together in fortified camps as soon as they were in any degree organised. They were destined to defend for the present these positions, which were not immediately threatened, while their training and armament could be completed there; and, therefore, these Mobilised National Guard cannot be considered when calculating the strength of the operating army in 1870.

Included in the before-mentioned formations, and composed for the most part of men of the same ages as were those who formed the mass of them, various bodies of more or less irregular troops sprung up under the names of Franc-tireurs, Eclaireurs, and Volunteers. Such bodies had existed almost since the beginning of the war; and although on the one hand it must be admitted that they in some places rendered good service by disturbing the communications of the Germans, still on the other it cannot be concealed that many individuals willingly joined these corps in order to evade the obligation to serve in the regular army by performing merely a nominal duty in them; that the discipline in these small formations, which were often dressed and decorated in a most strange manner, and bore most

ridiculous titles, left much to be desired; and that, moreover, they often, owing to their more than loose proceedings, rather hindered than aided the regular troops. The interference, therefore, of the Government to regulate these various corps, and to assign to each one its specific post, soon became necessary, but still even this could not effect all that was to be wished.

The Government of National Defence also allowed foreigners to enter the service of France. The most distinguished of those who offered their swords to the Republic was Garibaldi. Those who knew him were more than a little astonished at this, for they remembered how often and how fiercely he had expressed his hatred of the French, not merely of the Emperor Napoleon, and how this animosity had become doubly violent since his native town, Nice, had been united to France. But Garibaldi arrived in Tours a few days after the advent of M. Gambetta there, and received the command over the collective irregular troops in the Vosges, and also of a brigade of the Mobile Guard. Under his leadership many corps of foreigners sprung up, of Italians, Poles, and Spaniards, but they were certainly of very inconsiderable strength, not at all corresponding to the high-sounding titles which they generally assumed. We shall later on see Garibaldi active in the east; but we may here remark that, from the very outset of his career in France, he encountered much opposition. The chief adversaries of this declared enemy of Papacy

were among the clergy; and the followers of Garibaldi, by interfering in matters which in reality concerned the French alone, instead of devoting their whole attention to combating the Germans, put many weapons into the hands of their clerical adversaries, estranging thereby the masses, who on the whole are in France very faithful children of the Church.

Infantry is in case of need the easiest arm to improvise, but with the special arms the case is different. Frenchmen, like other civilised people generally, are not a nation of horsemen. The improvisation of mounted volunteers which was undertaken produced therefore very meagre results, and the Government of National Defence was practically obliged to fall back for cavalry upon the reconstruction of the old regiments, which, however, were now only forthcoming in the depots and in a few rescued ruins. In this work, the old soldiers who had served in the cavalry rendered good aid. But not only was there a want of trained horses, which could not be procured in a moment by requisition, but there was also a scarcity of saddlery; and this it was impossible to remedy by means of French labour alone, owing to the cessation of business which resulted from the hurried calling-out of the whole male population. It was, therefore, necessary to procure the requisite saddlery and horse-furniture elsewhere, and it was consequently bought abroad, especially in England, even in small quantities of a hundred pieces. This horse equipment was, moreover,

often of very bad workmanship, so that it was necessary to alter and repair much of it in France. It must therefore be regarded as a great achievement that, before the end of 1870, sixty of the old regiments, each consisting of two weak field squadrons, or of 200 men, were again in a state to take the field. It naturally follows that the same number of horsemen could not be apportioned to each of the newly-instituted Corps that was assigned to a like formation in its normal state under the Empire. But the Government had yet another means of supply. This existed in Algeria, whence considerable reinforcements were drawn for the regiments of Spahis, troops which in the cavalry hold the same place with regard to the Chasseur d'Afrique that the Turcos do to the Zouaves in the infantry. Moreover, free Bedouin hordes (Gums) were enlisted for cavalry service on French soil—a measure which perhaps for the interest of European civilisation it would have been better not to have adopted, and which we believe, seeing how badly it had fared with the Turcos employed by the Empire, could have been omitted without loss, if a so much the greater activity had been developed in France itself. But who can call desperation to account, especially when the conduct of war by Europeans assumes ever more and more the character of that of savages?

Artillery is in general easier to obtain than cavalry; men are required as drivers who understand horses without it being necessary that they should be per-

fect masters of the art of riding; and gunners may readily be obtained from among mechanics, if a proper selection be made, and too high scientific attainments are not demanded. In all ages it has been proved that a good artillery, especially in insurrectionary armies, is more easily obtained than good infantry; the great difficulty is in providing the *matériel.*

In the new formation of the French artillery, the Government had to rely for its first line upon the depots which were still existing, and upon the ruins of the old Imperial batteries. The old soldiers who had formerly served in them afforded a good nucleus. But as the opinion had become general in France, and by no means wrongly, that the Germans owed their victories in a very great degree to their numerous artillery and to its good employment, and as the new army was by no means to be composed solely of troops belonging to the former active forces, it became necessary to make an appeal to the living forces of the nation, which would bring about that decentralisation in the departments which the existing circumstances required. Consequently, as early as the 5th of November the institution of departmental batteries was decreed. By the edict then promulgated, each department was to supply a battery of 6 guns for every 100,000 men of its population, and as the Government still ruled over some 30,000,000 of Frenchmen, this would give 300 batteries, or 1800 guns, a number sufficient for an army of 600,000

men. The supply of guns, which were by preference to be of the English 7-pounder Reffye system, although other models were not excluded, was to be obtained from all available sources by the interposition of the State, both by employing the State foundries of land and sea service ordnance, by enlisting private industry, and by purchasing abroad. The gun-carriages, limbers, harness, and horse-furniture were to be similarly procured, and it was not to be considered necessary to adhere rigidly to any one pattern for all these things. The harness especially was to be obtained where any could be found, and in the state in which it was used in the district where it was procured, and afterwards improved by repairing any glaring deficiencies, and at the same time rendered if practicable in some degree uniform.

These somewhat desperate endeavours were the more justifiable, as young infantry who had yet to be accustomed to fire, and that in the face of modern arms of precision, would certainly require a numerous artillery to support them and prepare the way for their action. As a matter of fact, the results in this case also did not immediately follow the order; still much was achieved—more even than any one could have expected who considered the difficulties of the undertaking, although he might have had the greatest confidence in the love of country, the readiness to make sacrifices, and the energy of the French people.

Engineers are also easily improvised in a national

war. They are obtained by simply placing every skilled mechanic and labourer in his proper place. In every department a committee of defence was formed under the presidency of the prefect and of the general commanding, and this had essentially the task of finding out and of applying every means by which the advance of the Germans in this or that direction could be hindered. They had to arrange all the works of demolition and of intrenchment, and at the same time to discover and arrange means of communication for the detachments of the French forces, using as instruments the newly-created bodies of engineers.

The distribution of the country into territorial military divisions and subdivisions was retained intact. The generals commanding these were intrusted with everything relating to the organisation and command of the bodies of troops in their districts. Moreover, in the middle of October, the whole of France, with the exception of Paris, was divided into four general governments which essentially corresponded with the four marshalships or chief commands of the army of the Empire. The four governorships were established for the regions: 1, of the north, with the headquarters at Lille; 2, of the west, with the headquarters at Mans; 3, of the centre, with the headquarters at Bourges; 4, of the east, with the headquarters at Besançon. The command of the north was given to General Bourbaki, who, having left Metz originally

with the intention or wish of negotiating with the Empress Eugenie, had found, as soon as he had arrived at the enjoyment of liberty, that this was impossible or useless, and had placed himself at the disposal of the delegation of the Government in Tours. He could not, however, succeed in making himself popular in his new office, and was soon relieved, and employed in a more suitable manner.

The west was to be commanded by General Fiérek of the artillery; the centre by General de Polhes, the same who commanded the brigade in the action of Mentana; and the east by General Cambriels. This last officer had been wounded at Sedan before the capitulation, and that so severely that he was obliged to be afterwards trepanned. He had then, when somewhat recovered, repaired to Tours, certainly never suspecting that he, in his case, would be declared by the Germans to have broken the conditions of the capitulation. In his command he soon became involved in questions of precedence with Garibaldi, and troubled by these, and also by the state of his health, tendered his resignation. He was at first succeeded by General Michel, but he also could not remain long in the command of Besançon, and had to be elsewhere employed, whereupon the governorship of the east died out. The generals commanding these several regions were to collect the war forces of their territories as much as possible and organise them, without it being expected that such troops should im-

mediately be converted into field armies, the Government rather reserving to itself the power of calling them out as requisite, and of specially appointing their commanders.

The Army Corps which were gradually formed outside Paris numbered from the 15th upwards. The 12th Corps we saw disappear at Sedan; the 13th, failing to arrive in time to take part in the battle, had returned to Paris after the catastrophe. Meanwhile the formation of another Corps, the 14th, had been commenced in Paris, and although affairs soon became so changed in the capital that there could no longer be anything said of a 13th or 14th Corps, this explains how it came to pass that the Departmental Corps began with the number 15.

The Army Corps in the departments were composed essentially on the same principle as those of the Empire had been—that is, a Corps was, as a rule, to be formed of three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry, and to these were to be added as many batteries as circumstances might permit; and this last condition was doubly and trebly necessary, as all the Corps would be composed of young troops. The divisions of infantry were composed of the marching regiments formed since the end of July, and not yet destroyed; of regiments of infantry newly raised at the depôts, numbered from 101 upwards; of marching battalions of Rifles, Zouaves, and Turcos; and then of regiments of the Mobile Guard. As a rule, a

regiment of the active army, gathered together in some way or other, was joined with one of the Mobile Guard to form a brigade of infantry.

However high the numbers on the ration list of one of these new Army Corps may have been, its serviceable strength cannot be estimated at more than 30,000 men, of whom, on the average, 2000 were horsemen. The number of guns in such a Corps, including mitrailleuses, may sometimes have amounted to 100; but this cannot be taken as true for all of them. Sometimes also, in the days which immediately followed, the strength of a Corps may have increased to something greater than the numbers we have given, through chance reinforcements of a local nature, but no permanent or lasting alteration was effected by these additions.

On the 25th of November, Gambetta ordered the formation of eleven camps of instruction and defence, though some of these had practically been already called into existence. The eleven were: 1, at Helfaut (St Omer); 2, Cherbourg; 3, La Rochelle; 4, Bordeaux (St Medard); 5, Toulouse; 6, Montpellier; 7, Pas des Lanciers, near Marseilles; 8, Sathonay, near Lyons; 9, Clermont-Ferrand (Gergovia); 10, Nevers; 11, Conlie, near Le Mans. In these camps the Mobilised National Guard were to be assembled; and first, the 1st division of the second levy—530,000 men, according to our calculation—and then the Mobile Guard, and such troops of the active army as

were not yet ready to take the field, together with the necessary complements of the special arms. Moreover, these camps, although in the beginning only destined for the defence of important points and for instruction, were also to be employed as places for the organisation of divisions and Corps capable of taking the field. Each camp was, as a rule, to be constructed for 60,000 men; but the four which were adjacent to the seaboard—namely, those of St Omer, Cherbourg, La Rochelle, and Pas des Lanciers—were to be capable of containing 250,000 men each.

If, then, this strength of troops was brought simultaneously into the respective camps, there would be a force of 1,420,000 men assembled in them. These numbers have been much ridiculed, but it was not in reality the idea of the Minister of War that all the indicated camps should at one and the same time receive the forces assigned to them, but only that they should be so arranged as to be able to accommodate them in case the necessity should arise. And this idea was certainly not irrational. The camps which rested on the sea would be comparatively easily provisioned from abroad, even under the most difficult circumstances. Army Corps, or even an army itself, might, when hardly pressed, be compelled to take refuge in one or other of them; and as regards the camps not situated near the coast, it might very possibly become necessary, by the calling up of the second and third classes of the second levy, to shelter in any individual one—

not in all simultaneously—at least 60,000 men. The arrangement must therefore be judged from this point of view.

The camp of Toulouse, or the camp of the south-west army, was formed as early as the 12th of November: General Demay, an old artillery officer, was appointed commandant. With him were associated as commissaries, with the rank of generals of division, MM. Lissagary and Perrin, men who, up to that time, had only made themselves known as club orators, and were perfectly innocent of the slightest military education. This camp was also intended to arouse somewhat the organising activity of those parts, which was certainly by no means so conspicuous as was desirable.

Soon after Gambetta left Paris, he was followed, also in a balloon, by M. Kératry, who, having resigned the office of Prefect of Police, was now intrusted with the formation of the camp of Conlie, in which the Mobile Guard and the Mobilised National Guard of Brittany were to be assembled. The population of Brittany has remained even to the present day somewhat isolated. Among other characteristics it has still retained its devotedness to the Church; and it was in some degree a comical sight to see men who were in no way religious, demeaning themselves like saints of the calendar in order to gain influence over the people. Even M. Crémieux behaved like a Christian. Kératry, without altogether thus adapting himself

to circumstances, displayed great zeal, and by his activity and good sense succeeded, by the end of November, in collecting about 40,000 men—47 battalions and 9 batteries,—but shortly afterwards he gave in his resignation, owing to conflicts which arose between Gambetta and himself, and was succeeded in his command by General de Marivault.

The want of educated officers in this mass of new organisations soon made itself keenly felt. To remedy, then, this evil, and also to acquire the power to place fit men in the higher posts, unhindered by former regulations, the Government in the latter part of October suspended by a decree the customary laws of promotion for the duration of the war. Extraordinary promotions could now be made, either for services rendered or for proved capability, and military rank could also be given to persons who did not belong to the army, but this only provisionally and for the period of the war, the definite confirmation in such cases depending upon the after-services rendered. This measure was necessary, but it is quite another question, and one which cannot be answered altogether in the affirmative, whether the Government ever made a sufficient use of the power thus accorded it. A very welcome supply, especially for the higher posts of the new land army, was afforded by the many able marine officers, who, owing to the course the war had taken, could no longer be employed upon their proper element.

The notices we have here given will suffice to explain the organisations adopted up to the year 1871, excepting always the special ones arranged in Paris, which require special consideration; so that we can now follow the operations for a long time without any considerable interruptions. In the relation of these, it will probably become apparent that the French did not achieve with their organisations all that people who did not care to regard minutely the numbers and actual circumstances, might have expected from them. But he who gives heed to these things will be constrained to confess that the French, under the guidance of the Republic, far exceeded his expectations, however great may have been his opinion of their patriotism and energy. It may be that certain German doctors and journalists may still dare to talk of the French as a people rotten to the core, but we are convinced that German soldiers at least do not hold such language.

CHAPTER XXXII.

MILITARY EVENTS IN AND ABOUT PARIS FROM THE 1ST OF OCTOBER TO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER.

THE first half of October passed away very tranquilly around Paris. Both parties were deliberating, and preparing themselves for coming events.

We have already pointed out that the Germans at first calculated upon obtaining possession of the French capital in a very short time. They counted upon internal dissent, and upon the unstable footing of the existing Government. Was it not to be foreseen that parties would rise up against it, and that in anticipation of the horrors and privations of the siege, to which this Government wished to expose the inhabitants of Paris, these factions would overthrow the authorities and surrender the town to the Germans? And in truth the Government of National Defence had many enemies; from its very birth demonstrations had been made against it. But on all such occasions the patriotism of the Parisians manifested itself gloriously; and thousands of men, who were anything but friends of the Government, supported

and maintained it, in order not to present to the world abroad the spectacle of internal dissension in the hour of danger.

When M. Favre returned to Paris after the interview of Ferrières, and announced that nothing remained for France but to continue the combat and prepare to do battle, and when the whole population, hearing these things, instead of shrinking back, joined joyfully in the cry, the Germans were compelled to confess to themselves that they could no longer calculate upon a speedy triumphal entry into Paris in consequence of internal discord. They therefore, after the beginning of October, determined to employ other means; and on the 6th of October the King of Prussia removed his headquarters from Ferrières to Versailles, to be nearer to the German lines.

It had now become apparent that Paris could only be reduced by one of three means: either by a simple blockade, by a bombardment, or by a regular siege; and the adoption of one or other of these must depend upon the length of time for which the town was provisioned. This was not accurately known by any one, but it was certain that there could not be a sufficient supply for any lengthened period, especially of fresh meat, and of milk, butter, eggs, &c. It was calculated, and, as it was afterwards proved, rightly, that these would fall short before the 15th of November. After that date, then, the Parisians, if they held out longer, would have to submit to great and

unwonted privations. If they could endure these, they might certainly maintain themselves for a much longer time. But no one in Europe believed that they possessed such patient endurance in that way as they afterwards showed. Correspondents in Paris described the situation in rosy tints, although even before the end of October much misery began to be experienced. At that time, it is true, there were still provisions of all kinds; but prices had risen to the highest rates, and but few people were able to procure any culinary luxuries, or anything beyond the barest necessaries of life. The men under arms still received regular though scanty rations, and could not complain of want; but it is well known how much female labour is employed in every way in Paris, and now that all business was stopped, the occupation of women was suspended also. They could no longer earn anything; and want began to press heavily on them and their children, even before the supply of any of the necessaries of life was at all exhausted—before a single horse had been slaughtered, or before it had become necessary to fall back upon donkeys, dogs, cats, rats, and the wild animals of the Jardin des Plantes. The authorities of Paris did very much to secure the indispensable means of subsistence to the needy classes; but, as can easily be understood, the most earnest endeavours were insufficient to accomplish all that was requisite in so large a town.

After the investment by the Germans was com-

pleted, the fundamental idea in all the military operations of France could be nothing else than the relief of Paris. The longer the town held out, so much the more time would the departments gain to create armies for that purpose. But these must not delay their arrival too long. The great danger was that they might come to the rescue just an hour too late; another, although a lesser danger, was that they might only arrive in the supreme hour,—for it was desirable that the Parisian army should co-operate from within with the relieving forces; and if hunger had already exercised its dejecting effects upon the former, it could hardly be hoped that it would be able to act with any great energy. The policy of the Paris correspondents, then, in giving such favourable descriptions of the state of Paris, even to the extent of stating at times that the town could hold out for years, was undoubtedly bad; for in many of the departments men believed only too readily that there was no need for great haste in preparing the forces to relieve Paris, and it certainly was not necessary or expedient to confirm them in their error. Had not the whole of France entertained most illusory ideas as to the time that Metz would be able to hold out? and was not the bewildered surprise with which the news of its fall was received greatly owing to the way in which these illusions had been nourished?

Paris was certainly much more favourably circumstanced than Metz had been. It was not burdened

with an army entirely disproportionate to its population, and it had much more time to make preparations. But in any case it was more prudent to endeavour to bring about the relief of Paris as speedily as possible than to calmly defer the attempt for an uncertain time.

In the beginning of October, Count Bismark addressed a circular to the North German representatives at the Courts of the Great Powers, in which he pointed out the terrible consequences which might ensue if Paris did not surrender until compelled to do so by the bitter pangs of hunger. If the town fell under such circumstances, there could be no doubt that famine would ere then have slain its tens of thousands; and even if after the capitulation the German leaders were minded to do their utmost to pour provisions into the French capital, still—because they must first think of the requirements of their own armies, and because of the great difficulty of communications — obstacles would arise which would postpone for a long time any effectual reprovisioning of the town.

It was, however, impossible for the Germans to fix any definite term within which Paris must surrender through want of provisions. In such a calculation, errors, which might amount to months, could not be avoided, and thus it was impossible for the investing force not to bethink itself of other means by which to force the French capital to yield

itself, or which at the least would strengthen the effect of a simple blockade.

The prolongation of the resistance of Paris would not merely in itself prolong the resistance of France also, but it would likewise give time to the departments to form new organisations; and therefore the sooner Paris was compelled to surrender, so much the better for the Germans. Moreover, winter was at hand, and would inevitably demand great sacrifices. The German leaders gained some comfort from the reflection that they would be able to more easily protect the troops from its ravages by warm clothing, and by employing the accommodation at hand, because the majority of the men came from colder climates, and would probably find the winter before Paris milder than they were accustomed to at home. This assumption, however, proved to be incorrect, as the winter from 1870 to 1871 was unusually severe, and the inclement weather began very early. Moreover, the troops upon outpost duty could only be very incompletely sheltered from the rigours of the season, however carefully measures to that end might be undertaken; and the extent to which guard must be kept, and consequently the amount of work the Germans must necessarily do, depended solely upon the activity of the defenders of Paris.

The means of which we have spoken for forcing Paris to surrender were, besides a blockade, a bombardment and a regular siege.

It cannot be denied that a great aversion was manifested throughout Europe to the idea of a bombardment of Paris. Paris, it is true, was a fortress, and must therefore be prepared for the employment against itself of the violent means of which an enemy customarily avails himself to subdue a fortified place; but still Paris is by no means only a fortress. The pride of the Germans might resist the idea of acknowledging that Paris meant more for Europe than other capitals—than Berlin, for example; but still they did acknowledge it, let them jeer as they might at Victor Hugo when he called Paris the "Holy Town." But disregarding this, and assuming that neither sentimentality nor regard for the public opinion of Europe had any influences upon the decisions of the German headquarters, and that, on the contrary, it based its resolutions solely upon military grounds, still the enormous dimensions of Paris, and the extent of the girdle which its detached forts formed, rendered a bombardment extremely difficult; and if it had failed when employed against Strasburg —a town surrounded by a simple enceinte—how could any good result be expected from it, in and by itself, against Paris? In any case, it certainly could not be carried on from field-guns alone. A numerous park of the heaviest siege-ordnance must be brought up, which must at the least be more powerful than was necessary against Strasburg These heavy guns, together with a large supply of ammunition, must be

transported from the interior of Germany, for the most part along roads which were anything but safe, and which could only be traversed by day with the employment of every possible precautionary measure. Such a work, carried on partly along railroads, and partly along country roads, which had not been constructed for such heavy traffic, would under the most favourable circumstances occupy much time. Moreover, unless the Germans previously obtained possession of some of the detached forts, or at all events could by some means contrive to render it impossible for them to keep up a fire worth naming, it would be barely possible to approach sufficiently near to the town itself to damage it seriously by their cannonade, and so promote any disposition to surrender which might exist among the inhabitants.

Such being the state of things, we find it difficult to conceive why the German leaders did not from the outset resolve to besiege the town regularly, and why they did not make the necessary preparations from the first moments of the investment. The regular attack must in the first case be directed against some of the detached forts, for the siege of the main enceinte could only be undertaken after several of these had fallen. Now, it is indubitable that a regular attack against two or more of these detached works could be commenced with a much less artillery *matériel* than a bombardment of Paris itself; for in order that the latter might gain its end,

it would be indispensable to open fire upon the town simultaneously on all sides. It would not be sufficient to strive to make an impression upon any one fixed point, and therefore it would be necessary to have an enormous supply of ammunition at hand before commencing the cannonade, lest it should come to pass that, after two or three days' work, the lack of stores might compel a cessation of the firing, which would expose the Germans to ridicule, and redouble the courage of the besieged.

But the case would be quite different were a regular siege undertaken. This must be commenced against the detached forts—against perhaps three of them; or if the siege *matériel* sufficed, it might be set about as it was at Strasburg. The operation could certainly be begun by the middle of October; and the fall of some of the detached forts would in any case be a gain, even should it afterwards become apparent that a regular attack on the main enceinte was no longer necessary or expedient. The previous capture of some of the works also would, under any circumstances, facilitate a bombardment; and even should this not seem desirable, their fall would render the taking of other adjacent forts easier, and would thus aid in bringing about a closer investment of the capital, and a more complete command of it from without, which would tend to increase the moral depression of the inhabitants.

Whoever studies the matter carefully and impar-

tially will be obliged to confess that the Germans were not in any way so well prepared to carry on war against fortresses as to execute field operations; and that, moreover, in their calculations they came upon unexpected factors which had been created by the conversion of the Napoleonic war into the French.

In the beginning of October, Trochu occupied himself chiefly with the interior military organisation of the forces assembled in Paris, and with the formation of troops capable of fighting without the walls in order to enlarge the extent of territory held by the defenders, or to be prepared for a sortie *en masse* when a relieving army should draw near. About the 10th of October news arrived in Paris of considerable movements in the blockading force, and of the departure of some of its troops to the south. From general appearances and from special information, it could be concluded that these had marched away to reinforce the army of observation which the Germans had been obliged to detach to watch the formation of the relieving forces; and if this was the case, it might with justice be further concluded that the organisation of such armies had already made some advance: whether this was considerable or not would become apparent if it were ascertained whether the Germans had detached so many troops as to materially weaken the investment. To obtain more information on this point, General Trochu ordered a great sortie to be undertaken on 13th of October, under the leadership of General Vinoy,

who placed the troops which were to be principally and really employed in the enterprise under the command of General Blanchard.

On the morning of the 13th, then, Vinoy caused a heavy fire to be opened from the three forts, Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge, behind which the main reserve was posted, against the heights of Clamart. After this had been continued for some time, the sortie troops were pushed forward—a marching battalion on the right wing against Clamart, a brigade under General Susbielle in the centre against Chatillon, and two battalions of the Mobile Guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel de Grancey, on the left from Montrouge against Bagneux. At first the French met with but slight resistance, and penetrated without much difficulty into Bagneux and Chatillon, taking possession also of the stone-quarries (De Calvents) between the last village and Clamart; but General von Hartmann, commander of the 2d Bavarian Corps, having succeeded after a while in deploying many of his troops and in posting his batteries, compelled them again to retire. The losses of the Bavarians in killed, wounded, and missing after this affair, amounted to 388, of whom 10 were officers, while the French give theirs as "inconsiderable;" but as it had been reported in Paris that the Bavarians had marched away, and as, nevertheless, the sortie was resisted by them, General Trochu was thereby led to form a false conclusion, as we shall hereafter see.

On the same day on which this sortie was made, the French from Mont Valerien set fire to the Palace of St Cloud; and during the following days the advanced troops of the 6th North German Corps posted between Chevilly and Choisy le Roi were frequently alarmed by movements from Villejuif.

On the 21st of October a yet larger sortie was undertaken, and this time upon the peninsula of Nanterre, being directed mainly against Malmaison, La Jonchère, and Bougival. The first line of the attacking force was composed of three columns: the right one, under General Berthaut, between the Seine and the Cherbourg highway; the centre, under Lieutenant-Colonel Cholleton, to the east of Rueil; while the third on the left, under General Noël, issued from the south of Mont Valerien. The three columns together contained 6400 men and forty-eight guns, and were supported by two reserves of together 4600 men and forty-six guns, the one in rear of the right at Nanterre, under General Paturel, and the other in rear of the left at La Fouilleuse, under General Martenot. The cannon of Fort Mont Valerien, and the gun-boats on the Seine from their station at Surênes, were to open fire at noon; the artillery of the first line was then to attack, and after it had played for some time the infantry was to advance, but the latter was expressly forbidden to push forward beyond the heights of La Jonchère. An extensive system of signalling, such as is usually only

employed in exercising manœuvres, was also arranged in the dispositions; but it is difficult to conceive what was the real object of this sortie, unless indeed it was merely and solely intended to accustom the young troops to being under fire. The men who were engaged in it belonged to the newly-formed 14th Army Corps, under General Ducrot, who himself conducted the manœuvre.

The cannonade from Mont Valerien and from the gun-boats on the Seine rendered the Prussians on the alert betimes, and the French, in their advance over the descent which slopes down from St Cucufa to Malmaison, encountered an organised resistance from the 10th division of the 5th North German Corps. These troops were immediately supported by several battalions of the landwehr of the Guard, the division of which had been occupied at the siege of Strasburg, and after its fall had been called up into the neighbourhood of Versailles, to St Germain en Laye and Port Marly. Moreover, the artillery of the 4th Corps also took part in the combat, firing from the peninsula of Argenteuil, and the 9th division of the 5th Corps posted itself as a reserve for the 10th division. As a decided advance of the French was not prescribed in the dispositions for the sortie, the battle was limited to a useless, but by no means bloodless, musketry engagement along the line from La Jonchère to the Porte du Longboyau. The real combat was finished by about five o'clock in the afternoon,

but a cannonade was kept up from Fort Mont Valerien until 6.30 P.M.

On the 28th of October General de Bellemare attacked the village of Le Bourget on the Molette brook from La Courneuve and Aubervilliers, and obtained possession of it by surprise. The Prussians, who had only occupied it with a small force, were compelled to evacuate it; and the French established themselves in it, and placed it in a state of defence. The affair was in itself of no great importance, but apparently the Prussians were vexed that they had allowed themselves to be attacked unawares, and therefore even on the 29th they made various efforts with small detachments to retake the village, and they also opened fire upon it with their artillery. These detached endeavours not having succeeded, on the following morning—the 30th—the whole of the 2d division of infantry of the Guard, and several other detachments of troops, were concentrated for the reconquest of Le Bourget. The force was drawn up in three columns: in the first line—on the right wing two battalions of the Emperor Francis' Grenadier Regiment, under Major von Derenthal, at Dugny; in rear of them at Bonneuil the 2d regiment of Uhlans of the Guard, and at Arnouville all the artillery of the 2d division of the Guard that was not employed elsewhere; in the centre at Pont Iblon on the Morée stream, Colonel Count Kanitz with four battalions of Queen Augusta's and Queen Elizabeth's Regiments, a

company of pioneers of the Guard, and three horse-artillery batteries of the Guard; on the left wing, under Colonel von Zeuner, at Le Blanc Mesnil, two battalions of the Emperor Alexander's Grenadier Regiment, three companies of the battalion of Rifles of the Guard, and two batteries of the 2d division of the Guard. All troops of the 2d division of the Guard not mentioned here held the outposts along the line Stains-Dugny-Pont-Iblon-Le Blanc Mesnil, while a few battalions of the 1st division of the Guard were brought up and formed into a reserve for the 2d division.

At 8 A.M. the three horse-artillery batteries at Pont Iblon gave the signal for the commencement of the battle by opening fire directly upon Le Bourget (3000 paces). Simultaneously with this, Colonel Zeuner crossed the Morée with his two battalions, having the two batteries on his right covered by the three companies of the Rifles of the Guard, and moved against Drancy, in order to advance thence against the south side of Le Bourget. As soon as they had crossed the Morée they opened fire upon Le Bourget, and Drancy, being but weakly occupied by the French, was evacuated without resistance, so that Zeuner was able to turn at once against Le Bourget. The columns commanded by Derenthal and Kanitz advanced at 8.30 A.M. in the direction of Le Bourget, the three batteries of the horse-artillery of the Guard firing uninterruptedly over the latter one. These two bodies of troops,

together with the column under Zeuner, entered Le Bourget almost simultaneously, soon after 9 A.M. The struggle for the village was extremely stubbornly fought out; house by house was contested; and the combat lasted for four hours—that is, until nearly 1 P.M. The losses on both sides were very great. The Prussians, according to their own account, lost 500 men, among whom were the colonels of the Elizabeth and Augusta Regiments, Herr Zaluskowski and Count Waldersee. The French on their side lost many prisoners, as must always be the case in an obstinate local defence where no reserves are at hand.

No great importance can be attached to the gain or loss of such a point as Le Bourget in itself, for the possession of the village might frequently be contested in the course of events. That its loss on the present occasion created a very bad impression in Paris, must be mainly attributed to the fact that the authorities and journals in the capital had loudly proclaimed that its gain was an immense advantage. To this feeling also was added the excitement caused by the announcement of the negotiations of Thiers with Bismark; and thus the loss of Le Bourget contributed to cause the manifestation of the 31st of October, the particulars of which we have before related.

During the early days of November a certain stillness again reigned around Paris. No more sorties of any importance were attempted; for the Government of National Defence was fully occupied, partly in de-

termining its position with regard to the inhabitants of Paris, partly in reorganising the forces of the capital. But long before, as early as the beginning of October, General Trochu had been more than a little attacked because of his inactivity. He had already answered these charges on the 15th of October in a letter to the mayors of the twenty arrondissements of Paris, in which he explained that it was impossible to undertake, unpunished, large sorties with the first crowds which could be collected, without proper arms, and without sufficient artillery; and that he was, even at that moment, striving to procure troops fit in their armament to attempt great enterprises, and also in some degree disciplined and unconditionally subject to military law. In his organisation he always followed the principle of taking volunteers for service outside the ramparts from the battalions of the Sedentary National Guard, and of reinforcing the active army and the Mobile Guard by such mobilised National Guardsmen. It was calculated that from every battalion of the Sedentary National Guard about a company of mobilised men might be obtained, and four of such companies were to form a marching battalion, to the men of which the best arms would be given, especially the breech-loaders, which were up to that time distributed without any rule throughout the Sedentary battalions.

By the end of the first week of November the new organisation of the forces of Paris was completed, and

we must here give some information respecting it. The collective forces of the capital were divided into three armies. Of these, the First Army, under General Thomas, was composed of the National Guard of the Department of the Seine, 266 battalions; of a weak "legion" of cavalry, and of a legion of artillery. It was destined for service within the walls, and to man the main enceinte, being distributed along separate portions of it. Of these portions or sectors there were nine, corresponding to the exterior arrondissements. Each sector contained on the average ten bastions, six of the sectors being on the right, and four on the left bank of the Seine. We give here these sectors in succession, with their names and commanders, only remarking that the 1st sector commenced at bastion No. 1, that the 6th sector ended with bastion No. 68, the 7th began with bastion No. 69, and the 9th ended with bastion No. 94.

The sectors then were:—

1. Bercy, General Baroilhet.
2. Belleville, General Callier.
3. La Villette, Vice-Admiral Bosse.
4. Montmartre, Rear-Admiral Cosnier.
5. Les Ternes, Rear-Admiral du Quilis.
6. Passy, Rear-Admiral Fleuriot de Langle.
7. Vaugirard, Rear-Admiral de Montaignac.
8. Montparnasse, Rear-Admiral Méquet.
9. Des Gobelins, Rear-Admiral de Challier.

The command of the artillery on the right bank of

the Seine was given to General Pélissier, on the left to General de Bentzmann.

The Second Army of Paris, destined for great operations in the open field, was placed under the command of General Ducrot, who had as Chief of the Staff General Appert. It was composed of such of the old regiments as still existed, of marching regiments, and of Mobile Guards, and was divided into three Army Corps and one division of cavalry. The appellation of 13th and 14th Corps, which the Corps of Vinoy and Ducrot bore up to October, now died out; and the Second Army of Paris had now its 1st, 2d, and 3d Army Corps. The 1st Corps (Blanchard) consisted of the three divisions of Malroy, De Maud'huy, and Faron; the 2d Corps (Renault) of the three divisions of Susbielle, Berthaut, and De Maussion; the 3d Corps (D'Exéa) of the two divisions of Bellemare and Mattet. Finally, the division of cavalry (Champéron) had but three regiments.

The Third Army of Paris, the command of which was originally retained by General Trochu, but was soon afterwards delegated to General Vinoy, with Lieutenant-Colonel Pechin as chief of the staff, was intended to defend the detached forts, and also to undertake local sorties. It was made up of marching regiments, Mobile Guard, sailors, marines, custom-house men, wood-rangers, and, lastly, of Mobilised National Guard. The whole of these were divided into seven local divisions—namely, the 1st division,

General Soumain; the 2d, Vice-Admiral de la Roncière le Noury; the 3d, General de Liniers; the 4th, General de Beaufort; the 5th, General Corréard; the 6th, General d'Hugues; the 7th, Rear-Admiral Pothuau; and, in addition, a weak division of cavalry under General de Bernis. The 2d division of this Third Army was soon afterwards constituted as an independent Corps for the defence of St Denis.

The numbers of these armies in the early part of November may be estimated as follows :—

The First Army at	150,000	men.
The Second „	90,000	„
The Third „	100,000	„

the Mobilised National Guard not being included in these estimates.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

ENTERPRISES OF THE GERMAN CAVALRY IN THE ENVIRONS OF PARIS.

IMMEDIATELY after the investment of Paris was completed, the four divisions of cavalry which were attached to the Third and Fourth Armies were detached on special expeditions. They were to explore the country on the left bank of the Seine as far as the Loire, and exact requisitions in order to replenish and keep full the great magazines of the investing army at Corbeil; and each of them was reinforced by a detachment of infantry of one or two battalions of the 1st Bavarian Corps, to render them more independent in their movements.

The 5th division of cavalry, Rheinbaben, had its headquarters at St Rom. Thence it sent forward, on the 30th of September, a great part of the 12th brigade of cavalry (Bredow), with six companies of infantry, against Les Alluets and Maulle. For the possession of these villages, and for that of Herbeville, fighting ensued, the Germans being opposed by French partisans; but the artillery of the former, after a time,

set the places on fire. On the 1st of October, Bredow destroyed the railway along the left bank of the Seine to Rouen, close to Giverney, and occupied Mantes. Advancing still in the direction of Evreux, Bredow learnt, on the 4th of October, that the French troops with which he had before had to deal had concentrated at Pacy. On the 5th, therefore, he attacked that place and Aigleville, drove out the enemy, and sent forward a detachment, which met with no opposition, as far as Evreux. On the Eure he collected large supplies of forage and of cattle, which were forwarded to the German magazines before Paris.

While these enterprises were being carried out by Rheinbaben, the 6th division of cavalry moved on his left along the railway from Versailles, through Rambouillet as far as Chartres. On the 2d of October it sustained a first skirmish with some men of the Mobile Guard at Rambouillet. On the 4th, Colonel von Alvensleben was detached with the 15th brigade of cavalry, one battery, and two companies of Bavarians, to reconnoitre the town of Chartres. In the wood of St Hilarion he came upon the advanced-guard of a detachment of troops of the French National and Mobile Guards assembled at Epernon, but speedily driving them in, he on the same evening gained possession also of the town of Epernon. On the 5th, Alvensleben occupied himself in levying requisitions, and returned on the 6th with the greater part of his brigade to Rambouillet, laden with rich booty, having

left a few detachments pushed forward in advance. One of these, a squadron of the 16th regiment of Hussars, was quartered in Ablis, a prosperous village near the railway through Vendôme to Tours. These horsemen were attacked unawares by Franc-tireurs during the night from the 7th to the 8th of October, and were either slain or dispersed, but few only succeeding in escaping. On the 9th of October, Ablis, the inhabitants of which were accused of being privy to the surprise, and of rendering service as guides, was scientifically burnt to the ground.

This was the first act which clearly announced the commencement of the "war of terror," although accusations had been long before made by each party against the other of not observing the recognised usages of war. We must confess that, after a careful observation, we do not attach much importance to such charges, for war is certainly in itself a cruel affair, and the savageness with which during a battle every man, even the most humane, becomes filled, is a natural phenomenon the effects of which cannot be restrained; and, moreover, such accusations have of late become a kind of fashion. In the war of 1870 the Geneva Convention gave rise to many such recriminations. But whoever regards the matter impartially must admit that not a few of the determinations of the Conventions could only be carried out by abolishing war altogether. As, for example, how can one party prevent its shells, which now range two miles or more, from sometimes striking

the enemy's ambulances, engaged maybe in collecting the wounded? But many of the French charges soon fell through. Thus it was asserted by them that the Germans, notwithstanding the St Petersburg Convention, made use of explosive projectiles for their small arms. For field-guns, as is well known, such are the only projectiles now in use—a circumstance which exemplifies the confusion which prevails as to humanising war. But French doctors have themselves explained how it stood with regard to this alleged use of explosive bullets, and from their statements it appears that the French troops mistook small fragments of the thin coating of lead which covers the projectiles fired from the German breech-loading ordnance for fragments of explosive projectiles from small-arms.

The cruelties, again, which may have been committed by the German troops in Bazeilles on the day of Sedan may well be overlooked, for they at all events were committed in the heat and fury of battle; and it cannot be expected that soldiers, when their blood is up, and they are hot with furious fighting, shall always listen to the counsels of humanity; and the same may be said also of the events which took place at Epense.

But the burning of Ablis was altogether another matter; and this cold-blooded destruction, calmly ordered and deliberately executed, stands in a very different category of deeds. And such acts happen now

ever more frequently; and to-day, in the nineteenth century, they are announced with all the candour and self-sufficiency that characterised the "great" Cæsar when he informed the Senatus Populusque Romanus that he had caused the right hands to be cut off some thousands of Gallic men who had dared to rebel against the same Senatus Populusque Romanus, and especially against him, the Imperator.

We have given ourselves much trouble to find out a case where such a manner of conducting war on a system of terror has led to any good result, but we have been unable to discover any. Even the much-extolled Manhés, fighting on a confined theatre of war, and simply against bands of brigands, were unable to effect anything with it. Napoleon I. lost much in Spain by waging war in such a manner. Moreover, we are most fully persuaded that the German soldiers who were ordered to carry out the cold-blooded destruction of this peaceful and prosperous village went to the work with heavy hearts; for must they not have thought of their own houses? And still more, we are convinced that the higher German officers who gave such commands gave them sadly also, and gave them only because they believed, in good faith, that good would arise from them. In our conception, that is precisely a delusion. For, in the first place, such-like experiments demoralise the best army; men soon grow accustomed to anything, and why may not German soldiers do hereafter in their Fatherland, from

pure love of them, those things which they did in France by compulsion. The indifference to acts of horror which characterised condemned murderers in the second decennary of our century, accompanied them from the times when, as soldiers of the first Napoleon, they were participators in, or witnesses of, similar deeds in Spain. In the second place, again, such means will never lead to a peace, but only to a compulsory cessation of hostilities; and it is certainly no advantage for us in civilised central Europe to retrograde two thousand years in such a manner. Can the annihilation of a civilised nation be advantageous to another civilised people? No! and this we can say without judging this matter from a higher and really civilised point of view, by merely applying to this particular case the laws of political economy, which have been so long and generally preached.

On the left, again, of the 6th division of cavalry, the 4th, Prince Albrecht of Prussia, operated along the railroad from Paris by Arpajon, Etampes, Angerville, Toury, and Artenay, to Orleans. On the left bank of the upper Seine, the heights of the Côte d'Or branch off to the south from the plateau of Langres, while the Morvan mountains trend away to the south-west towards the Loire between Nevers and Decize. From these latter, again, a chain of hills branches off, which, approaching the Loire at Cosne, runs along with it into the neighbourhood of Orleans, where it turns again to the north-west, to terminate finally in the

hills of Perche upon the peninsula of Cherbourg; and it is this chain of but low elevation which separates the basin of the Seine from that of the Loire. The only water-courses of any importance flowing from this water-shed are the Essonne and the Eure, which run into the Seine, and the Mayenne, the Sarthe, and the Loire, all of which join the Loire. The highest point of the chain is between Gien and Orleans, where it rises up to about 600 feet above the level of the sea, or 100 feet above that of the valley of the Loire. In the Perches, towards the peninsula of Cherbourg, it attains at some points an elevation of 900, and even of 1300, feet; and from them branches run off into the peninsula of Bretagne.

The chain of heights which we could only characterise as the water-shed between the Seine and the Loire, and which has in reality no general name, is covered on the right bank of the Loire from Gien to Orleans by the extensive forest of Orleans, and on this abuts on the north, between the Eure and the canal of Briare, the extremely fertile plateau of Beauce. Coming from Paris on the Orleans railway, Beauce is reached by Etampes, and the forest of Orleans by Chevilly; and on the more eastern line, through Malesherbes and Pithiviers, the forest of Orleans is reached at Neuville aux Bois.

The town of Orleans, with 50,000 inhabitants, lies on the right bank of the Loire, and is at the main junction of the railways which unite the east and the

west with the south of France. The principal communications from Bordeaux and Toulouse to Paris also run through Orleans, and the town, although certainly unfortified, forms a natural *tête-du-pont* for the enterprises of the French troops assembled on the left bank of the Loire for the relief of Paris. To the south of the Loire, adjoining Orleans, the barren unfertile plains of the Sologne extend between the Dhui and the Sauldre westward towards Blois; on them, under the Second Empire, large plantings of fir-trees had been carried out, which at present cover about 1000 square miles.

The 4th division of North German cavalry stood on the 4th of October in Toury. On the 5th a French detachment, which was estimated too highly at a division, advanced from Orleans northwards. The 4th division, threatened on its flank, retired into the northern boundary of the Beauce to Etampes, and to Authon to the west of it, and sent information of what had occurred to the Crown-Prince of Prussia.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE ENCOUNTER AT ARTENAY—THE OCCUPATION OF ORLEANS BY THE GERMANS, AND ITS RECONQUEST BY THE BATTLE OF COULMIER.

THE French troops which had penetrated on the 5th of October northwards through Toury, belonged to the germs of the Army of the Loire, composed at that time of the 15th Army Corps alone. The Corps numbered in serviceable combatants 30,000 men, infantry and cavalry, and was under the command of General De la Motterouge. This General was born in 1802, and received his military education in the School of St Cyr. In 1852 he became brigadier-general, and in 1855 in the Crimea general of division. In the year 1859 he commanded in Italy the 1st division of M'Mahon's Corps. In 1867 he retired into the reserve, and in 1869 was returned to the Corps Legislatif as an official candidate with a large majority over his opponent, Glais-Bizoin. General De la Motterouge had a well-merited fame as a good soldier, but he never made the slightest pretensions to the character of a military "genius." He knew full well that he

could not relieve Paris with the 30,000 men whom he had at his disposal, and he therefore confined himself to reconnoitring in the direction of the capital. Probably he would have done better if he had still further limited his movements. Evil-minded people assert that his parliamentary opponent drove him on beyond the proper military boundary. How far this is true, we will leave for future inquiry.

When the Crown-Prince of Prussia received information of the occurrence at Toury, he at once formed a detachment under the command of General Von der Tann to oppose the advance of the French Army of the Loire, the real strength of which was unknown, but which it was wiser to estimate at a too high rather than at a too low rate. The headquarters of Von der Tann were at that time in Longjumeau, the home of the gay postillion whom the celebrated singer Wachtel, himself a postboy once, represented so well. Under the command of the General were placed the greater part of his own Corps, the 1st Bavarian, the 22d division of the 11th North German Army Corps, the 4th and 2d (Stolberg) divisions of cavalry.

Von der Tann was first to advance to Arpajon to take up the 4th division of cavalry. On the 7th of October he arrived there, and on the 8th pushed forward his advanced-guard through Estrechy upon Etampes. The French, however, made no attempt to push forward, but on the contrary retired before the Germans, whereupon Von der Tann was

ordered to undertake himself an offensive movement against the line of the Loire. Complying with these directions, he on the 10th of October encountered at Artenay Longerue's brigade of cavalry, which had been strengthened by a few companies of rifles. A battle ensued, in the course of which Longerue was reinforced by General Reyau's division, and thus increased in numbers, the French maintained themselves in Artenay until 2.30 P.M.; but the Germans then bringing into action superior forces, their adversaries were compelled to commence a retreat, which was continued as far as the western part of the forest of Orleans.

At 6 A.M. on the next day, the 11th of October, Von der Tann began to advance again upon Orleans. On his extreme right was the 4th division of cavalry, which sought to penetrate to the Loire itself; on the left of this the 22d division (Wittich) was to march by Sougy, Huêtre, Briey, and Boulay, upon Ormes; in the centre was the 1st Bavarian Corps; and on the left the 2d division of cavalry, to observe the forest of Orleans and to explore and take possession of as much of it as possible. Of the centre—that is, of the 1st Bavarian Corps—the 4th brigade advanced upon Orleans along the road through Chevilly, on its left the 3d brigade moved upon St Lié, while the 1st brigade followed the 4th as a reserve. As they advanced, the 3d brigade met with a somewhat stubborn resistance. During the combat which consequently followed, the advanced-guard of the 22d division, the

32d regiment, remained in support to the south of Boulay. The artillery of the division, supported by a few Bavarian batteries, deployed between Briey and Gidy, and after fighting for some hours, the French were obliged to yield, although they had received considerable reinforcements, especially at Ormes, from the left bank of the Loire. General De la Motterouge had, in fact, ordered all his troops to withdraw into the left bank of the Loire and into the Sologne, a movement which naturally could not be effected without a certain amount of disorder. It was therefore not really necessary for the Prussian batteries to bombard the open town of Orleans, as they afterwards did, at 5 P.M., from Ingre; for, under any circumstances, General Von der Tann could have made his triumphal entry into the city on the evening of the 11th of October.

M. Gambetta was deeply imbued with the revolutionary principles of 1793. He therefore at once superseded General De la Motterouge, because this latter had not been able to gain a brilliant victory with 25,000 young and barely-organised troops opposed to 40,000 well-disciplined Germans. But to be consistent, ought not Gambetta to have caused the guillotine to be prepared for every defeated leader? Ought he not to have sent to the army civil commissioners with unlimited plenipotence, and with orders to place themselves always at the head of the troops engaged? Ought he not indeed to have

himself assumed the command of the main army to make it invincible?

It is in general true that one man alone can never achieve very great things in any matter; he must be supported. In war it often happens that a leader acquires great military renown without in the least meriting it, simply because the elements of the army which he chances to command are good and excellent. But if the God of War himself stood at the head of a host whose components were nothing worth, he would not be able to prevail. This is an indisputable truism. A good leader may arrive at some results with very moderate tools, but too much must not be demanded from him. General De la Motterouge might have manœuvred so as to render it difficult for General Von der Tann to gain possession of Orleans, and he might also have made the position of the latter afterwards in and about the town very uncomfortable; but it is difficult to understand how he could have prevented the capture of the open city, considering the quantity and quality of the forces at his disposal. Experienced generals called upon to operate with very young troops, may make mistakes through expecting too much from them, and regarding them as old soldiers; but M. Gambetta, who required that General De la Motterouge should hold Orleans at any cost, had certainly not the slightest comprehension of the relative value of military forces.

De la Motterouge was superseded in the command

of the Army of the Loire by General D'Aurelles de Paladines. This General, who was born in 1803, and had been in the reserve forces since 1869, had been educated in the Military School of St Cyr; and having spent the greater part of his time of service in Africa, had afterwards distinguished himself in the Crimea, at first as brigadier-general, and then as general of division. He was not actively employed in the campaign of 1859 in Italy, but nevertheless rendered important serviees in his post as commander of the 9th Military Division (Marseilles), by promptly forwarding men and *matériel* to the field army.

After he succeeded to his new command, General D'Aurelles gradually received considerable reinforcements—to the 15th Army Corps a 16th was added, and then the nucleus of a 17th. Thus strengthened, he determined, towards the end of October, to make an attack upon Von der Tann's Corps, and, if possible, to surround and cut it off. To this end the main body of his forces was to cross the Loire to the westward of Orleans at Mer, Beaugency, and, if practicable, at Meung, and then advance upon the line Ormes-St Père à By; while a strong detachment watched and disquieted Orleans from the Sologne, and the right wing, under General Pallières, composed chiefly of cavalry, passed over the Loire to the west of Orleans at St Benoit, and completed the surrounding movement from that side.

Such an operation, to be successful, must be executed

with the greatest precision and rapidity. But these two elements of success were scarcely to be expected from young troops with the existing insufficiency of their leaders and the inadequateness of their equipment—there being, among other things, a great lack of means of transport. With improvised troops, such as those of General D'Aurelles, only the most simple operations should be undertaken. The men may possess great bravery, but none of the other qualities essential to the success of complicated movements can be looked for. On the French side there was much nonsense talked after the first misfortunes about the so-called "secrecy of operations." For our part, we believe that when execution follows rapidly upon conception, it is scarcely necessary to attempt to keep the affair secret from the enemy; and that when, on the other hand, long weeks elapse between the time when the plan is formed and the day when it is carried out, then even the most perfect preservation of the secret by the inspired journals will not avail anything—unless, indeed, a most unexampled degree of carelessness and ignorance may be attributed to the hostile general and his staff, who would naturally not merely seek for information in the newspapers, but would presumably bethink themselves of, and provide for, every contingency.

As early as the first days of November, General Von der Tann received intelligence that French detachments, coming partly from the west and partly from the left bank of the Loire, had strongly occupied

the line on his right flank, from Mer on the Loire to Morée on the Loire, and especially the forest of Marchenoir. At that time he had present in Orleans one division of his Bavarian Corps; the other was pushed forward into the Sologne, while the 22d division had been detached to Chartres. Of cavalry, only the 2d division was completely at his disposal. With it, therefore, he made reconnaissances; and from the information collected, and from the reports of spies, he became assured by the 7th of November that the main body of the French Army of the Loire intended to attack him on the right flank. In order, therefore, to be able to await the arrival of the 22d division, and of any further reinforcements which might be sent to him from the blockading army around Paris, Von der Tann, on the 8th of November, evacuated Orleans, leaving behind in the town only the sick and a regiment of his Corps, and took up a position on the highroad from Orleans to Chateaudun, between St Père à By and Ormes, having his advanced troops pushed forward to Coulmier and Huisseau. It will perhaps not be superfluous to call to mind here that during the last days of October and the first of November M. Thiers was in Paris and Versailles attempting to negotiate an armistice.

On the morning of the 9th the detachment of German cavalry which was moving westwards through Coulmier came very early, at about 7 A.M., upon French troops, which moved forward to oppose them,

and a very obstinate fight ensued along the front Coulmier-Huisseau, and especially on the right wing of the Germans at Coulmier. The French had brought up all the artillery which they had ready, and on that day were very superior in that arm to their adversaries. The young French infantry behaved very well, particularly as an active advance was not demanded from them; and therefore, as it became dusk, Von der Tann withdrew slowly upon St Père à By, in the direction of Artenay; and from the latter place again on the following day, the 10th, upon Toury, where on the succeeding night the 22d division joined communication with him.

There is no doubt that the surrender of Orleans created a great impression in the German headquarters at Versailles, and was considered to be of more importance than in our opinion it really was. Orders were at once issued to despatch more troops to reinforce Von der Tann, and large forces had just become available for this purpose through the capitulation of Metz. Later on we shall see the use which was made of these and other troops.

On the French side, General D'Aurelles de Paladine spoke very modestly of the victory of Coulmier, both in his report to the Government of National Defence and also in the order of the day addressed to his troops. Very different was the tone of M. Gambetta, who saw in this success the beginning of the relief of Paris—as if this could be effected by a young army

which at a very high estimate numbered but 60,000 men, against 200,000 Germans accustomed to war. Moreover, he on this occasion so exaggerated the services of the brave and gallant D'Aurelles, that any wise man could foretell the certainty, not merely the probability, of his speedy dismission.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE OPERATIONS IN THE EAST—ADVANCE OF THE 14TH GERMAN ARMY CORPS UPON THE OIGNON, AND THE BATTLE OF OIGNON ON THE 22D OF OCTOBER.

During the last days of the siege of Strasburg, the Franc-tireurs and the men of the Mobile Guard gathered together in the southern Vosges had greatly molested the communications of the Germans. As soon, therefore, as Strasburg fell, General von Werder sent a column under General von Degenfeld into the Vosges to reconnoitre, to scatter any bands of partisans it might encounter, and to instil dread into the inhabitants. This column was composed of 6 battalions, $2\frac{1}{4}$ squadrons, and 12 guns. It was subdivided into three minor columns of 2 battalions each, with a proportion of artillery and cavalry. Of these smaller divisions one, the northern one, was to cross the Vosges, moving from Mutzig by way of Schirmeck; and the other two, the central and southern ones, were to traverse the mountains by various routes, and unite finally at Raon l'Etape and Etival in the valley of the Meurthe.

The departure of these troops from the neighbourhood of Strasburg took place on the 1st of October—the northern column leaving a battalion behind at Schirmeck to keep up the connection between Degenfeld in the Vosges and Werder at Strasburg. In crossing the mountains great difficulties were experienced, as the French had everywhere destroyed the roads or thrown barricades across them, although it is true that these obstacles were only partially and but very weakly defended. The first encounter was a very unimportant one on the 5th of October at Raon l'Etape, at the confluence of the Plaine and the Meurthe.

Meanwhile, by a decree from the headquarters at Ferrières, dated the 30th of September, the formation of a 14th Army Corps under General Werder was ordered. This was to consist of the troops which had taken part in the siege of Strasburg, with the exception of the landwehr division of the Guard, which was sent to join the troops before Paris, but was replaced by a new landwehr division, and of the 4th reserve division, Schmeling, which had been assembled in the beginning of October at Freiburg in the Breisgau. Simultaneously with this order, Werder received on the 4th of October his promotion to general of infantry, and on the same day further instructions to cross the Vosges with his Corps to attack and disperse the French troops which were being collected and organised there. For this operation he had just then only the

Baden field division and the 30th Prussian regiment of infantry, as it was necessary to employ the landwehr division of Treskow and Schmeling partly in garrison duties and partly in subduing the smaller fortresses in Upper Alsace. To Degenfeld he sent directions instructing him to regard thenceforth his detachment as the advanced-guard of that part of the 14th Army Corps already in movement towards Epinal.

On the 5th and 6th of October the troops of Werder which were to be employed in these operations left the neighbourhood of Strasburg for the Vosges. On the 6th, Degenfeld, in compliance with special orders appended to the general instructions, determined to occupy St Dié, and commenced to ascend the Meurthe. But as he marched, he was attacked at Etival on his right flank by strong detachments of French coming from the direction of Remberviller and Bruyères. This obliged him to halt, and a violent engagement followed, which concluded finally with the repulse of the French attack, but still the onslaught had rendered it impossible for the Germans to reach St Dié on that day. Degenfeld therefore remained during the 7th with his main body to the south of Etival, to secure the descent of Werder into the valleys of the Plaine and Rabodot, but sent forward detachments to St Dié, La Bourgonce, and St Bénoit, which places they reached without encountering further resistance.

On the morning of the 8th of October, Werder's columns, under Generals Laroche du Jarrys and Keller,

descended into the valley of the Meurthe at Etival and St Dié. On the 9th, Werder, having now concentrated all his available troops, established his headquarters at Raon l'Etape, and on the same day set his advanced-guard in motion from the Meurthe towards the Moselle upon Epinal, following it on the 10th and 11th with his remaining forces in four columns. During the advance small skirmishes took place at Remberviller, Bronveulières, and Arnould, and on the 12th at Epinal. On the same day Werder removed his headquarters to this last-named town, and thence ordered various reconnaissances towards the west and south. On the 15th he departed, moving along the Basle-Paris Railway, through Xertigny and St Loup to Besoul. This town was occupied on the 18th, the Germans meeting with no serious opposition to their advance; but still, whenever the faintest attempt at resistance was made, they shot down unmercifully and levied heavy contributions.

During their march upon Besoul, the Germans recognised that the centre of the French resistance in this district was the important town of Besançon. The town is situated upon a peninsula formed by the Doubs, has 47,000 inhabitants, and is surrounded with modern fortifications, which cause it to be ranked as a fortress of the first class. In the campaign of Cæsar against Ariovistus, the town, the old Besontio, served as a main point of support to the former. Between it and Besoul runs the Oignon. Close to the point

where it flows into the Saone, antiquarians have discovered at Moigte de Broye the battle-field of Magetobriga, upon which the proud king Ariovistus defeated the Gauls so decisively that his haughtiness thenceforth knew no bounds.

Werder could scarcely think of attempting to take Besançon with the forces which he had; but by pushing forward in that direction he might nevertheless succeed in enticing forth and defeating in the open field considerable portions of the young French army forming in those parts. By this, many advantages would be gained. The Germans, no longer immediately threatened by French field forces, would be able to operate with greater freedom in Alsace, and to undertake, besides, expeditions in any direction with their otherwise disposable troops. Moved by these reasons, therefore, Werder resolved to pursue the French in the direction of Besançon, and to this end caused his forces to move on the 22d of October in three columns upon the Oignon: upon the right wing, against Le Pin, Prince William of Baden; in the centre, against Etuz, Degenfeld; on the left, against Voray, General von Keller; while the reserve, under General von Krug, was to advance behind the centre upon Oizelay, smaller detachments covering and clearing up the flanks.

Degenfeld and Keller soon met with considerable resistance, especially the former, after he had gained the passage of the Oignon at Cussey. Throughout

the day he sustained the battle nearly alone, only receiving support from the Prussian reserve brigade of Von Krug,—Keller and Prince William coming up somewhat too late. But spite of this the Germans were again successful, and that against a considerable numerical superiority.

Werder, however, dared not venture to think of taking Besançon. As he had operated on the Oignon, so must he proceed likewise more to the westward, and therefore he now directed his troops upon Gray on the Saone, a thriving town of 8000 inhabitants. By the 24th of October he had concentrated there the main body of his troops, and sent detachments to the west and north-west towards the southern slopes of the plateau of Langres. These detachments had to sustain various slight skirmishes, making in them many prisoners from among the rural population, and shooting down by martial law, without troubling their consciences much about conventional rules, those who defended their country.

On the 28th of October, Werder deployed his available troops along the Vingeanne, a small affluent of the Saone, flowing into the latter just above the point where it receives the Oignon. In this neighbourhood, about Prauthoy on the Vingeanne, the battle between Cæsar and Vercingetorix was most probably fought, whereby the latter was obliged to retire upon, and shut himself up in, Alesia (Alise St Reine), the siege of which plays such a prominent part in military his-

tory. Werder established his headquarters in Reneve. On the 29th of October he purposed advancing upon the old capital of Burgundy, Dijon, intending to occupy that open town of 40,000 inhabitants, which was only a good day's march distant from the positions on the Vingeanne. With this intention he had already, on the 28th, pushed forward the brigade of Prince William of Baden to Mirebeau on the Beze; but on the morning of the 29th he received orders to establish himself in Gray, and from this important railway junction to cleanse the environs of the plateau of Langres, and so secure the left flank of the advance of Prince Frederic Charles, who, after the capitulation of Metz, was to repair to Troyes on the Seine.

Werder accordingly resolved to march with at least one portion of his troops upon Gray; but as intelligence had been received from Prince William that Dijon had been abandoned by the French forces, he at the same time determined to send forward to that town the two Baden brigades of Prince William and of Keller, giving the chief command to General von Beyer, who had again assumed the leadership of the Baden field-division.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE OCCUPATION OF DIJON ON THE 31ST OF OCTOBER.

On the morning of the 30th of October Beyer commenced his march, Prince William's brigade starting from Mirebeau, and that of Keller from Talmay on the Lower Vingeanne. In opposition to the earlier information which had been received, Prince William encountered opposition even when he arrived at Magny St Medard—very slight, certainly, at first, but gradually increasing in obstinacy as the Badensers advanced further towards Dijon by Arc sur Tille, Varois, and St Apollinaire.

The truth was, that on the 28th of October the French troops in Dijon had, by the wish of the municipal authorities, evacuated the town. It would really have been an act of insanity to have attempted to defend as a fortress the open city, although it is true that the scanty remains of some old fortifications still existed, especially on the eastern side, the quarter from which the Badensers would attack. If the military forces of France, which up to that time had been assembled, had been properly concentrated

in good time, instead of being disseminated in the defence of separate localities, more might have been effected. But now the population, especially the working classes, opposed the decision of the local authorities, and, on the 29th, crowded before the prefecture and forced the new prefect to promise the defence of Dijon. Marching battalions of the line came up in all haste from Beaune, Auxonne, and Langres, and to these Mobile Guards of the Departments Côte d'Or and Lozère, and Mobilised National Guards of Dijon, joined themselves. These collective troops placed themselves under the command of Colonel Fauconnet, and he at once took the necessary measures for defence—pushed forward a detachment, which was the one that offered the first serious resistance to the Badensers, to Magny St Medard, occupied St Apollinaire and the suburbs of Dijon, particularly those of St Nicolas and St Pierre to the east of the town, where the gardens are for the most part surrounded by walls, caused them to be placed in a state of defence, and then formed with the remaining a reserve on the south of the town.

Colonel Fauconnet himself fell early in the forenoon in the fight about Apollinaire, and the defence of that place became afterwards somewhat irresolute, so that after three o'clock the Germans were able to turn to the attack of the suburbs of St Pierre and St Nicolas. There the infantry struggle was excessively stubborn. The Germans suffered so considerably, that at 4 P.M.

General Beyer judged it expedient to cause the attack to be more thoroughly prepared for by the artillery, and accordingly the infantry was withdrawn and collected under cover of a bombardment. The Baden guns continued to fire upon the town until after dusk; and meanwhile Prince William's brigade was concentrated in St Apollinaire and Varois, where also Beyer established his headquarters, and Keller's brigade on the left between Couternon and Queligny. While the Baden troops were in the act of concentrating, a French battalion came up from Langres, and, covered by the darkness, fell upon the right flank of the Germans, occasioning there a short but violent combat, consequent on which it was compelled to retreat.

By 7 P.M. Dijon was on fire in seven places, and General Beyer then ordered the cannonade to cease. At half-past three o'clock next morning a deputation of the municipality appeared before the outposts of Prince William's brigade, and in the name of the town demanded a capitulation; but before this the French troops had been induced to quit Dijon, and had taken their departure during the night. The terms of the surrender were concluded at 10 A.M., the main condition imposed upon the town being that it should furnish supplies for 20,000 German troops, but only on regular requisitions through the authorities; and as a surety for the fulfilment of its promise to keep the peace, the town was to lodge a

sum of half a million of francs, which, however, would be repaid if it kept its word.

At 1 P.M. Beyer entered the town with his troops. His losses amounted to 245 killed and wounded, those of the French to about double that number. Only Prince William's brigade of Baden troops had really come into action, as Keller, by reason of the long march which he had to make, only arrived very late before Dijon. The town having been thus gained possession of, was left in charge of General Beyer, whilst Werder, in the first two days of November, moved with the remainder of his troops from Gray upon Besoul, in the environs of which the Franc-tireurs were again beginning to exhibit great activity.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 4TH RESERVE DIVISION — THE CAPTURE OF SCHLETTSTADT AND NEU BREISACH.

We have already made mention of the 4th Prussian reserve (landwehr) division under the command of General von Schmeling. After it had been concentrated at Freiburg in the Breisgau, it crossed the Rhine in ferry-boats on the 1st and 2d of October at Neuenberg, into Alsace, its immediate task being to take the smaller fortresses of that district. Schmeling sent a detachment to the left to the rich manufacturing town of Mülhausen, and turned himself to the north against Neu Breisach. This small town, which contained barely 3500 inhabitants, and had been fortified by Vauban as a bastioned octagon, was summoned to surrender, but refused; and even a bombardment from field-guns during the night from the 7th to the 8th of October, failed to induce the commandant to change his mind. General Schmeling therefore determined to diverge for the present against Schlettstadt—leaving only a detachment behind, before Neu Breisach and Fort Mortier, a detached work

situated to the east of the fortress towards the Rhine.

Schlettstadt, which has 10,000 inhabitants, is, as a town, of much more importance than Neu Breisach. As a fortress, it is, like the latter, a bastioned octagon; but its siege seemed to be more easily undertaken, as it lies nearer to Strasburg, and Schmeling could therefore the more easily procure thence his siege *matériel.* As a fact, he was reinforced from the latter place by siege-artillery, detachments of fortress artillery, and companies of fortress engineers, and also by a regiment of landwehr (Ostrowski) from Treskow's division.

The commandant of Schlettstadt, Squadron Chief De Reinach de Foussemagne, answered a summons to surrender somewhat haughtily. Schmeling, therefore, after he had received his reinforcements and finished his preparations, first caused a four-gun battery to be constructed to the east of the fortress and of the ground inundated by the waters of the Ill and of the Blind; and a cannonade was commenced with success on the 20th of October. Shortly afterwards, during the night from the 22d to the 23d of October, the first parallel was opened, at a distance of only 500 to 700 paces from the eastern side of the fortress; and at the same time six batteries, for a total number of 32 guns, were built in rear of it. From these a fire against the ramparts and the town could be commenced on the morning of the 23d. The batteries,

and also the first parallel, were completed with an incredibly small loss.

On the morning of the 24th the white flag was hoisted over Schlettstadt. By noon the capitulation was arranged, and Prussian battalions were marched into the town by the special wish of the commandant, to restore order, as the garrison, after refusing to continue the defence, gave themselves over to every possible excess. By four o'clock in the afternoon, these men (in number about 2000, chiefly Mobiles), having by the terms of the surrender become prisoners of war, were removed from the fortress, and on the following day Schmeling formally entered the town. In it were found 120 guns. Ostrowski's regiment of landwehr was left behind for the present to garrison the fortress; and on the 26th, Schmeling departed for Neu Breisach, taking with him the greater part of his division, and the siege-artillery concentrated before Schlettstadt.

On the 2d of November several Prussian batteries came into action against this latter place, at first on the north side at Wolfganzen and Biesheim; while simultaneously with them three Baden batteries on the right bank of the Rhine at Alt Breisach opened fire upon Fort Mortier, which was only armed with seven guns. This latter work, Captain Castelli of the 74th regiment of the line commandant, capitulated early on the morning of the 8th of November. On the 10th the commandant of the fortress, Lieu-

tenant-Colonel Lostie de Kerhor, was also obliged to run up the white flag. On the morning of the 11th the Prussians occupied the gates of Neu Breisach; and an hour later the French prisoners of war, about 5000 men, marched out. In the fortress the Prussians found 108 guns, as well as many supplies.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 14TH NORTH GERMAN ARMY CORPS DURING THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER.

DIJON had fallen into Werder's hands on the 31st of October; but at the same time he had been compelled to retire again upon Besoul, to keep up his connection through the Vosges with Alsace and the troops which were arriving from Germany. After success has been won, things appear very insignificant which in their time loomed forth as gigantic phantoms; and now General von Werder was obliged to carry on war with all his disposable forces, much as he had learnt to do in the Caucasus, against "impalpable bands," as they are called in the present military phraseology, —against the people, as will be said in a future military nomenclature. But Werder had, moreover, other strategical problems to solve, which were quite in accordance with modern military ideas. Thus he had to subdue such of the fortresses of Alsace as had not already been taken or attacked by the Germans. It has just been related how the 4th landwehr division obtained possession of Schlettstadt and Neu Breisach.

Meanwhile a new landwehr division had been concentrated on the 26th of October at Kehl, under General von Debschitz; and as this sufficed to form the garrisons required in Alsace, Treskow's division was set free to undertake other tasks. It was therefore destined for the attack on Belfort, and towards the end of October commenced to move towards it.

Belfort, situated on the Savoureuse—a river which, uniting with the Haleine, flows into the Doubs—is a small town with 7500 inhabitants, most of whom do not dwell in the town itself, but in the suburb De France on the west, of Montbeliard on the south, and of Breisach on the north-east. The original fortifications of the town date from Vauban. They are constructed on his third system, with tower *réduits*, and would form a regular pentagon if the citadel did not project forward in place of one of the bastions, and if a second bastion was not much retired for the sake of obtaining mutual defence. The citadel itself, La Roche, is in shape a small casemated crown-work, with three enceintes rising terrace-like one above another, and with ditches hewn in the rock. It stands on the south-eastern corner of the town fortifications, and has all the imposing effect of a strong old mountain-castle. It also was built, essentially in its present form, by Vauban.

The so-called intrenched camp extends on the north-eastern side of the town fortifications on both sides of the highway to Kolmar. It consists of

two main works—the forts of La Justice on the south, and of La Miotte on the north, of the road. These two are connected with one another by a continuous fortified line, and with the main enceinte of the town by two more fortified lines of a very simple construction, and the interior of the camp lies much lower than the works which surround it. Fort Miotte has a high watch-tower, visible from a great distance.

The railway from Basle to Paris, coming from Mülhausen, runs on the south of the town from east to west to the village of Danjoutin on the Savoureuse, and then crossing the river turns nearly north, and passes through a deep cutting to the west of the suburb of De France. When the line was constructed, the company was obliged to build a work to cover this suburb and the bridge leading from it over the cutting. This fortification took the form of a very flat hornwork with a long front. It was run up in earth without any covered spaces, and did not at all fulfil the requirements of modern warfare. Accordingly, when in 1867 the system of fortresses in France was subjected to a revision, the construction of new detached forts at Belfort was projected, one of which, the Fort des Barres, was to be placed immediately in front of this hornwork, and a second, and perhaps a third, on the chain of heights of the Perche.

The construction of the Fort des Barres was commenced in 1868, and was completed in all essential

details before the outbreak of the war of 1870, so that only unimportant additions were then necessary. The work was in the form of a large crown-work, having its gorge towards the old railway fort, and closed with a wall. It had large traverses and cavaliers in the bastions and on the curtains, especially on the northern or right half, with a view to defilade it from the spurs of the Mont du Salbert, which run out close before the fort, or at least at a distance which may be called close considering the range of modern artillery. The work was also amply provided with excellently-arranged bomb-proof spaces. The chain of heights of the Perche runs along the left bank of the Savoureuse, in front of the citadel, and therefore on the south-east of the fortress, between the villages of Danjoutin and Perouse, and from its hills a good view is obtained towards the Jura Mountains over the "Gap of Belfort." Upon this chain, General Lecombe in 1815 threw up several earthworks, which greatly contributed to the defence of the town against the Allies. Since 1867 no less than six projects have been drawn up for the permanent fortification of the Perche. At first it was designed to build two detached forts there, but afterwards it was determined to have but one; and the variety of opinion which existed was as to the form which this solitary work was to take.

When in 1870 war was declared against Germany, nothing had been settled on this point; still less had

the work on the Perche been commenced. After hostilities had been begun, two field-forts were undertaken there—one upon "La Haute Perche" to the eastward, another on "La Basse Perche" to the westward towards Danjoutin; a similar one was also placed to the south of the Fort des Barres at Bellevue, and, moreover, the latter work was joined by an intrenched line to the fortified camp near La Miotte.

The Government of the Republic named as commandant of Belfort Denfert-Rochereau, chief of battalion in the engineers, who at the same time was promoted to colonel. The choice thus made was an excellent one, which certainly cannot be said of all the selections made at this time. Colonel Denfert had for many years conducted the works about Belfort, knew the place and its weak points thoroughly, and was, moreover, a simple, quiet, thoughtful man, who had only concerned himself about his country, not about the Empire.

Belfort was certainly, through its fortifications, a much stronger place than Schlettstadt and Neu Breisach, and even than Strasburg itself; but still it was not by any means so difficult to take as the Prussian newspapers described it to be. It was only necessary to find the weak point to attack; but this was not discovered here any more than it was at Paris. It would seem that northerners coming from a flat district are inordinately impressed by mountains—even

by eminences which in a mountainous country would only be called hills—and that they are thereby led to take wrong steps in spite of all their wisdom.

On the 2d of November, Treskow's troops began to appear before Belfort, and on the 3d the place was invested, although certainly very incompletely. On the 4th, General von Treskow addressed a very peculiar letter to Denfert. In it he did not directly demand the immediate surrender of Belfort, but he gave the commandant all manner of counsels as to how the horrors of the siege with which the place was threatened might be alleviated. Denfert replied in a very humorous manner that the surest means to spare the inhabitants such a trial would be for Treskow to depart from the neighbourhood; but that, nevertheless, he had no great expectations that this most certain remedy would be adopted, and that, accordingly, he had taken other precautionary measures. Later on Belfort acquired a still greater importance, and we shall be obliged to return to it again. For the present we leave it, only remarking that for many weeks nothing took place in its vicinity, save skirmishes between the German investing forces, endeavouring to complete and maintain their blockading line, and the French garrison, which was striving to disquiet its adversaries and prevent the carrying out of their efforts. The investment was at first very incomplete, and the correspondence with the country outside was for a long time uninterrupted.

Treskow's division being thus commissioned to surround, and, if possible, take Belfort, which it was now in any case important to obtain possession of, as the German Government had declared that it intended to keep Alsace after the conclusion of peace, the 4th landwehr division (Schmeling) could be called up, after the fall of Neu Breisach, to protect the *etappen* roads (lines of communication), and to form a reserve for those troops of Werder's Corps which were disposable for field operations. With these, therefore, Werder could now act more boldly, and on the 12th of November he concentrated them on the Saone between Pontaillier and Auxonne. The Baden brigades were also called up from Dijon, and it was determined to take possession of Auxonne. This small utterly unimportant town of 7000 inhabitants was placed in the old French scheme as a fortress of the third class, chiefly because of its citadel; and Werder convinced himself by reconnaissances with his advanced troops that the place was occupied, that the garrison was on the alert, and that the fortress could not be taken by a *coup de main.*

Meanwhile the French forces in the neighbourhood availed themselves of the opportunity afforded by the removal of the German troops from Dijon to reoccupy it. Werder was greatly displeased at this, and therefore, on the 14th of November, he again marched upon that town. These French troops in the environs of Dijon belonged to Garibaldi's Corps. The latter, who

originally had established his headquarters in Besançon, and had there fallen out with General Cambriel, had moved to Dôle, and afterwards, owing to the energetic advance of the Germans, to Autun. At that time his Corps numbered barely 10,000 serviceable men. His Chief of the Staff was a General Bordone—according to French accounts an apothecary of Avignon, who, having involved himself with the tribunals by an immoderate love of his art, had withdrawn into Italy, and there changed his French name of Bourdon into Bordone. How much truth there may be in the reports of the criminal antecedents of M. Bourdon we do not know, but we can certainly affirm that this M. Bordone was a most singularly-chosen Chief of the Staff for a Corps which was to be raised to a strength of 20,000 men, and which was, by its activity in *la petite guerre*, to exercise the influence of one of 50,000. As a matter of fact, this man seemed chiefly to have waged war against the priests, and against the former adherents of the Emperor Napoleon III. But if Garibaldi was badly enough served on his immediate staff, he had at the same time some right good partisan officers in the Corps, ready for any bold and daring undertaking, among whom may be named his two sons, Menotti and Ricciotti.

It was, then, a detachment of Garibaldians which occupied Dijon after the Badensers had quitted it. Upon receiving information thereof, Werder, not hav-

ing any prospect of being able to take Auxonne immediately, marched again, on the 14th of November, upon the capital of Burgundy, and, as he approached, the Garibaldian party again withdrew. Werder, upon this, while his main force was being concentrated about Dijon, despatched two columns southwards, the one upon Nuits, the other upon Dôle. The first of these took the enviable route along the Côte d'Or, through the districts where Chambertin and Clos de Vougeot grows, and established itself firmly in those parts, as is easily conceivable, enjoying the good wine, and with its aid despising the dangers threatened by hostile roving parties. The column sent against Dôle had to sustain a more important combat at St Jean de Losne on the Saone, where they found the bridge destroyed.

Werder, holding fast to Dijon as a central point, confined himself to smaller undertakings against the volunteer corps, which, continually attacked and dispersed, ever appeared again and again at other points. As early as the 10th of November he had sent a detachment to the Seine, to seek to establish a communication with the army of Prince Frederic Charles. It arrived, after incessant fighting with Franc-tireurs, as far as Chatillon on the Seine, but was then compelled to retreat, and succeeded in reaching Dijon again through the Côte d'Or, having suffered but unimportant losses. Shortly afterwards, Chatillon was occupied by a battalion (Unna's) of the 16th regiment

of landwehr, and two squadrons of the 5th hussar regiment of the reserve. These troops established themselves only too comfortably in the town, and in the night of the 19th of November were surprised by a detachment of Garibaldians under Ricciotti Garibaldi. So successful was the attack, that the German troops only escaped with difficulty, losing 120 men and 70 horses; and reassembling on the north of Chatillon, commenced a retreat in a north-easterly direction, at first upon Chateau-Villain.

As early as October there had been much talk in the leading circles of France of a great operation in the east. An army was to be assembled there, and advancing from south to north was to disturb Alsace and break up the Strasburg-Paris railway, the vital artery of the German armies before Paris. Undoubtedly such an operation was rightly conceived; but in October the new organisations had made but very small progress, and if the French forces were not forthcoming in excess, it must seem to be more natural to assemble together everything that could be raised for the great and nearest objective of relieving Paris by the most direct means. And in reality the operations in the east were postponed, and we shall hereafter see how they were only earnestly undertaken at a much later period.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE FIRST AND SECOND GERMAN ARMIES AFTER THE FALL OF METZ — THE CAPITULATION OF SOISSONS AND THIONVILLE.

THAT simplicity of the operations of the German armies which characterised the first periods of the war, could not continue as hostilities went on. The wider the theatre of war became extended, so much the more did the struggle assume the character of a national war, and so much the more numerous were the secondary objects which the German leaders had to pursue and consider. It will therefore be well to recall to mind from time to time the general picture of the war, since the many details tend to obscure and confuse it.

In the middle of November, the picture, then, is generally this:—

In Paris an army has been formed, numerically at least very strong; the capital still maintains itself, and submits, in a wonderful and unexpected manner, to the hard conditions which a state of siege brings with it, while all the resources of intellect are being employed to discover new means of resistance, and

by their application to prolong the defence. Still it can be foreseen that the great town must be finally compelled to surrender, by famine or by something similar, unless relief arrives in time. The German troops before Paris are in quality superior to the newly-created French forces, and the more time they gain to intrench themselves, the more capable will they become of repelling, even though they be inferior in numbers, the sorties of the garrison of Paris, however well conducted such enterprises may be. Everything depends upon a timely relief from without. Should such an attempt succeed in reaching the German lines, a sortie by the mobile army in Paris will contribute greatly to the success of the enterprise; but this army cannot possibly execute alone that which the whole of France should endeavour to bring to pass.

For the relief of Paris there is ready the Army of the Loire, under General D'Aurelles de Paladine. Its advance along the road from Orleans to Paris, and the battle of Coulmier, have obliged General Von der Tann to withdraw in the direction of Paris; but reinforcements are hurrying up from all sides to the Bavarian commander, and it will be very difficult for the Government of National Defence so to strengthen D'Aurelles' army as to enable it to operate successfully against the Germans. The command of the army of observation, detached against the Army of the Loire, is intrusted for the present to the Grand Duke of

Mecklenburg. D'Aurelles can seek and may find connection with the Army of the West, which is forming in the camp of Conlie, or even with the Army of the North, which is based on Lille and Amiens, and he may be further reinforced by all the new troops which are being organised in the south-west of France, and which are assembling about Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Nevers. Will D'Aurelles de Paladine—will they who are to organise and bring to him forces for the attainment of the great objective—succeed in being beforehand with the Germans?

In the east things are nearly equally balanced. Werder cannot possibly achieve any great results with the numerically small forces at his disposal. But in this zone of operations the French are no stronger than he is, for although superior to him in numbers and in material resources, they are still divided by local considerations. The departments on the shores of the Mediterranean do not do all that they might, because they regard the war in itself as being still far distant from them. The department of the Rhone, and those adjacent to it, care principally to provide for the defence of Lyons; and thus Werder is only opposed by a few French detachments, which trouble him certainly, but which he can keep in check. His most important task is the capture of Belfort, but this he seems almost to have forgotten, being busied with collateral enterprises, and finding it apparently more agreeable to capture large undefended towns in the open country.

Meanwhile Metz and Bazaine's army have capitulated. From the first days of September until the end of October, the First and Second German Armies stood united under the command of Prince Frederic Charles before this principal place of arms of France; but after the surrender of Metz, the two hosts were now again separated. The First Army, placed under the command of General von Manteuffel, and consisting of the 1st, 8th, and 7th Corps, was to engage the French Army of the North, advancing itself in a direction from east to west, between the Belgian frontier and the lower Seine. It was further to capture such strongholds as were still unsubdued in those parts, and to establish communication with the coast, so that if the supplies by land should fail, provisions for the army might be procured by sea from and through England.

The Second Army, under Prince Frederic Charles, was to march to the south-west towards the middle Seine, and establish the communication between Werder in the east and the Army of the Loire, under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, which, after the battle of Coulmier, had been concentrated in the west. According to the aspect that affairs might assume, Prince Frederic Charles could throw his forces either eastward or westward, and wherever he might direct the main body of his troops, there would the chief command devolve upon him, a field-marshal since the taking of Metz. Thus he would assume either the leadership of the forces of Werder

or of those of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.

The 2d Corps, Franseeky, of the army of Prince Frederic Charles, was given up to the army of the Crown-Prince of Prussia, and arrived before Paris on the 12th of November, where the Würtemberg division was also united to it. With his remaining Corps, the 9th, the 10th, and the 3d, the last on the left wing, Prince Frederic marched at first southwards towards the upper Seine and the railway from Paris to Mülhausen. His headquarters moved from Pont à Mousson by Commercy, Ligny, Montier sur Saulx (5th of November), Joinville, Doulevent (8th of November), and Brienne, to Troyes, where he arrived with a part of the 9th Corps and the 1st division of cavalry on the 10th of November.

On the 6th of November the advanced-guard of the 3d Corps had an encounter with Franc-tireurs at Boulogne on the road which leads from Blesmes on the Strasburg railway to Chaumont on the Mülhausen line, in the valley of the Upper Marne. The French were defeated, but on the following day they again made a stand at Berthenay, immediately below Chaumont, and defended themselves obstinately against the new attack of the Prussians, but were finally again obliged to retreat, whereupon they retired upon the remarkable fortress of Langres, and a brigade was at once pushed forward to observe it. On the 5th and 6th of November the sappers of the Second German Army

restored the many places broken up by the French on the railway Blesmes-Chaumont.

In consequence of the battle of Coulmier, Prince Frederic Charles, with the greater portion of his troops, was called up to the Loire, to engage there the army forming for the relief of Paris. His headquarters, with the centre of the army, left Troyes to advance upon the Loire by way of Villeneuve l'Archevêque and Sens, along the Yonne and the Paris-Dijon-Pontarlier railway, and we shall soon see him again actively engaged.

Of Manteuffel's army, the 7th Corps remained behind for a time on the Moselle—one division garrisoning Metz, while the other was detached to besiege Thionville; of the 1st Corps, one division advanced before Mézieres, and a brigade of the other before La Fère, in order to subdue also these two fortresses on the Meuse and Oise; finally, the 8th Corps, the 3d brigade of infantry, and the 3d division of cavalry, moved upon the Somme upon Amiens, to engage there the so-called French Army of the North. The advanced-guard of the 3d division of cavalry came first into collision with the French at Le Quesnel, between Roye and Amiens, on the 23d of November; and later on we shall follow the operations of these troops after that day. For the present, we have yet to notice the fall of those fortresses which capitulated before the end of November, and which have not yet been mentioned.

During the time that the Germans lay encamped

around Metz, the small fortress of Thionville had been also observed by them, and at times molested. The troops to whom this duty was intrusted were continually changed, and their special enumeration would be of no general interest. But after the fall of Metz it was resolved to seriously attack Thionville, and Lieutenant-General Kameke, chief of the 14th division, was commissioned to undertake the task. Kameke, born in the year 1817, entered the Prussian Corps of engineers in 1834, became a captain in 1850, and was at the same time removed to the General Staff. From that date he was employed on the Staff in the Ministry of War and in the Prussian embassy in Vienna, commanding also occasionally bodies of infantry. In 1861 he became a colonel, and in 1865 a general. In the campaign of 1866 he was Chief of the Staff of the 2d Corps; in the following year he returned to the engineers, and at the end of it was intrusted with their leadership. In 1868 he was appointed lieutenant-general, and at the outbreak of the war of 1870 was placed at the head of the 14th division — although it was certainly remarkable to remove the chief of the engineers from his post just at the beginning of a struggle in which presumably fortress warfare would play an important part.

On the 13th of November, Kameke ordered the complete investment of Thionville. His headquarters were established at Hayange, and a post of observation was erected on the chateau of Serre. On the 16th of November the building of the batteries was com-

menced; on the 19th and 20th the siege-trains arrived from Metz, and the batteries were at once armed, while simultaneously the investing lines were drawn in closer. At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 22d the bombardment was commenced, when the following batteries opened fire on the unhappy little town: 1st, at Oberjütz (Haute Yutz), 4 field-batteries—18 6-pounders and 6 4-pounders; 2d, by the wood of Illange, 4 24-pounder guns, 4 12-pounders, and 4 13-inch French mortars from Metz; 3d, at Gassion, 4 short rifled 24-pounders; 4th, 8 long rifled 24-pounders from 2 batteries on the right and left of the chateau of Serre; 5th, in the wood of Weymarange, 4 short 24-pounders; 6th, before Weymarange, 8 12-pounders in 2 batteries; 7th on the road from Grande Hettange to Thionville, near the Maison Rouge, 12 12-pounders in 3 batteries. For service in these batteries, which lay between 2000 and 5000 paces from the fortress, 13 companies of fortress artillery were concentrated.

The fire, which was opened at 7 A.M. on the 22d of November, and which was at first answered with vigour by the besieged, was continued until noon, and then, after a pause of one hour, recommenced and carried on with the same spirit until 4.30 P.M. After that hour it was continued slowly but unintermittedly throughout the whole night, while at the same time the first parallel was opened against the west front of the fortress at a distance of 800 paces. On the 23d of November the besieged hoisted the white flag at

1.30 P.M. They did not, however, wish to capitulate, but merely demanded an armistice of twenty-four hours, with free permission for women and children to depart. The request was not granted; but Kameke gave a respite until 6.30 P.M., to allow the determination to capitulate to ripen. This, however, not being agreed to by the expiration of the given time, the Prussians again commenced the bombardment.

At half-past ten o'clock on the forenoon of the 24th of November, the besieged again ran up the white flag upon the church tower, and this time the negotiations for the surrender were speedily concluded. On the morning of the 25th, the Prussians occupied the gates of the town; and at two o'clock in the afternoon, the French garrison—about 4000 men—marched out as prisoners of war, and laid down their arms before the gate of Saarlouis. The Prussians found 200 guns in Thionville.

The fortress of Verdun, which, as we have seen, had been cannonaded as early as the end of August, was more closely surrounded after the 25th of September by a detachment of the Third Army; and when the surrender of Paris did not take place in the expected short time, and the security of the communications of the German armies in France with Germany became of greater importance, a serious attack upon Verdun was prepared. In the night between the 11th and the 12th of October, the Germans occupied the villages of Thierville on the left and of Belleville on the right bank of the Meuse. In the following night batteries

were constructed at both these places. But although the necessity of a regular siege of the place was provided for, a bombardment in reality sufficed to bring about the surrender of Verdun. Immediately after Bazaine's capitulation at Metz, considerable supplies of artillery became available for the besiegers, and the cannonade assumed a very violent character. On the 8th of November, Verdun was compelled to surrender, when 4000 prisoners, 136 guns, and 23,000 stands of arms, fell into the hands of the Germans.

Soissons was obliged to yield as early as the 16th of October, after being bombarded for fourteen days by landwehr belonging to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's Corps. By its surrender 4700 Frenchmen became prisoners of war; and, moreover, the Germans found 128 guns well supplied with ammunition, a war-chest containing 92,000 francs, a well-stored provision-magazine—sufficient for a division for five months—and depots of clothing and equipments.

The Castle of Ham, famed as the prison of Napoleon III. after the failure of his attempt at Boulogne, was evacuated by its garrison, and occupied on the 21st of November by Prussian horsemen of the 3d division of cavalry. La Fère, the main claim of which to distinction is the fact that Napoleon I. first entered as an artillery subaltern into the regiment bearing its name, capitulated with 2000 men and 70 guns after a two days' cannonade. The capture of Amiens is so intimately connected with the operations of Manteuffel's army, that we pass it by for the present. All these

small fortresses without detached works were of no real service to the defence—their capture simply increased in a very easy way the trophies of the Germans; and it may be said that their resistance would have been terminated even sooner than it was, if the fortress warfare had not been somewhat carelessly carried on by the Germans.

But although small fortresses proved to be useless in this war, the large ones played a most important part in it. At a future time we shall return to this subject, and show that if these great fortresses failed to prove fatal to the German invasion, it was owing solely to the unhappy French military organisation, which only allowed improvised armies to be brought upon the theatre of war after the events of September.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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